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To my beloved Lisa 
and to our kids 
Stella and Tom
  
  
I had a strange dream, or half-waking vision, not long ago. I found 
myself at the top of a mountain in the mist, feeling very pleased 
with myself, not just for having climbed the mountain, but for 
having achieved my life’s ambition, to find a way of answering 
moral questions rationally. But as I was preening myself on this 
achievement, the mist began to clear, and I saw that I was sur-
rounded on the mountaintop by the graves of all those other phi-
losophers, great and small, who had had the same ambition, and 
thought they had achieved it. And I have come to see, reflecting 
on my dream, that, ever since, the hard-working philosophical 
worms had been nibbling away at their systems and showing that 
the achievement was an illusion. 
Richard Hare
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Preface 
The goddamn thesis is finally finished! I started graduate school so 
long ago it has become an embarrassment. Former students of mine 
finished before I did – something that is, our head of department in-
formed me in brazen denial of the thesis’ major presupposition, “un-
natural and, hence, wrong”. A friend told me, in yet another misguided 
attempt at cheering me up, that a possible upside to working for such 
a long time on the dissertation is that my chapter on the evolutionary 
origins of moral thinking must be the first ever Pleistocene eyewitness 
account of what really happened back then. Oh well. Anyway, here it is. 
I wish to thank the many friends and current and previous col-
leagues who have provided support over the years. These include 
Sama Agahi, Jonas Åkerman, Gustav Alexandrie, Per Algander, Simon 
Allzén, Erik Angner, Gustaf Arrhenius, Andrea Asker Svedberg, Con-
rad Bakka, Lars Bergström, Katharina Berndt Rasmussen, Stina Björk-
holm, Greg Bognar, Björn Brunnander, William Bülow O’Nils, Åsa 
Burman, Staffan Carlshamre, Åsa Carlsson, Jens Dam Ziska, Hege 
Dypedokk Johnsen, Jonathan Egeland Harouny, Karin Enflo, Björn 
Eriksson, Romy Eskens, Daan Evers, Maria Forsberg, Anna Petronella 
Foultier, Lisa Furberg, Kathrin Glüer-Pagin, Jimmy Goodrich, Johan 
Gustafsson, Gösta Grönroos, Sören Häggqvist, Bob Hartman, Anandi 
Hattiangadi, Lisa Hecht, Mattias Högström, Madeleine Hyde, Mats In-
gelström, Mikael Janvid, François Jaquet, Sofia Jeppsson, Eric Johan-
nesson, Hana Kalpak, Karl Karlander, Mirre Khan Oidermaa, Ulrik 
Kihlbom, Simon Knutsson, Palle Leth, Johan Lindberg, Sandra Lind-
gren, Anders Lundstedt, Hans Mathlein, Andreas Mauz, Victor 
Moberger, Niklas Möller, Tara Nanavazadeh, Pavlo Narvaja, Jonas 
Nordebrand, Karl Nygren, the late Ragnar Ohlsson, Niklas Olsson 
Yaouzis, Sara Packalén, Peter Pagin, Martin Peterson, Anna Petrén, 
Mikael Pettersson, Dag Prawitz, Marcel Quarfood, Daniel Ramöller, 
Emma Runestig, Peter Ryman, Håkan Salwén, Stefan Schubert, Levi 
Spectre, Henning Strandin, Maria Svedberg, Gunnar Svensson, Kjell 
Svensson, Nils Sylvan, Claudio Tamburrini, Torbjörn Tännsjö, Folke 
Tersman, Amanda Thorell, Olle Torpman, Hans-Jörgen Ulfstedt, 
Emma Wallin, and Åsa Wikforss. 
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An early version of chapter two was presented at University of 
Gothenburg’s Department of Philosophy, Linguistics, and Theory of 
Science. Many thanks to organizer Ingmar Persson and all the others 
who participated in those discussions.  
I was most fortunate to be able to spend a semester working with 
Gilbert Harman at lovely Princeton University. I thank Gil and the 
many new friends I made while there, in particular Mark Budolfson, 
Angela Mendelovici, Philipp Koralus, and Jack Spencer. My stay at 
Princeton was made possible by grants from The Swedish Foundation 
for International Cooperation in Research and Higher Education 
(STINT) and from the Anders Karitz Foundation. I am very grateful to 
both of these institutions for their support. 
For many years, I’ve had a second academic home at Karolinska In-
stitute’s ethics group within the Department for Learning, Informatics, 
Management, and Ethics (LIME). I was given the opportunity to pre-
sent an early version of chapter four there, and I wish to thank my 
many good friends at LIME: Gert Helgesson, Annelie Jonsson, Niklas 
Juth, Petter Karlsson, Anna Lindblad, Niels Lynøe, Tomas Månsson, 
and Manne Sjöstrand.  
A third and more recent academic home has been DIS where I’ve 
taught a course on medical ethics for American students spending a 
semester in Stockholm. Many thanks to Anne Bachmann, Louise Bag-
ger Iversen, Kim Bergqvist, Jim Breen, Susana Dietrich, Natalia 
Landázuri Sáenz, Tina Mangieri, Mark Peters, Steve Turner, and many 
other friends and colleagues at both the Stockholm and Copenhagen 
offices. 
Jens Johansson was opponent at my mock viva in 2019, and I thank 
him for his many valuable suggestions. After that, Gunnar Björnsson 
and Krister Bykvist formed the departmental internal assessment com-
mittee and pointed to several remaining shortcomings which I’ve done 
my best to rectify. Thank you both.  
Thank you also to associate professor Charlotte Alm of Stockholm 
University’s Department of Psychology, who took the time to discuss 
virtue ethics from a social psychology perspective with me. She 
seemed baffled and intrigued that these results from the 1960s and 70s 
had been taken to such extremes in some quarters of moral philosophy. 
Her nuanced views on the person-situation issue reinforced my suspi-
cion that there was something fishy about that debate as it had taken 
place in philosophy. 
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Special thanks to my main supervisor Jonas Olson whose advice, 
patience, and constructive criticisms over the years have been im-
mensely helpful. Thanks to him the thesis rose again from a dormant 
state and I was finally able to bring it to completion. And then there’s 
co-supervisor Frans Svensson. Whenever I’ve produced something, 
he’s read it more or less the same day, sending back detailed feedback 
and words of encouragement and guidance. An expert on virtue eth-
ics, he never tried to dissuade me from my initial (and too hasty) ac-
ceptance of the situationist critique of character traits but instead qui-
etly demonstrated that some individuals just are reliably helpful, hon-
est, and kind. Reflecting on his role in this project I am reminded of the 
story of Lund University chemistry professor Charlotta Turner whose 
Yazidi grad student got stuck in a rough spot in ISIS occupied territory 
of Iraq while he was trying to save his family from genocide.1 Turner 
had the university security folks enlist a mercenary commando squad 
to extract him and get them all back to Sweden and his research. While 
militarily engaging the world’s most blood-spattered terrorist organi-
zation on behalf of her grad student was a pretty nice thing to do, it 
does not quite match the assistance Frans has provided. There are 
many things that need to align for someone to be able to finish a com-
plicated and protracted enterprise such as a PhD thesis but I know for 
sure I would not have been able to do it if it weren’t for him. Thank 
you.  
Thanks to a fortunate mix of unconditional love and ignorance of 
academia, both my family by birth and my family by choice have stood 
by my side over the years. Thank you to my mother Inga-Britt, to my 
sisters Karin and Marianne, to my mother-in-law Margaretha, and 
most of all to Lisa. 
 
1 www.nbcnews.com/news/world/how-swedish-professor-helped-rescue-grad-stu-
dent-isis-controlled-iraq-n947866 
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Introduction 
“That’s an empirical question” uttered in a philosophy seminar usu-
ally means the end of discussion. The development of philosophy since 
its beginning in ancient times has been one of dropping topic after 
topic, giving birth to new fields as they cluster into coherent wholes 
with research questions and methods of their own. What is left is a set 
of “eternal” questions or issues. Some even think philosophical ques-
tions by their very nature lack answers, or perhaps that they have an-
swers – only not ones we can ever find. In his introduction to A History 
of Western Philosophy, Bertrand Russell movingly characterized philos-
ophy as a “No Man’s Land” between science and theology: “Like theol-
ogy”, he wrote, “it consists of speculations on matters as to which def-
inite knowledge has, so far, been unascertainable; but like science, it 
appeals to human reason rather than to authority, whether that of tra-
dition or that of revelation.”2 
You can think of the separation of science and philosophy as one 
brought about in response to what kind of evidence is thought to be the 
relevant kind. If the question you pose can be answered by making an 
observation, or performing a more controlled experiment, we think of 
that question as belonging to the natural or social sciences. But, as Rus-
sell, pointed out, there are some questions which are not answerable 
just by accumulating more data or observation, and which nonetheless 
at least seem to make a lot of sense and be approachable applying, well, 
reason. Some of these questions are mathematical – and then there is 
this motley bag of issues we call philosophical: What is truth? What is 
knowledge? What has value? What makes acts right or wrong? And so 
it is that we think of philosophical problems as problems we can pon-
der just using our intellectual capacities to think clearly, make distinc-
tions, making valid inferences etcetera. Even though philosophical 
problems may connect to scientific issues, just doing more and more 
careful science will not directly answer the philosophical problems.  
While philosophers these days would typically think that the topics 
they are considering cannot be answered by careful observation and 
experimentation, and so is not reducible to some scientific inquiry, for 
our predecessors, the line was not as sharp. As Kwame Anthony Ap-
piah put it:  
 
2 Russell, 1946 p. 13.  
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You would have had a difficult time explaining to most of the canon-
ical philosophers that this part of their work was echt philosophy and 
that part of their work was not. Trying to separate out the ‘metaphys-
ical’ from the ‘psychological’ elements in this corpus is like trying to 
peel a raspberry.3  
I am pointing this out to illustrate how an interest in psychological and 
other empirical matters is not a new trend in philosophy but rather a 
return to the classic way of doing things: incorporating domains of 
knowledge and modes of inquiry to answer whatever questions we 
find interesting. So although “experimental philosophy” is a recent la-
bel to describe attempts to use scientific methods to shed light on or 
answer philosophical questions, the broader research program as such 
is not new, and if anything attempts to dissociate philosophy from 
other types of inquiry is the exception. 
This is a thesis on moral philosophy, and there are special reasons 
why, in this field, there is a long tradition of emphasizing the split be-
tween matters empirical and matters moral. The most famous wedge 
to be driven in between science and ethics was formulated by David 
Hume in 1739: 
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have 
always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordi-
nary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes 
observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am sur-
prised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of proposi-
tions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected 
with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, 
however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, ex-
presses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should 
be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should 
be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new re-
lation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different 
from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall 
presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this 
small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and 
let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely 
on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.4 
 
3 Appiah 2008, p. 13. 
4 Hume 1739/40, p. 469, While it is true to say this so-called Hume’s law introduces 
a wedge between the is-talk of science and the ought-talk of ethics, Hume’s project 
was also to incorporate ethics into science, subtitling his book “An attempt to intro-
duce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects”.  
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This has become known as Hume’s law, which in slogan form says that 
you cannot derive an ought from an is, or more formally that no moral 
conclusion can be derived in a deductively valid fashion from a set of 
non-moral premises. As far as I am aware, no successful counter ex-
ample to this law has ever been produced, and this thesis is not at-
tempting it either. The significance of Hume’s statement was perhaps 
not obvious to coming generation of thinkers, for it would not take 
long before some of them indeed wanted to derive an ought from an 
is. The fact that Hume himself so casually blended normative and de-
scriptive talk did not help either, and it is indeed unclear if what he 
meant to say in that passage is equivalent to what we now think of as 
Hume’s law. 
More than a 100 years after Hume’s Treatise, Charles Darwin pub-
lished his On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection – and 
people immediately started to think it had moral implications of all 
sorts. One idea associated (perhaps somewhat unfairly5) with philoso-
pher and intellectual jack of all trades Herbert Spencer says that to as-
cribe to a behavior or set of motives that they are “good” is equivalent 
to saying they are “more evolved”. Suggestions of this sort, i.e. that 
there is an identity between the evaluative and the natural, was at-
tacked by G.E. Moore who in his Principia Ethica considered it an in-
stance of “The Naturalistic fallacy”.6 According to Moore, “good” re-
ferred to a non-natural, irreducibly normative, quality, which could 
never be identical to natural properties such as “pleasurable” or “more 
evolved”. If what was good and what was more evolved were one and 
the same thing, asking “This behavior is more evolved, but is it good?” 
would be just as silly as asking “This behavior is more evolved, but is 
it more evolved?” Clearly, Moore, remarked, the first question is 
“open”, i.e. it is not obvious what the answer is, whereas the second is 
not open but ill-posed or has a trivial answer.  
There has been much debate around Moore’s proposals, both con-
cerning what it really means to say a question is “open” and just what 
kind of identity – semantic or ontological – is ruled out by his analysis. 
But the general lesson stuck: stay away from incorporating biology 
and psychology into philosophical ideas about right and wrong. The 
separation was further deepened by the logical positivist movement 
 
5 Weinstein 2019. 
6 Moore 1903, sections 10-14. 
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which came about around this time. 7 So for a large part of the twenti-
eth century, moral philosophy proceeded in a more a priori fashion, 
trying to steer clear of the empirical fields.  
1 The resurgence in empirically oriented philosophy 
The terms “experimental philosophy” or “X-phi” refer to a trend or 
research paradigm emerging within analytic philosophy around the 
turn of the millennium. If there is a founding father or specific individ-
ual in the modern era with which this approach is associated it is cer-
tainly Stephen Stich, who through his own work and that done by his 
many grad students was crucial for the expansion of this line of inquiry 
within philosophy. In The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic 
Theory of Cognitive Evaluation, Stich raised a warning that there may be 
much more diversity in how various populations think about philo-
sophical problems than had hitherto been assumed.8 Together with his 
then grad student Jonathan Weinberg and his former grad student 
Shaun Nichols, Stich some years later did an empirical study on the 
intuitions about knowledge ascriptions in so-called Gettier cases, find-
ing that American students and students in East Asia systematically 
varied in their assessments.9 In addition to cultural variations in peo-
ple’s intuitions about knowledge ascriptions, one study suggested 
there is also systematic cultural variation on views discussed in phi-
losophy of language, with Westerners and East Asians thinking differ-
ently about references and proper names.10 Other studies found gen-
der differences in intuitions about philosophical cases, or that person-
ality traits may predict views on free will and responsibility.11  
 
7 Ayer 1936; Stevenson 1944. 
8 Stich 1990.  
9 Weinberg, Nichols & Stich 2001.Though this finding gave rise to fruitful discus-
sions prompting philosophers to reflect on priors or assumptions, it has not stood up 
well and more recent surveys seem to find no cultural differences in intuitions of this 
sort. See Machery et al. 2015 and Machery et al. 2017 for these later studies. Gettier 
cases are cases where a person has a justified true belief and it is still not clear she has 
knowledge. See Gettier 1963. An enormous literature exists around this. For an over-
view of the issue, see Ichikawa and Steup 2018. 
10 Machery et al. 2004. 
11 For the gender differences issue, see Buckwalter & Stich 2014. Their findings are 
criticized in Seyedsayamdost 2015 and Adleberg, Thompson & Nahmias 2015. For 
personality traits as predictors of judgments on freedom and responsibility, see 
Feltz & Cokely 2009. 
 9 
These are all fascinating findings themselves, if only from the point 
of view of psychology. But for philosophers they seemed unsettling in 
that they called into question the reliability of our capacity to assess 
philosophical problems using intuition and considered judgment.12 
Admittedly, we do not really have to do experiments to get us thinking 
about such problems. Gerry Cohen noted that Oxford philosophers by 
and large accepted the analytic-synthetic distinction whereas Harvard 
philosophers by and large did not. Philosophers at both these prestig-
ious universities are clearly as smart and well-informed, so why would 
it be that there is such a divide structured along this arbitrary line?13 
Roger White noted that he probably holds many of the philosophical 
beliefs he holds because, more or less by coincidence, he went to a cer-
tain grad school with a certain advisor.14 Had he ended up in another 
grad school and another advisor he would have held other beliefs, be-
liefs incompatible with the beliefs he now holds. And those beliefs 
would have seemed to him just as self-evident and secure as his cur-
rent ones do. Origin stories like that has spurred a fruitful interest in 
philosophical methodology and so-called metaphilosophy. 15  They 
evoke a theme we will have reason to come back to many times, 
namely the notion that some background stories of how a belief came 
about seem to vindicate the belief in question whereas others seem do 
debunk or undermine the belief in question. 
2 The rise of the new empirical moral philosophy 
At about the time as Stich and his grad students at Rutgers University 
surveyed ordinary people’s linguistic and epistemic intuitions, philos-
ophy grad student Joshua Greene over at neighboring Princeton Uni-
versity came up with a new approach to thinking about the so-called 
trolley dilemmas. They can be worded somewhat differently, but here 
are three examples:  
 
12 In a paper ominously titled “The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy”, Antti 
Kauppinen argued against the value of experimental approaches for moving philoso-
phy forward. His criticism focuses on conceptual analysis and examining so-called 
folk-psychological conceptions of such things as responsibility, knowledge etcetera. 
Since this thesis does not examine or rely on that kind of data it will not be relevant to 
address the concerns he raises. 
13 This observation comes from Cohen’s If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So 
Rich? but I have only read of it in White, below. 
14 White 2010. 
15 See Williamson 2007 and 2020. 
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Switch, Bystander or Spur  
A runaway trolley is heading towards a group of five people further 
down the tracks. If nothing is done they will be hit and killed. A by-
stander positioned at a switch can redirect the trolley onto a side-
track, where one person will be hit and killed. Would it be morally 
permissible for the bystander to redirect the trolley in order to save 
the five? 
Push, Footbridge, or Fat Man 
A runaway trolley is heading towards a group of five people further 
down the tracks. If nothing is done they will be hit and killed. A by-
stander positioned at a footbridge spanning the tracks considers 
jumping in front of the trolley to stop it and save the lives of the five 
people on the tracks. He realizes he weighs too little, and so his sacri-
fice will be of no use. Next to him, however, stands a very large per-
son. By pushing that person off the footbridge, the trolley would 
come to a stop, although the large person would be killed. Would it 
be morally permissible for the bystander to push the large person 
from the footbridge in order to save the five? 
Loop 
A runaway trolley is heading towards a group of five people further 
down the tracks. If nothing is done they will be hit and killed. A by-
stander positioned at a switch can redirect the trolley onto a side-
track, which loops back to the main track. On this loop stands a large 
person who is heavy enough to bring the trolley to a stop, although 
the large person would die as a result. Would it be morally permissi-
ble for the bystander to redirect the trolley onto the loop track in or-
der to save the five? 
Philippa Foot formulated the first of these dilemmas in a 1967 paper 
on the ethics of abortion and the doctrine of double effect.16 Judith Jar-
vis Thomson later created the Push and Loop versions,17 and after that 
 
16 Foot 1967. In Foot’s version, the person acting in the first case was the driver of the 
trolley, not a bystander. I do not think this matters as long as we continue to make the 
following assumptions: 1) the trolley is out of control due to an accident, not negligence 
or sabotage; 2) if nothing is done the five will be killed, and whatever is necessary to 
save them demands an action of some sort: switching a lever or pushing a person. If 
we think of the situation as involving a bystander at the switch rather than a driver of 
the trolley, we may perhaps think of the bystander as more of either interfering or 
letting the natural chain of events play out, whereas if we think about the problem 
from the point of view of a driver, it seems more plausible to think of her as responsible 
for either outcome; there is no default. Personally, I do not think that matters, and in 
the recent literature the difference seems to have been obfuscated. Even if you are the 
driver, it remains true that, just as in the bystander case, inaction is an option. 
17 Thomson 1985. Thomson, who came up with the Footbridge and Loop versions, re-
fers to the individual whose weight is sufficient to stop the trolley as “Fat Man”. Most 
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there have been yet more versions concocted, but these three constitute 
the basic three ingredients of what has been called ‘trolleyology’.18 Phi-
losophers have used these dilemmas to probe into matters such as 
whether or not it matters that a death is brought about by action or 
inaction, if using someone as a means is always wrong, if there is a 
difference in intending for someone to die versus foreseeing that they 
will die and so on. The more philosophers thought about these cases, 
especially if they were of a basically nonutilitarian persuasion, the 
more complicated matters started to appear. Is there any coherent 
whole which could provide as justified and make sense of our intui-
tions about them?  
Greene had the suspicion that the explanation people have such a 
hard time formulating that theory X, has to do the psychological re-
sponses the various cases give rise to in us. He suggested that if we 
want to understand the philosophical disagreement around such 
cases, and the more theoretical underpinnings which they are expres-
sions of, we need to uncover the psychology behind it all. So he took 
the trolley problems to a psychology professor and asked if he could 
help him look into the brains of people while they are processing these 
moral dilemmas. The result was published in the prestigious journal 
Science and reached an audience far bigger than the little teacup that is 
academic philosophy.19 The trolley problems started to become a sta-
ple of not just many academic disciplines – philosophy, psychology, 
neuroscience, behavioral economics, cultural anthropology – but also 
of popular culture.  
There has since been an explosion of interest in empirical moral psy-
chology, often with a (tedious) focus on the trolley problems. This in-
terest has also coincided with, and gotten strength from, a contempo-
raneous celebration of philosophy applied to the social and political 
 
writers today refer to the person instead as “large”, “heavy”, a “bodybuilder” or some-
one wearing a heavy backpack. Philosophers are so habituated to pondering thought 
experiments of this sort, they all assume nothing else besides the two options de-
scribed is possible to do. They also assume the question is not what to do given uncer-
tainty about what actions plausibly lead to which outcomes. It is unclear if people sur-
veyed in various polls and experiments also consistently make these assumptions. 
People do have a tendency to avoid the problem by thinking there is third solution or 
inserting doubts about the plausibility of the causal claims the dilemmas presuppose. 
These methodological worries are discussed in Ahlenius & Tännsjö 2012. 
18 The term ‘trolleyology’ (in this sense) originates with Appiah 2008, p. 89. For a 
comprehensive and very readable history of the trolley dilemmas, see Edmunds 2014.  
19 Greene et al. 2001. 
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domains, since it has been suggested that something like figuring out 
solutions to the trolley dilemmas is involved in programming the be-
havior of self-driving cars. Should the car act so as to maximize sur-
vival chances of its occupants regardless of the costs to others? If the 
only way the car can avoid crashing into a kindergarten is to crash in 
to a pedestrian, should it? This meant the trolley dilemmas went from 
being a set of obscure thought experiments in academic philosophy to 
something that seemed to be a key factor in an emerging technological 
and logistical development potentially affecting billions.20 And moral 
philosophy was at the center of it all. 
Many additional factors together help explain the increased interest 
in empirical approaches to moral philosophy. Greene was lucky that 
the fMRI technique was just being developed and that Princeton 
housed one of the first used for non-medical purposes. Hume would 
certainly have wanted such a machine, but it was not available to him. 
The time was simply right. Another factor is that the world’s most fa-
mous philosopher, Peter Singer, wrote favorably about Greene’s find-
ings and conclusions, making them well-known to a wide audience 
both within and outside of academic philosophy.21  
In December of 2002, Daniel Kahneman (together with Vernon 
Smith) received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, for 
“for having integrated insights from psychological research into eco-
nomic science”.22 So it is fair to say there was at the time a general in-
terest in recruiting insights from psychology to other neighboring 
fields, and the pictures emerging of human psychology both from 
Kahneman’s and Greene’s research are quite similar, and Greene ex-
plicitly builds on insights from Kahneman (and his deceased collabo-
rator Amos Tversky). Both behavioral economics and experimental 
moral philosophy are research programs which seek to incorporate an 
empirically adequate, as opposed to an assumed or idealized, view of 
human psychology into their respective bodies of research. 
Greene’s work is unquestionably the main cause the trolley dilem-
mas escaped the academic discussions of moral philosophers and 
made their appearance in psychology, comparative anthropology, dis-
cussions about the ethics of self-driving cars, magazines and even tv 
 
20 See Nyholm & Smids 2016, and Kauppinen forthcoming. For a large survey of 
people’s ideas about how such vehicles should be programmed, see Awad et al. 2018. 
21 Singer 2005 and, for a wider audience in a syndicated column, Singer 2007. 
22 www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2002/kahneman/facts/ 
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series.23 After Greene’s experiments, the trolley dilemmas became the 
hub of empirically oriented ethics, and in many ways the public face 
of ethics.24 Being such thankful ways of introducing the longstanding 
conflict between utilitarian and deontological ways of addressing 
moral problems, they have proved irresistible tools in both teaching 
and in the empirical study of moral judgment. To an extent I think their 
popularity makes moral philosophy seem silly and out of touch with 
real-world problems, not to mention real world psychology. For all 
their merits, it would be absurd and impoverished to believe we can 
come to understand and assess all of moral thinking by exclusively 
dwelling on these contrived scenarios. Having said that, I am method-
ologically promiscuous and welcome confronting moral theories with 
any kind of evidence we may think is of relevance in making up our 
minds about their plausibility. Real cases, imagined cases, practically 
impossible but logically possible cases, consistency with other views 
we believe we have reason to believe etcetera – all of these facets are 
legitimate checkpoints when doing moral philosophy. To my aware-
ness, there is pretty widespread agreement on this stance actually, but 
it is worth mentioning to anyone who has peeked in on ethics or ex-
perimental philosophy and walked away with the impression we are 
only thinking about weird thought experiments. We shouldn’t, and we 
aren’t.  
3 The plan of this thesis 
As you can see, there is at present a return to psychological and bio-
logical issues bordering on moral philosophy. This renewed interest is 
often not in the business of anchoring morality in, or somehow deriv-
ing it from, biology, but is rather employed in a skeptical or destructive 
enterprise: to use findings and ideas from evolutionary theory or psy-
chology to one way or the other undermine various views in moral phi-
losophy.25 This way of employing findings in psychology and evolu-
tionary theory will be a recurring theme throughout this book. 
The thesis is a monograph, but perhaps a somewhat eclectic one. 
The various chapters are bound together by un overarching question: 
 
23 I am thinking of The Good Place and Orange Is the New Black, as discussed in Eliza-
beth Yuko’s 2017 Atlantic piece. 
24 See for instance Davis 2015. 
25 In works of a more popular kind, not written by academic philosophers, one can 
see subtitles as “How Science Can Determine Human Values” (to Sam Harris’ The 
Moral Landscape. 
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what can the philosophical field of ethical theory learn from absorbing 
what is being done in evolutionary, cognitive, social, and developmen-
tal psychology, where morality is studied not primarily from the point 
of view of right and wrong but as a way of coming to understand its 
role in human life? But the thesis is less eclectic than first impressions 
perhaps convey. Although spanning many seemingly disparate issues 
in moral philosophy – the ongoing discussion between consequential-
ists and deontologists, the possibility of justifying some ethical claims 
by giving them status of self-evident truths, the plausibility of thinking 
of ethics as centered around notions of virtue and vice etcetera – there 
are common links tying all of these debates together, namely the psy-
chobiological underpinnings of our moral emotions, thoughts and be-
haviors. Claims of innateness are implied both in the debates covered 
in chapters 2 and 3, on the philosophical relevance of neuroscientific 
and evolutionary debunking approaches to moral judgments respec-
tively. And the seemingly separate debate, addressed in chapter 4, on 
the challenge from social psychology to virtue ethics, is likewise 
linked, or that is my contention at least, to the psycho-evolutionary 
findings and theories which hold center stage in the innateness chap-
ter.  
4 Moral innateness 
Chapter 1 examines the basis of our capacity for moral cognition. Is 
thinking in moral terms something humans do sort of as a spin-off ef-
fect of having language and living together, or is it rather “hard-
wired”? This inquiry takes me into evolutionary psychology and bio-
logical anthropology. There are many options in this debate, with var-
ious grand psycho-evolutionary models about the nature of moral 
judgments and the moral emotions or, for short, morality. I will not 
take a definitive stance among the options, but will present and defend 
enough to make it likely that moral innateness in a specific enough 
sense is plausible. Though here and there in the chapter I reveal my 
adaptationist inclinations, I believe what I ultimately try to establish is 
not too outlandish and may be arrived at from various starting points, 
namely the idea that evolution has provided us with a set of emotional 
responses which lead us to moralize in some ways rather than others. 
This psycho-evolutionary background, and the more particular con-
clusion about emotions, will then be of relevance for the ensuing two 
chapters, which link moral judgment and cognition to the debate in 
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ethical theory, in particular the conflict between consequentialist and 
deontologist normative theories. 
5 What pushes our moral buttons? The neuroscience of moral 
judgment 
In chapter 2, I describe the immensely influential research by Joshua 
Greene, the philosopher who borrowed a brain scanner to see what 
happens inside our heads when we engage in moral problem-solving. 
Greene and others then invoked these findings in the debate over 
which is the more plausible ethical position, deontology or utilitarian-
ism. As we will see it is not by trying to bypass Hume, but by using 
these empirical data in a more indirect way, that he aims to undermine 
intuitive support for deontology and remove some of the resistance to 
utilitarianism. 
Greene draws from a wealth of evidence – brain imaging, research 
on heuristics and biases, evolutionary theory, surveys, anthropology, 
forensic psychiatry and other kinds of data – to defend a theory he 
calls the dual process theory of moral judgment. The dual process the-
ory, roughly, says that there are two kinds of mental processes respon-
sible for producing moral judgments. One component occurs quick 
and automatic and the other is more time-consuming and deliberate. 
The two forces, as it were, fight it out within us, leading us to some-
times accept verdicts produced by an unreflective automatic process, 
and other times to side with the more cognitively demanding verdict 
of the second type of processing. This empirical theory of moral psy-
chology, in turn, Greene believes, may be invoked to undermine some 
of the intuitive support for deontological approaches to ethics while 
leaving utilitarian approaches relatively unharmed. The last fifteen or 
so years have seen an intense discussion, both from the point of view 
of science and moral philosophy, accepting, assessing and rebutting 
this challenge. In this chapter I look at the dual process view and its 
relevance for moral philosophy. While being largely sympathetic to 
Greene’s claims, defending him against some of the criticism formu-
lated by Selim Berker, I argue that a certain degree of restraint is called 
for.  
6 Bracketing our evolved psychology 
Bringing chapters 1 and 2 together to discuss the implications of an 
evolved tendency to moralize in a certain way and the ongoing debate 
over utilitarianism and its contenders, I turn in chapter 3 to a proposal 
by Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer on the lines that we 
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can get at ethical truths using reason to counteract some of our evolved 
biases. Lazari-Radek and Singer fruitfully try to merge two projects: 
that of answering the evolutionary debunking of moral beliefs made 
famous by e.g. Sharon Street, on the one hand, and, on the other, that 
of adjudicating between what they call the demands of ethics and the 
demands of rational egoism. Answering this latter challenge in favor 
of the ethical primacy is also an answer to the evolutionary challenge 
more generally, they claim. And not only that, the special way, in-
spired by Henry Sidgwick, that this conflict is resolved also shows, 
they claim, that the kind of general evolutionary debunking of ethical 
beliefs made popular by Street and others does not target the kind of 
impartial ethical beliefs undergirding utilitarianism but only a subset 
of ethical beliefs more conducive to deontological modes of thinking 
in ethics. As much as I would want this to be successful, my assessment 
is largely negative. My skepticism towards this project mainly stem 
from two sources. One source has to do with their reliance on an intu-
itionist moral epistemology in contrast to a more coherentist one, 
which makes more explicit use of a reflective equilibrium style of jus-
tification, as opposed to a foundationalist. The others source of skepti-
cism towards their specific project has to do with the difficulties of in-
sulating one kind of ethical judgments (those favoring utilitarianism) 
from other kinds of ethical judgments. Once we put on the skeptic 
glasses of evolutionary debunking, it is hard avoid its corrosive effects 
on all ethical judgments, deontological or otherwise. The current dis-
cussion on evolutionary debunking strategies is a flourishing field, 
with most contributions approaching the matter from a metaethical 
point of view. Since Lazari-Radek and Singer explicitly invoke evolu-
tionary debunking (and its remedy) to support a specific normative 
theory, viz. utilitarianism, I focus in this chapter on that form of re-
sponse to the debunking challenge. 
7 Lack of character? 
In chapter 4, I turn to a different way of using psychological research 
to influence a debate in moral philosophy: the attack on virtue ethics 
using social psychology. According to this critique, which has been 
voiced notably by John Doris and Gilbert Harman, the behavior of hu-
man beings is simply not the result of them having different character 
traits. Instead, according to the challenge at hand, the dynamics of the 
social situation, including many features we are not even aware of, ex-
plain what makes us do what we do. 
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Though I agree that some of the defenses that virtue ethicists have 
offered could have been better, I also try to help them, by offering the 
evolutionary-biological account of human behavior presented in ear-
lier chapters. What we know of human psychology anchored in such 
an understanding speaks against thinking of us as autumn leaves 
flown around by the wind. And a more updated reading of the scien-
tific evidence bears this out too. Still, one may worry that my psycho-
biological attempts to save virtue ethics from situationist social psy-
chology was just taking it out of the frying pan and into the fire. I be-
lieve that the situationist challenge, if correct, would have been worse 
for virtue ethics and that there remains good hope that it can be wed-
ded to a modern and accurate psychology. The overall conclusions is 
that, because virtue ethics is the normative ethical view most imbued 
with assumptions about human psychology, it is particularly vulnera-
ble to what the empirical science of psychology actually warrants. 
8 Why this? 
There are many issues in philosophy where an experimental angle has 
been applied to shed light on entrenched debates. In this thesis, I focus 
on empirical work with a direct bearing on debates in ethical theory. I 
wanted to create an invigorating collision between such work and the 
basic contenders in normative ethics – consequentialism, deontology, 
and virtue ethics – to examine if these debates could in any way be re-
solved or at least be advanced as a result. There has been other exper-
imental work done on matters of relevance for ethics, such as freedom 
of the will and moral responsibility, or the links between accepting a 
moral view and being disposed to act on it. That kind of research is of 
course highly interesting but does not directly challenge any of these 
basic moral outlooks.
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1 Is Morality Innate? 
In a study published in Nature 2003, Capuchin monkeys were trained 
to return from their cage a token and receive a piece of cucumber as 
reward. Fans of cucumber, the monkey kept returning the tokens again 
and again. When a conspecific in a neighboring cage all of a sudden 
received a grape (which is sweeter and more highly valued) for the 
same task, the recipient of cucumber would demonstratively throw 
away the cucumber and refuse to continue the exercise. The tendency 
not to accept the cucumber was even stronger when the neighbor re-
ceived the grape without returning the token (i.e. getting the reward 
without the effort).26  
So, monkeys do not like it when they are rewarded comparatively 
less. When presenting a video of the spurned monkey’s refusal to play 
along, de Waal quipped that the sequence was “basically the [occupy] 
Wall street protest” (i.e. reaction to perceived injustice).27 Such capti-
vating and human-like behavior in closely related non-human animals 
inspire reflection on the psycho-emotional bases and evolutionary or-
igins of the more advanced but related moral psychology that we see 
in humans. Do these observations support, as the authors of the study 
suggest, “an early evolutionary origin of inequity aversion”?28 
Is there, then, a biological basis for our proclivity to evaluate the 
behavior of others and ourselves in moral terms? In a sense, the answer 
is trivially yes. We already knew that, say, pet lizards sharing much of 
the environment of human children do not come to moralize the be-
havior of self and others the way their human mini masters come to 
do. Something about human and lizard biology accounts for that dif-
ference. Granted, lizards are very alien creatures. What about closer 
relatives, such as other primates? As we saw above, some researchers 
talk about the building blocks of moral cognition being present there.29 
And if, in some sense yet to be specified, moral capacity is innate, find-
ing its root among our closest relatives would be an important piece of 
 
26 Brosnan & de Waal 2003. 
27 https://youtu.be/meiU6TxysCg. 
28 Brosnan & de Waal 2003, p. 297. 
29 Frans de Waal has famously argued for the evolutionary continuities of human 
morality and its roots in primate psychology. In addition to the study on Capuchin 
monkeys and unequal pay, see Procter et al. 2013. See also Henrich & Silk 2013, Hea-
ney, Russell, and Taylor 2017, and Brosnan & de Waal 2014.  
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evidence. This chapter examines various interpretations of the claim 
that morality is “innate”, and defends what has been called a strong or 
even “immodest” version of innateness.30 I do this by looking at work 
from developmental, evolutionary, and cognitive psychology, as well 
as ethology. I present the contours of two current grand theories of 
moral innateness, viz. Jonathan Haidt’s “Moral foundations” and John 
Mikhail’s “Universal grammar”, arguing that all these various sources 
give us plausible grounds for accepting the immodest view. 
Why would philosophers be concerned with the possible biological 
bases of morality? Well for one, there is simply the attraction of 
Wilfred Sellars’ dictum that philosophy is about coming to ”under-
stand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang to-
gether in the broadest possible sense of the term”.31 Ethics – under-
stood as the traditional fields of metaethics, normative theory, and ap-
plied ethics – is of course an integral part of philosophy, but following 
Sellars it is also the business of philosophy to come to understand how 
this field hang together with all the phenomena (psychological, biolog-
ical, linguistic etcetera) surrounding the traditionally “pure” domains 
of philosophical inquiry. Another reason is that philosophers can con-
tribute to the advancement of this research by providing their exper-
tise, both about moral philosophy and a general competence in con-
ceptual analysis, clarity and rigor of reasoning. Additionally, we want 
to find out if there are any implications for moral philosophy depending 
on the answer to the innateness question. Maybe there are no interest-
ing relations between moral philosophy and the issue of the proposed 
biological capacity to think and feel in moral terms. Or perhaps, quite 
to the contrary, these findings, depending on what they are more spe-
cifically, could serve to vindicate, refute, undermine or support a given 
theory or view in normative or meta ethics. Such ancillary questions 
will be addressed in later chapters. In this chapter I will describe the 
varying ideas that may be called moral innateness, and will try to make 
it plausible that there is indeed a sense in which moral innateness is 
true.  
The issue of the biological underpinnings (or lack thereof) of moral-
ity is part of a larger discussion about the makeup of human psychol-
ogy – an exploration of human nature if you will. Although it is a given 
that we approach this topic with the understanding that our psychol-
ogy, like our organs and bodily functions, is the product of millions of 
 
30 Prinz 2009, p. 168. See more below. 
31 Sellars 1962, p. 35.  
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years of evolution, it is a contested question just how finely chiseled 
the mechanisms of our psychology and behavioral repertoire are. The 
research program called Evolutionary Psychology (an offshoot of soci-
obiology) is usually taken to be committed to the idea of massive mod-
ularity, i.e. the notion that our psyches are made up of a multitude of 
specialized, genetically grounded algorithms or computational mech-
anisms that evolved to solve certain problems faced by our ancestors.32 
One such module, or set of modules, might very well be a moral ap-
praisal system, and indeed evolutionary psychologist typically are 
moral nativists.33 “Module” has a physical, spatial ring to it. But the 
expression does not refer to neural anatomy, but to functional speciali-
zation. Alternatively, one takes an “empiricist” view of the mind, pos-
tulating fewer and more broadly competent problem solving faculties 
that need much empirical input. Empiricists about the mind typically 
deny moral innateness (and indeed the innateness of many other psy-
chological or behavioral traits).34 These two competing accounts will 
be the recurring leitmotif of this chapter. 
From an evolutionary point of view, there are two plausible major 
pathways taking us to what we now think of as morality: sympathy 
and cooperation.35 Sympathy is a psychological adaptation instilled in 
our lineage to solve the challenge of prolonged care of offspring. Hu-
man children, compared to all other animals, are uniquely helpless and 
slow to develop. Taking care of them is tolling and could not be done 
by someone who is not wired to feel strongly for their wellbeing. So, 
while all mammals need mechanisms that make parents tend to their 
offspring, the parental care seen in humans is beyond anything else 
known on this planet. The other key component is not about care and 
sympathy, but about how we as intensely social creatures are depend-
ent on others with whom we do not always have a psychological bond 
of bigheartedness. Our species’ great dependence on cooperation is 
thus the second fundamental factor undergirding our moral psychol-
ogy.  
 
32 Downes 2014. 
33 I will use ‘innateness’ and ‘nativism’ as synonyms. 
34 See Prinz 2012 for a compelling book-length empiricist case. More on Prinz later.  
35 For the neurobiology of bonding and mammalian sympathy, see Churchland 2011 
and 2019. For examples of accounts emphasizing cooperation, see Curry 2016 as well 
as Curry, Mullins, and Whitehouse 2019. 
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Humans have had the same brain size and mental capacities for 
many, many tens of thousands of years. We started to use these re-
sources to pursue science and other intellectual enterprises only re-
cently. They were not developed to solve those kinds of things in our 
evolutionary past. The most plausible account is that we owe our out-
standing cognitive capacities largely to reap the benefits of coopera-
tion. The brain circuity and mental capacities needed for language in 
turn are part of this account. Language is a social phenomenon and 
likely arose in large part because it helped our ancestors coordinate 
action as well as to disseminate information on things like the trust-
worthiness or reproductive status of ourselves and others.36 There is 
thus a crucial interdependence between these three very important as-
pects of our species: language, cooperation, and morality. 
1 The meaning of innateness 
We have already seen that saying morality has a biological basis is not 
saying much since everything we do does. A more restricted query is 
asking if morality is innate. Alas, these terms are imprecise and used by 
different thinkers in different ways. Trying to get a clearer grasp of the 
central terms is thus a good start. The first commonsensical suggestion 
is that “innate” connotes a degree of hardwiring and means something 
like “genetic in origin and robustly independent of environmental in-
fluence”. On this view, a person’s blindness may be innate: say she 
lacked the genes that encoded for fetal development of the optic 
nerves; and, of course, no amount of training or other form of environ-
mental influence would make her see. Though blindness may be ge-
netic in origin for a given individual, stereovision in the human species 
is an adaptation.37 In psychiatry, there is a discussion on how to ac-
count for conditions such as autism spectrum disorders. People used 
to believe autism was caused by a certain kind of parenting style, but 
it has become more common to now believe it is genetic in origin.38 The 
upshot, then, is that autism might be innate. Though such a usage of 
the term is perfectly legitimate, I think this implication of what I la-
beled the commonsensical view makes apparent that we really want 
to ask a more general question of the human species, and not just about 
 
36 Berwick, Chomsky et al 2013; Dunbar 1996; Jones 2016; Al-Ubaydli, Jones, and 
Weel 2013; Proto, Rustichini, and Sofianos 2019.  
37 For further discussion and other uses of “innate”, see Mameli & Bateson 2011. 
38 See Sandin 2014 and Malik et al. 2019. 
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the biology of some individual.39 Given this wider focus, it is more use-
ful to think of innateness in the present context as a shared species-
typical psychological architecture, i.e. the traits we have in virtue of 
being humans. To get a grip on what kind of thing that may be, it helps 
to think of such qualities in terms of biological adaptations.  
An adaptation is a trait or a feature of an organism, which has been 
developed under the pressure of natural selection. Erections and ears 
are adaptations, as are teeth and opposable thumbs. Capacity to read 
and write are not adaptations but we recruit cognitive machinery 
which are in order to fulfill such evolutionary recent tasks. Asking 
whether or not morality is innate, then, is asking whether or not mo-
rality is a trait whose emergence in our lineage is to be explained by 
the reproductive success it conferred on our ancestors over those lack-
ing that trait in their surroundings, or whether it is to be explained 
more along the lines we would explain our capacity to read and write. 
These latter capacities are features of our psychology, but we do not 
typically think they themselves have been the target of selection pres-
sures. That may be because they are too recent to have had an influence 
on our genome, or because they cannot be meaningfully separated 
from a larger bundle of capacities of which they are a part, or constitute 
a non-adaptive but neutral side effect of adaptive capacities. These lat-
ter kind of phenomena are called, following Stephen Jay Gould and 
Richard Lewontin, spandrels, a term they borrowed from architecture.40 
There, a spandrel refers to the approximately triangular area created 
between two arches or between an arch and the wall, for instance in a 
church. This surface area can be used for decoration or to write a mes-
sage, but that is not why they exist. They exist because they are a side-
effects of that particular way of erecting a high building. Moral nativ-
ists think our moral capacity is more like vision and less like reading 
and writing; more like the arches and less like the spandrels they acci-
dentally give rise to. 
 
39 I side with Joyce 2006 in thinking of “innate” from the point of view of its role in 
evolutionary history, rather than disentangling at the level of a specific individual 
whether or not a given trait has a biological or environmental root. Mogensen 2014 
points to usages of “innate” that do not involve adaptation, as when we say that a 
given dysfunction in an individual is innate. This usage is perfectly acceptable, and 
authors need to be explicit about what they stipulate central terms to mean. In this 
work, “innate” refers to a species-wide adaptive trait.  
40 Gould and Lewontin 1979.  
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2 Innateness in non-moral domains 
By measuring looking time and other signs of puzzlement or surprise, 
contrasted with habituation, psychologist have tried to operationalize 
the extent to which human infants’ perception and mental processing 
of the world come equipped with certain innate ideas or structuring 
principles. There seems to be a number of constraints or set of regula-
tory expectations that are innate, and thus “known” by infants, for in-
stance that solid bodies cannot pass through one another, that a mov-
ing physical object cannot cause another physical object to move unless 
they come into contact, or that objects move along continuous trajecto-
ries and cannot disappear and rematerialize. Using limited visual cues 
of partly hidden and partly observable movements, infants will form 
expectations as to whether or not what they have seen is the movement 
of one and the same or two different objects. Infants also distinguish 
between objects and animate agents. The common feature is that these 
expectations are not conclusions drawn from experience and inductive 
reasoning, but are present prior to any experience or reasoning.41  
Babies also understand the bodily movements of other humans in a 
special way. In one study, an infant would be observing a person 
reaching for either a teddy bear or a ball placed next to one another. 
Next, an experimenter switched the placing of the objects. When the 
first person once again reached, the infant expected them to reach for 
the same object, not the same place. When a rod or metallic claw did 
the reaching, this expectation was absent.42 This suggests infants have 
a competence which allows them to infer intentions of other people, 
while realizing non-animate objects, while moving, do not have inten-
tions.  
With the example of understanding other people’s intentions we’ve 
moved into the realm of interpersonal relations, i.e. the social world. 
Navigating this territory is likewise premised on the existence of spe-
cialized problem-solving capacities of our minds. Perhaps the most in-
tensely studied candidate is cheater detection. Cheating occurs when an 
agent takes the benefit of a social exchange but does not satisfy the 
requirement that the benefit was premised on.  
The suggestion that we have a specialized cheater-detecting mech-
anism grew out of comparisons of our reasoning abilities concerning 
conditionals in general as contrasted to social exchange conditionals in 
 
41 See Baillargeon 1987, Spelke 1990, and Spelke & Kinzler 2007. A very readable 
overview of some of this research is given in Bloom 2013.  
42 Woodward 1998. 
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particular. Identifying a cheater might be thought of as applying a sim-
ple conditional scheme: If P (you pay the price), then Q (you can have 
the goods). Psychologist Peter Wason wanted to see how well people 
perform at falsifying conditional hypotheses. He showed participants 
the following cards with either a letter or a number on the side facing 
up: 
D  F  3  7 
Each card has a letter on one side and a number on the other. He then 
asked them to check the veracity of the rule “If a card has a D on one 
side, it has a 3 on the other” (a pretty basic P implies Q statement) by 
turning the card(s) that need to be turned, and only that/them. Which 
card(s) do you turn? Most subjects chose either the D card or the D 
card and the 3 card. The correct answer is the D card and the 7 card. 
The 3 card and the F card are irrelevant for the conditional rule and so 
do not need to be turned, but people are very bad at picking out the 7 
card as a possible violator of the rule.43 
Now let us look at a structurally similar check on a conditional rule. 
This time the rule is “If someone is drinking beer that person needs to 
be 18 or older.” Which of the following cards (representing bar guests) 
do you need to turn to check if the rule has been violated: 
Drinks beer Drinks Fanta Is 25 years old Is 16 years old. 
Here most people effortlessly come up with the right solution: we need 
to know how old the beer drinker is and what the 16-year-old is drink-
ing. It does not matter what the 25-year-old is drinking and we do not 
need to know how old the Fanta drinker is.  
The notion that there are specialized psychological appraisal sys-
tems for detecting cheating in social exchanges also gains support from 
studies on patients presenting with positive schizophrenic symptoms. 
Such patients will have deficits in their general reasoning abilities, but 
exhibit intact capacities when the content is switched to social ex-
change.44 The upshot is that though we are dealing with a pretty sim-
ple piece of conditional reasoning, we do not approach the problems 
 
43 The first study by Wason 1968 was about even numbers and colors of cards. The 
contrast to reasoning about cheating was introduced in Cosmides & Tooby 1992. 
44 Kornreich et al 2017. For an overview, see Cosmides & Tooby 2015. 
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using a domain-general reasoning ability. Instead, depending on 
whether or not there is a content of possible social exchange gone sour, 
we are able to pick out the suspects. And, importantly, cheater detec-
tion, not general logical thinking, solves it for us. The same kind of 
tasks have been tinkered with to control for possible confounding fac-
tors such as familiarity with the situation described, readability etcet-
era. The pattern remains the same: we are expert cheater detectors and 
amateur logicians. Findings like these support the notion that at least 
part of our capacity to identify and assess social interactions are due to 
specialized mental faculties rather than a consequence of general rea-
soning-abilities. More recent research has corroborated and expanded 
on these cognitive adaptations for monitoring social exchange and 
neighboring areas. Again, people exhibit an elevated capacity, com-
pared to descriptive controls, to identify violations of socio-moral 
codes pertaining to helping behavior, maintaining coalitions, and sub-
mitting to authority. 45 
3 Morality – content and capacity 
When someone suggests morality is or is not innate, just what is in-
volved? In addition to simply denying any such innateness, there then 
seems to be three possibilities, with an increasingly “full” pre-
equipped capacity claimed: 
1) Non-nativism: Just as human beings do not possess a dedicated 
set of proclivities and competencies to talk about staplers or 
chocolate bars, there is no innate competence or proclivity to 
make moral judgments, and the domains we moralize, and the 
content of our moral judgments, are entirely up to the sur-
rounding environment. 
2) Weak nativism: Human beings possess a dedicated set of pro-
clivities and competencies to moralize, but the domains we 
moralize, and the content of our moral judgments, are up to the 
surrounding environment. 
3) Strong nativism: Human beings do not only possess a dedicated 
set of proclivities and competencies to moralize, we also have 
an innate tendency to make and accept moral judgment with a 
certain content, i.e. the content is strongly constrained.46 
 
45 See Sivan, Curry, and van Lissa 2018. 
46 Following Prinz 2014, p 105. 
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To ask if morality is innate, then, is to ask if a) we have an adaptive 
capacity to make moral judgments of a rather open-ended character or 
b) a capacity to make moral judgments with a strongly constrained or 
directed content or none of these. Of course empiricism in this debate 
does not deny the obvious, namely that we do make moral judgments. 
It just claims this is something learned and made possible by general 
capacities that we have and which did not evolve to make moral judg-
ments.  
Since the strong version makes additional claims compared to the 
weak versions, i.e. that we are wired not only to moralize but to mor-
alize a certain way, it would appear that acceptance of the weak ver-
sion is easier to justify as compared to the strong version. Jesse Prinz 
even used to call the strong version “immodest”, suggesting only a 
fanciful assessment of the available evidence can lead anyone to accept 
it.47 But as a matter of evolutionary chronology it is hard to understand 
how weak or capacity nativism, which is here taken as the more mod-
est claim, might have evolved sans a pre-linguistic content, a domain 
our ancestors tended to moralize. And, importantly, a domain over 
which we moralize could not make all kinds of moral judgments made 
within it equally adaptive. A domain matters because it matters what 
we believe and do within that domain. There is good reason to believe 
we would not be a moralizing species if we were not first a species 
with strong emotional reactions to, e.g., social interactions. Therefore, 
I think the notion that morality could be innate in the sense that we 
make moral judgments and it is then an open matter what kinds of 
moral judgment we would be making is prima facie implausible. 
Long before anyone on this planet had ever made a moral judg-
ment, our ancestors first evolved a set of emotional and behavioral 
propensities in response to various challenges, opportunities and 
threats. These propensities may cluster into various domains, such as 
cooperation, care or deference. Only later emerged a linguistic compe-
tence to moralize what goes on in these domains. But the content came 
before the capacity. We come equipped with a set of innate biases that 
make some moral judgments seem more attractive than others. If this 
were not the case it would be equally easy to train children to come to 
accept the norm that people who help others deserve punishment, as 
it would be to train children to accept the norm that people who harm 
 
47 Prinz 2009, p. 168. 
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others deserve punishment.48 There would be no natural psychological 
pull towards the norm that helpers deserve praise and harmers blame, 
and presumably no tendency to like those who offered help more than 
those who caused harm. The acceptance of some moral judgments over 
others is clearly adaptive. Individuals who were prone to making 
moral judgments of the sort “It is okay to kill your babies” were less 
likely to thrive and reproduce than beings disposed to accept judg-
ments like “It is good to return favors and seek trustworthy partners”. 
Admittedly, in order to ground the specifically adaptationist claim 
about moral judgments, it is not enough to show that moral judgments 
are shaped by our emotional and behavioral dispositions. One also 
needs the additional claim that making moral judgments influences 
action and attitudes in ways that go beyond what the dispositions 
alone do. I will address two ways of linking moral thinking to behavior 
in section 5, viz. the idea that morality functions as a commitment de-
vice and as social signal.  
4 The emotional bases of moral judgment 
Among empirically oriented researchers of moral psychology, a grow-
ing consensus has emerged over the last fifteen to twenty years or so 
concerning the profound role of emotions in moral cognition. The evi-
dence comes from functional imaging of the brain, research on psy-
chopathy and Autism spectrum disorders, on patients with partial 
brain damages, from emotional priming induced under hypnosis, the 
influence of disgust on moral judgments, motivated reasoning, and 
many more.49 Of course, the idea that emotions play an important role 
for moral judgment is much older than that. What has happened, 
though, is that this view has been supplemented with a wealth of evi-
dence not available to thinkers like David Hume.50 
 
48 In personal communication, developmental psychologist Kiley Hamlin recalled of 
such an attempted study that “we essentially tried to have an experimenter praise 
harmers and boo at helpers – we didn't get very far because kids were super distracted 
by the experimenter and didn’t seem to process the show at all.” But see Van de 
Vondervoort & Hamlin 2019, and DesChamps, Eason, and Sommerville 2016 for study 
designs attempting to answer these questions. 
49 For some overviews, see Prinz 2009, Greene 2013, Sinnott-Armstrong (ed) 2008a 
and 2008c. Criticism of some of the proposed links between disgust and moral judg-
ment can be found in Ghelfi et al. 2020. 
50 These empirical data concern the causal processes that give rise to moral judg-
ments and are compatible with cognitivist ideas on the semantics of moral judgment. 
See Joyce 2008 for further discussion.  
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In the preceding section, I argued that content must have come be-
fore capacity, partly because our moral judgments have something to 
do with what it is adaptive to approve and disapprove of. To see why 
this is so, consider the following account from a non-human context, 
again by primatologist Frans de Waal. The chimpanzees Puist and Luit 
had a longstanding habit of helping each other. One day, Puist was 
attacked by a third individual, Nikkie. Puist turned to Luit in search of 
support, but Luit did nothing to avert the attack. Subsequently, Puist 
furiously attacked not Nikkie, but Luit, who had failed to reciprocate 
previously offered assistance. If you believe that fury in response to 
the defection of a coalition partner is more adaptive than delight, you 
should believe some contents of our moral judgments are more likely 
than others. 
Both human and nonhuman animals experience emotions of a vari-
ety of sorts, propelling or inhibiting them as appropriate towards 
adaptive behavior. They need to drink and eat, avoid trauma and con-
taminated food sources, find a mate to reproduce with, and stay clear 
of predators and many other dangers. That is why they experience 
emotions such as hunger, thirst, disgust, sexual desire, and fear. The 
creatures humans evolved from were capable of experiencing emo-
tions long before they were human, and indeed long before they were 
even social animals. Some of the emotions that evolved prior to any-
thing we can call morality also regulate social behavior, and these emo-
tions were the coopted building blocks upon which morality later 
arose. 
How did it arise? Recall the indignant Capuchin monkey. She was 
perfectly happy working for cucumbers – until it dawned upon her 
someone else got grapes for the same job. Experiencing and displaying 
anger at unfavorable distributions is an adaptive mechanism for 
avoiding exploitation. The strong negative reaction makes it more 
likely that the individual Capuchin monkey will not stay in or accept 
bad deals, and the reaction, what Brosnan and de Waal call an “ineq-
uity aversion”, is also a signal to others the she will not. It is important 
that the monkey not only experiences something like offense, but she 
displays it to others as well. Moral emotions serve to regulate behavior, 
that of the individual as well as that of others. And the same is true of 
the story of the three chimps of course: Puist’s anger at and ensuing 
attack on the traitor send a clear message that failures to reciprocate 
will not be tolerated. 
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5 Morality as commitment device and social signal 
Why might a moral sense, i.e. a capacity to moralize, be an adaptive 
feature, something that would be enhancing the reproductive success 
of our ancestors? Is it not enough that we have, as the capuchin mon-
keys and the chimps, pro-social and punitive emotions? Why would 
this thing moralizing enter the stage?  
Humans as physical creatures are not very impressive. Not the fast-
est, strongest, smallest or largest of animals. But we have our brain-
power and our spectacular capacity to cooperate and plan ahead. 
These have been the keys to our success. We have already seen how 
cheater detection is an inbuilt feature of our psyches. Why would that 
be? Because we rely on cooperation to survive. Hence, being trustwor-
thy, and being known to be so, and being able to assess the trustwor-
thiness of others, are important traits in an organism whose success is 
tied up with the joint efforts of others. But sometimes you just do not 
feel like chipping in. There is always temptation to forfeit the cost part 
and still reap the benefits produced by the generosity and diligence of 
others. But others are quite remarkable at spotting cheaters and will 
quickly terminate all reciprocal interactions with you if you cheat. And 
that is not good for you. Cooperating is not as good as cheating unde-
tected, parasitizing on others, but definitely better than ostracism. So 
humans (and other social animals) are locked in a sort of arms race, 
stag hunt dilemma type of scenario where we need to constantly mon-
itor our incentive to cooperate, the tendency of others to cheat if they 
can get away with it, and so forth.51  
Morality would have been a successful strategy to cope with that 
kind of situation. Adopting certain moral convictions removes op-
tions. I have never been tempted to break in to my neighbors and steal 
from them when they are away. The thought has never crossed my 
mind. I am pretty sure I could get away with it, but I am just not into 
that sort of thing. This way moral convictions shape behavior, by either 
pushing us to do the things we think we should but lack immediate 
motivation to do, or making us refrain from doing what is tempting 
 
51 A stag hunt dilemma is a situation where an individual can choose to reap a small 
benefit from solitary action (killing a hare) or a larger benefit (killing a stag) requiring 
the cooperation of others, without being able to monitor or influence whether or not 
others will actually participate in the cooperation; often ends up with all individually 
going for the lesser hare reward. The expression originates with Rousseau, and is 
given a comprehensive treatment in Skyrms 2003. 
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but not what we should, or, as in the breaking-in case, simply by re-
moving options from conscious consideration. In many cases, moral 
convictions may be unnecessary, as the behavior may be unattractive 
or unattractive in any event. But for other instances, adopting a set of 
moral convictions will help the individual with providing a behavioral 
auto-pilot removing some options and considering or suggesting oth-
ers. That way, the sense that you are morally accountable provides a 
powerful motivational corset in the marshmallow test that is life. 
Acceptance of norms also signals to others that you are committed 
to a certain course of action, and can reliably be predicted to act in cer-
tain ways. That is a valuable asset. You can be trusted, not just to do 
what is beneficial for you, but what you think you should do regard-
less of that, as well as to oversee that the people you interact with do 
too. If you are the kind of person who would not go back to a market 
vendor because the raspberries they sold you had molds on them, you 
are more likely to receive raspberries with molds on them than some-
one who is the kind of person who would go back and point that out 
and is known to be such a person. But raspberries do not cost much, is 
it worth the hassle? It is the principle, they shouldn’t be fooling people 
like that.52 
How does morality succeed in doing all of this motivation-boosting 
and interpersonal policing? The trick is the apperception that morality 
is calling us from outside of ourselves, providing an external nudge or 
non-conditional instruction. This takes us to the question what it is, 
more precisely, to, as I have been calling it, “moralize”, or “make moral 
judgments”. Here I think it is wise to give a rather general characteri-
zation, one that does not at this stage tilt or exclude options further 
down the road when we want to assess the philosophical implications 
of the possibility of moral innateness. For that reason, I am reluctant to 
say, for instance, that moral judgments are beliefs, and that utterances 
of moral sentences are assertions, i.e. expressing something either true 
or false. Nor that they are mere expressions of a favorable or a disap-
proving attitude. What is important is that moral judgments are taken 
to have an authority or validity which is independent of the wants of 
the speaker, i.e. they are categorical. Moral judgments come with 
oomph, i.e. a perceived inescapable normative clout, as Richard Joyce 
named the phenomenon.53 He provides the following checklist, stating 
 
52 See Frank 1988 for more on this line of reasoning.  
53 Joyce 2006, pp. 62-4; 199-209. See also Olson 2014. Perceived or not, one might 
think that moral judgments are inescapable, i.e. binding whether the agent recognizes 
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we would expect to tick off at least some of them before we call some 
human activity making moral judgments: 
Moral judgments centrally govern interpersonal relations; they seem 
designed to combat rampant individualism in particular. 
Moral judgments are often ways of expressing attitudes—e.g., favor 
or disapproval— but at the same time they bear all the hallmarks of 
being assertions (i.e., they also express beliefs). 
Moral judgments purport to be practical considerations irrespective 
of the interests/ends of those to whom they are directed. 
Moral judgments purport to be inescapable—there is no “opting 
out.” 
Moral judgments purport to transcend human conventions. 
Moral judgments imply notions of desert and justice (a system of 
“punishments and rewards”). 
For creatures like us, the emotion of guilt (or “a moral conscience”) is 
an important mechanism for regulating one’s moral conduct.54 
6 The Moral Foundations Theory 
There are several grand models or theories attempting to systematize 
and make sense of human moral psychology. Probably the most dis-
cussed is the so-called Moral Foundations Theory developed by Jona-
than Haidt and Jesse Graham, using work done by anthropologist 
Richard Shweder.55 The theory sets out to list the basic allegedly innate 
“taste buds” that shape moral thinking and that accounts for both sim-
ilarities and differences between cultures and individuals. Each of 
these taste buds refers to a domain or set of problems that we tend to 
moralize, and the conjunction of them all is what we may think of as 
the moral foundation. Each domain arose in response to a set of adap-
tive challenges for our ancestors, and the emerging psychology makes 
some moral judgments and ideas of virtue more likely. For example, 
early humans had a lot to gain from cooperation, but also risked being 
exploited. Successful interactions will lead to emotions like gratitude, 
while having been taken advantage of will trigger anger. We think of 
 
that or not. In the present discussion, I am primarily interested in the psychological 
part 
54 Joyce 2007, p 262.  
55 Following an innate human tendency to focus on visible high-status individuals, 
in the henceforth I will simply refer to it as Haidt’s view. See Haidt 2012.  
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character traits relevant for this domain as virtues such as trustworthi-
ness, fairness etcetera. The suggestion that there is a class of “triggers” 
with corresponding moral taste buds in us is tantamount to strong na-
tivism. On Haidt and Graham’s view, human morality can be plausi-
bly broken down to these five fundamental building blocks: 
care/harm; fairness/cheating; loyalty/betrayal; authority/subversion, 
and finally sanctity/degradation.  
The set of adaptive challenges and their corresponding solutions in 
our psychological make-up is summarized in the chart below. 56 We 
need not here go into, and critically assess, the precise taxonomy. The 
important thing is the overall conclusion that moral judgments are un-
derpinned by a suite of emotional responses put in place by evolution 
to regulate behavior, including signaling to others. 
 
56 Chart from Haidt 2012, p. 125. 
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7 Universal Moral Grammar 
Claims of innateness in a certain domain typically arise from the sug-
gestion that our competence in that domain outmatches, and cannot 
plausibly be accounted for by, the exposure to stimuli, training, and 
experience (hence the contrast with “empirical” views, according to 
which competence is a function of the input received).  
Perhaps the most famous case of a proposed innate competence is 
Noam Chomsky’s idea of a Universal Grammar.57 The term “Universal 
Grammar” is alternately used to refer to either the fundamental and 
thus shared features of all human languages, or to the brain circuitry 
(in the human child) which allows them to pick up their first language. 
In any event, the central idea is that language acquisition and the basic 
structural similarities of unrelated languages make it plausible to as-
sume there is a commonly shared, biologically innate faculty of lan-
guage. As Steven Pinker puts it:  
Language is not a cultural artifact that we learn the way we learn to 
tell time or how the federal government works. Instead, it is a distinct 
piece of the biological makeup of our brains. Language is a complex, 
specialized skill, which develops in the child spontaneously, without 
conscious effort or formal instruction, is deployed without awareness 
of its underlying logic, is qualitatively the same in every individual, 
and is distinct from more general abilities to process information or 
behave intelligently.58 
Here are some features of language and language-users that universal 
grammar accounts for quite well: that all human societies have lan-
guage; that children are able to understand and use sentences they 
have never heard before; that languages around the world vary but 
show adherence to a limited set of basic shared rules; that children 
quickly learn to judge whether a new sentence is grammatically correct 
or not; that people know what is correct but are unaware of any gram-
matical rule justifying that assessment; that speaking our first lan-
guage is effortless; that children surrounded by an artificial pidgin lack-
ing consistent grammatical rules develop a creole, a natural language 
with consistent grammatical rules absent from the stimuli they’ve en-
countered; that deaf babies of deaf parents “babble” using hand ges-
tures in the same rhythmic way hearing infants babble with their 
 
57 Over the years Chomsky has revised – some say, retracted – the hypothesis of uni-
versal grammar. His early statement of the view appears in Chomsky 1965. A more 
recent discussion appears in Chomsky et al 2002. 
58 Pinker 1994, p. 18. 
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voices; that deaf babies spontaneously develop a grammatically natu-
ral sign language.  
Can this enormously powerful idea from linguistics – a shared basic 
competence leading to different but structurally related languages – 
fruitfully be brought to bear on the question of moral innateness? Is 
there, in morals, as in linguistics, a shared universal “grammar”? 
Chomsky himself suggested the idea, it was later favorably hinted at 
by Rawls, and it has more recently been developed meticulously by 
John Mikhail.59According to Mikhail, the human mind holds “a com-
plex and possibly domain-specific set of rules, concepts and principles 
that generates and relates mental representations of various types. 
Among other things, this system enables individuals to determine the 
deontic status of an infinite variety of acts and omissions.”60 This feat 
is done, so the theory says, by internal, inaccessible, fast and automatic 
representations of action-types valencing the subject’s assessment of 
what the right thing to do is. Mikhail mentions as an example battery, 
i.e. acts which are “purposefully or knowingly causing harmful or of-
fensive contact with another individual or otherwise invading another 
individual’s physical integrity without his or her consent”.61 The pres-
ence in human psychology of a tendency to keenly observe battery 
makes evolutionary sense and also accounts for the universal finding 
that all human populations surveyed rank the various versions of the 
trolley dilemmas the way they do.62 (Push being a form of battery while 
Switch and Loop are not)  
If this innate automatic categorization and moral valancing of vari-
ous behavior exists, we should expect some of the following: 
1. A competence on the part of children to acquire, accept, and 
use moral judgments that goes beyond explicit instruction.  
2. A cross-cultural variety of moral norms, nonetheless under-
standable as surface phenomena compatible with a shared 
basic set of norms. 
3. A competence to judge novel moral situations. 
4. A competence to make moral judgments on situations and be-
haviors while being unable or hard-pressed to supply a justify-
ing foundation for the judgment. 
 
59 Mikhail 2007, 2008, and 2011. Rawls, p. 46-7. 
60 Mikhail 2007, p. 144. 
61 Ibid, p. 145.  
62 Ahlenius & Tännsjö 2012. More recently, and with a larger data set: Awad 
et al. 2020. 
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5. A first-person phenomenology of moral judgments typically 
being obvious and effortless, akin to perception.  
6. The presence in all natural languages of expressions to convey 
what is obligatory, permissible, and forbidden. 
These predictions are very accurate.63 For our purposes here, there is 
no need to definitively try and settle which ones of the different nativ-
ist systems is the correct one. It is also not totally clear if they are in-
compatible and, if so, what evidence could refute or vindicate any one 
of them over the others. What I do want to establish, is that we have 
an innate tendency to make moral judgments, and that this capacity is 
pre-structured. There are domains we are more likely to moralize than 
others, and there are dispositions or biases making us more favorable 
to some forms of moral judgments over others.  
Since Haidt’s view so explicitly grounds moral thinking and moral 
judgment in emotional responses, it may seem to be incompatible 
with, or at least quite different from, Mikhail’s universal grammar 
view. Is not the appeal to emotions sufficient to account for moral con-
victions – do we really need this talk of a complex moral “grammar”, 
hidden from even ourselves yet at work deep in our minds? But emo-
tions alone cannot explain the data. We know that some situations give 
rise to more emotions than others, but why? This is where the action 
type, the “grammar”, enters the picture. Some behaviors give rise to 
emotional responses because of the way they are represented to us.  
8 Framing effects 
There are additional ways in which the way we represent actions taps 
into innate triggers making us favor or reject options while having a 
hard time articulating just how they differ. Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky, and many others in their aftermath, famously studied 
human irrationality and our use of heuristics, i.e. tools or cognitive aut-
pilots simplifying the process of arriving at a decisions.  Here is a tell-
ing example of their research. Two groups of respondents are both 
given the following scenario: 
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual 
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative 
programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that 
the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are 
as follows:  
 
63 See for example Haidt 2001, Hauser et al 2007, Mikhail 2011, Hamlin 2013. 
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At this point the two response groups are given different versions of 
the options. Participants of group 1 are given the following two re-
sponse options, and asked to recommend one of them: 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.  
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will 
be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.  
And participants of group 2 are given the following two options, and 
asked to recommend one of them: 
If Program C is adopted 400 people will die.  
If Program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, 
and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die. 
Among participants of the first group, 72 percent preferred A and 28 
percent preferred option B. In the second group 22 percent of partici-
pants recommended C and 78 percent recommended D.64 But A and C 
are the same options, and B and D are the same options. So it is not the case 
that people are consciously applying, say, a cost-benefit or a maximin 
strategy to solve matters like these. Rather the way we assess the op-
tions is biased by a certain representative scheme that makes us sepa-
rate options that are logically equivalent. The framing is a framing pre-
cisely because the different descriptions tap into and activate deep-
seated moral appraisal systems. If there were no such deep-seated ap-
praisal systems, but simply an all-purpose reasoning ability to ap-
proach public policy or moral matters, we would not be framed. 
It is a crucial feature of the moral grammar hypothesis that (as with 
language) we do not have conscious access to the normative rules it 
contains. If we could not be framed by the wording of these scenarios 
that would be evidence for resistance to automaticity based on an in-
nate normative rule box, and speak for the notion that moral problems 
are approached in a cognitively transparent way by domain-general 
features of our rational capacities. But we can, and they are not.  
9 The moral/conventional distinction 
I think it is fair to say common sense recognizes a distinction between 
transgressions of norms of, on the one hand, convention and, on the 
other, morality. The primitive idea is that some of the norms we abide 
by are simply the result of agreement and habitude – and can be lifted 
 
64 Tversky & Kahneman 1981, p. 453; also recounted in Kahneman 2011, p. 368. 
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or changed by an act of will – whereas other norms command subser-
vience in a manner not reducible to mere agreement or habit. These 
latter norms, then, would be the moral norms.  
There is some debate as to the possibility of giving this intuitively 
plausible distinction any philosophical and psychological substance. 
As Nicholas Southwood notes, “We are therefore in the unfortunate 
but all too familiar philosophical position of being in possession of a 
distinction that makes a great deal of sense pre-theoretically, yet being 
in want of a compelling vindicating account of the distinction”.65  
If there is a universal moral grammar it seems we should expect 
children to make that distinction. And they do. A typical study will 
have children answer questions like “In school, no one is allowed to 
speak before raising his or her arm. Suppose the teacher said ‘today 
anyone can just speak directly without first raising their arm’, would 
it then be okay to speak directly without raising the arm?”, and then 
compare their answers to questions such as “In school, no one is al-
lowed to pull the hair of another kid. Suppose the teacher said ‘today 
you can pull the hair of someone else if you want to’, would it then be 
okay to pull someone else’s hair?”.  
If an authority figure cancels the rule, children think it is okay to 
not raise the hand before speaking, but they do not think pulling some-
one’s hair would be made okay by an authority figure’s cancellation of 
that rule.66 Or, in other words, it is not the kind of rule that derives its 
clout from an authority. Pulling someone’s hair constitute a form of 
harmful battery, and is hence seen as violating a moral rule, the com-
pliance to which is not optional (see Joyce’s set of characteristics of 
moral judgments above). 
10 The case against innateness 
So there is a lot of psychological baggage which appears to make the 
nativist position well-supported. But the nature of the field is such that 
no position is uniquely plausible or uniquely compatible with the 
available evidence. In this final section I will examine Jesse Prinz’ plea 
for the role of culture. Prinz is what is called an empiricist about the 
mind, and rejects innateness about psychological traits, language, 
emotions, thinking, and values. He does not think human moralizing 
is an adaptation and he does not believe there is a specific domain or 
 
65 Southwood 2011, p. 764 
66 An overview and critique is given in Kelly et al 2007. Kumar 2015 defends the 
distinction, arguing that moral judgments in a certain sense are a “natural kind”. 
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content which we are naturally disposed to moralize, although as hu-
man life is organized it may often be that some domains rather than 
others are in fact the object of attention from the moral point of view. 
Prinz calls himself a “methodological anti-nativist” which amounts to 
a burden of proof-position in the present debate: “we should assume 
that a faculty is not innate until evidence leads us to say otherwise”.67 
The idea is, we know we have some domain-general rational capacities 
and any theory postulating specific faculties or mental specialized rou-
tines adds to that, and we should accept these additions only insofar as 
doing so is prompted by the available empirical evidence. 
Even if I were to accept this non-nativist default, it is clear from the 
preceding sections that I believe there indeed is evidence to support 
such specialized competencies as well as tendencies towards certain 
domains and contents. Speaking of contents, Prinz grants that there is 
evidence that people of different cultural backgrounds judge the trol-
ley problems similarly, always holding Switch to be more permissible 
than Loop, which is deemed more permissible than Push.68 The nativist 
take on this agreement is that human beings share innate mechanisms 
for representing and emotionally valancing action types. But, Prinz, 
claims, this cross-cultural agreement can just as well be explained in 
other ways:  
The fact that people in different cultures give similar responses might 
be explained by prototype effects. When people learn the concept 
murder, the paradigm cases involve direct intentional physical as-
sault, not indirect harms. The reason for may have nothing to do with 
innateness. All cultures must have rules to stop people from directly 
and intentionally aggressing against each other, on pain of societal 
collapse. Rules against indirect harms, however, are less prevalent, 
because there are fewer circumstances within a society when indirect 
actions will result in someone’s death, and a society that failed to 
have such rules might be relatively stable. The pushing scenario con-
forms most closely to the kind of actions that every society is likely 
to condemn. It is more clearly an instance of murder than the scenario 
in which a person is killed as the side-effect of diverting the trolley. 
In the “diversion” scenario, the death is also less salient and the cause 
of death for the one person is rendered comparable to the cause of 
death for the five, making the comparison between the two outcomes 
 
67 Prinz 2014, p. 105. Prinz complains nativism in the study of psychology is often 
implicit, while, interestingly, Laurence & Margolis 2013 complain empiricism is often 
assumed rather than argued for.  
68 Ibid., p. 106. 
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vivid. So there need not be any unconscious rules at work here. Peo-
ple are taught that murder is wrong by means of prototypical cases, 
and they tolerate killing more readily when it departs from the pro-
totype, lacks salience, or is rendered comparable to an alternative ac-
tion that involves the same kind of killing but greater losses.69 
Is Prinz right in suggesting that the data is just as well if not better 
explained by prototype effects and shared environmental constraints 
of human societal affairs? First, the notion that something catches on 
in our psyches because it is a prototype of something is quite close to 
the nativist notion of cognitive organization in advance of experience. 
Why is it that in all cultures murder is prototypically a form of battery, 
i.e. harmful or offensive contact with another? Prinz may respond that 
any kind of act can be used as a prototype, and then that act will be the 
standard people think of as the canonical token of that type of act. On 
the nativist view, some constructs are more likely to be seen as proto-
typical in part because the instruction we are all given exploits a pre-
paredness in us, similar to how it is much easier to make a child fear 
snakes than electric sockets quite independent of how dangerous or 
common these things are in the environment the child grows up in.70  
The picture on the empiricist or anti-nativist take is that emotions 
can be directed at customs and action types, thereby moralizing those 
customs and action types. Nativists (in particular adherents of the 
strong version) additionally hold that some customs and action types 
are prone to triggering emotions and associated judgments in us. On 
the anti-nativist view, we do not have emotions the target of which 
shape our moralizing. Rather, anything can be moralized, and emo-
tions are then coopted to enforce that moralization.71 But what is in fact 
moralized may vary wildly. This indeterminacy or openness, I claim, 
fits ill with the various sources of evidence covered so far in the chap-
ter, and is in particular hard to explain given an observed continuity 
between us and related non-human animals. Chimpanzees do not learn 
to feel enraged by other’s failure to reciprocate; they are enraged and 
display these emotions to prevent defections and punish those that 
have already occurred. And because we share this suite of emotions it 
is more plausible to suggest that their presence in us will guide what 
we moralize and how.  
 
69 Prinz 2014, p. 106. 
70 See Schmitt & Pilcher 2004 for references to the fear of snakes literature, but above 
all for the more general discussion of psychological adaptations. 
71 This approach is more fully developed in Prinz 2007. 
 41 
The anti-nativist proposal further predicts that it would be equally 
easy to raise children by using indirect, nonviolent forms of killings as 
the prototype of wrongful killings, and the young members of this 
community would struggle to see that violently pushing someone in 
front of a train could be just as bad as switching a lever that would 
redirect the train onto them. More generally, the proposal would seem 
to imply that there are no innate psychological constraints on what hu-
man beings may be cultured to favor and disfavor in the moral do-
main. Training children to punish those who fulfill promises and re-
ward those who break promises, and laude those who share and shun 
those who steal would all be equally effortful, since there would be no 
preprogrammed software making any behavior or principle seem to 
the children more or less attractive than any other. There is lots of evi-
dence from research on infants and toddlers showing that they like 
and prefer those whom they have observed helping as opposed to hin-
dering others. They also expect praise and blame to be directed at help-
ers and hinderers, respectively. 72 This is an expected observation on a 
nativist view, but seems harder to square with the empirical or non-
nativist supposition. For sure, because of recurring facts of human life, 
norms of reciprocity are bound to appear in all cultures, but on the 
non-nativist view there is no expectation that toddlers come equipped 
with preferences or expectations for one or the other norm. 
11 Conclusion 
The whole moral innateness discussion is somewhat messy. The na-
ture of the questions asked is not crystal clear, falling somewhere in a 
no-man’s-land between psychology, evolutionary biology, cultural an-
thropology, and philosophy. The positions advanced tend to take the 
form of “models”, and I think it is fair to say that all stances are, as of 
now, underdetermined by the available evidence. I believe the most 
fruitful way to think of nativism is as a developing research program 
rather than a certain position tied to the specifics of John Mikhail’s uni-
versal moral grammar or Jonathan Haidt’s moral foundations theory. 
Nativism in this broad sense provides, I have claimed, the best account 
of many observations, ranging from cross-cultural data to child devel-
opment and people’s justifications of their moral judgments. There are 
many details that remain to be filled in for any project aiming to pro-
 
72 See Bloom 2013 for further references and discussion. 
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vide a theory of innate moral psychology. Haidt’s and Mikhail’s theo-
ries are just two examples, and there are others still of course.73 There 
will be much overlap among any plausible accounts, and there will be 
remaining disagreements that may be possible to resolve given careful 
observation and testing as well as more theoretical considerations. 
But, after all, maybe the disagreements here are overblown. Prinz 
speaks of plasticity but also accepts that, 
Perhaps some moral rules are easier to learn than others and some 
might even be impossible to sustain. Morality is no doubt constrained 
by our biological endowment. The emotions we have, our capacity to 
attribute mental states, and our care for kin all serve as building 
blocks that help shape the outcome of norm construction […] the sci-
entific study of morality should not be limited to psychology, neuro-
science, ethology and biological evolution. It should expand to in-
clude anthropology, history, sociology, and other fields that track 
sources of cultural variation. A complete science of morality will 
work at multiple levels.74 
While placing our emphasis at different parts in the full story of human 
morality, we can all agree to the richer, non-reductive mode of inquiry 
Prinz pleas for. That mindset is especially fitting given a research area 
where the absence of decisive evidence is so manifest.  
Remaining research and disagreements notwithstanding, there are 
two lessons to draw, that will turn out to be of interest in ensuing dis-
cussions: 1) We have an innate set of emotional responses and biases 
that make some moral judgments seem more plausible than others to 
us; and 2), we often lack conscious access to a set of justifying princi-
ples from which individual judgments are derived, making us vulner-
able to self-deception or at least ignorance of why it is we hold certain 
moral views. Importantly, these conclusions can be accepted by many 
of the participants in the debate over moral innateness.  
 
73 See for instance Curry, Mullins, and Whitehouse 2019. 
74 Prinz 2014, p. 115-6. 
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2 Deontology: Reductio ad Amygdalam 
It was truly a new thing when, in the fall of 1999, philosophy grad stu-
dent Joshua Greene approached Jonathan Cohen of the neighboring 
Department of Psychology to suggest that they together put people 
pondering moral dilemmas into a brain scanner. The research that fol-
lowed led Greene both to formulate an empirical theory of moral judg-
ment and to challenge certain moral theories and ways of doing moral 
philosophy. His initiative came after a nagging suspicion that philoso-
phers had exhausted the possible theoretical maneuvers by which to 
accommodate a commonly shared but irritatingly straggly set of intu-
itions regarding the so-called Trolley Problems. The fact that it seems 
hard for philosophers to formulate a coherent whole wherein these in-
tuitions fit, is, after all, an interesting psychological phenomenon: how 
and why do individuals harbor closely related views that there is no 
obvious common support for, or that may even be incompatible with 
one another?  
In this chapter I will present Joshua Greene’s challenge to deonto-
logical moral philosophy which he bases in what he calls the dual pro-
cesses theory of moral judgment. This theory is, he believes, the best 
way to make sense of a vast body of research from behavioral and neu-
roscience on cognition in general and moral thinking in particular. Af-
ter going through the neuroscientific studies, I will present and criti-
cally assess the challenge the results are purported to face deontology 
with. My presentation here will follow the rebuttal offered by Selim 
Berker, whose critical assessment of Greene is the most thorough pre-
sented so far. In this part my discussion is mostly critical of Berker and 
so defends Greene, although I also side with Berker in the larger as-
sessment that the victory over deontology was called prematurely. I 
finish by discussing post-trolleyology work by Frances Kamm and Ju-
dith Jarvis Thomson, pointing to avenues left to explore for a deontol-
ogist view. 
1 The trolley problems 
Philippa Foot first described a moral dilemma subsequently known as 
the trolley problem in her 1967 paper “The Problem of Abortion and 
the Doctrine of the Double Effect”.75 The story of the dilemma goes like 
 
75 Foot 1967. 
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this. A runaway trolley plunges toward five people strolling about fur-
ther down the tracks. The only way to save this unfortunate group of 
people is to divert the trolley down another branch once it reaches a 
junction just ahead of the strollers. The problem, alas, is that further 
down that other branch one person is strolling about equally inno-
cently. Should the bystander interfere, and divert the trolley down the 
less populated branch, so that five may live and one die rather than the 
other way around?  
Now consider the Footbridge Push dilemma.76 As before, a runaway 
trolley is heading towards five flaneurs further down the track. This 
time, however, there is no alternative branch for it to veer into. The 
bystander is now standing on a footbridge overarching the tracks be-
tween the rushing trolley and the five people. The only way to save the 
five individuals is for the bystander to push a very large person, stand-
ing next to her on the bridge, in front of the trolley, thereby thwarting 
its course. (Our protagonist bystander herself, we may assume, is not 
sufficiently heavy to stop the trolley.) Would it be morally okay for the 
bystander to push the large stranger, thereby killing one person so that 
five may live?  
Surveys and classroom experience again and again confirm that 
people generally accept or favor switching the train in the first case but 
reject pushing the person in the second case.77 Why is it that most peo-
ple think it is permissible to redirect the trolley, thereby killing one 
instead of five in the first case, but impermissible to kill one in order to 
save five in the other? Perhaps it has to do with the notion of using 
someone simply as a means to other’s ends? In the first case, the death 
of a single person is merely an unfortunate side effect of the by-
stander’s diverting the trolley onto another branch. In the footbridge 
case, however, the large person is used as a means to stop the trolley: 
his death – or rather the fact that the trolley grinds to a stop when it 
hits him – is a prerequisite of the other’s surviving.  
This resort runs into trouble once we consider yet a variant, the Loop 
case.78 As in the first case, the bystander can divert the train onto an-
other branch. This branch, however, loops back to the same track, 
thereby only prolonging for seconds the lives of the five people further 
down. As it happens, a very large person wanders on the tracks of the 
 
76 Thomson 1985. 
77 Ahlenius & Tännsjö 2012, Greene 2013; 2016, Hauser 2006; Awad et al. 2020. 
78 Thomson, op. cit.  
 
45 
loop, and should the trolley be shifted onto the loop he will be suffi-
ciently heavy to arrest the trolley (but not sufficiently heavy to survive 
the collision). The only way to save the five is to direct the trolley onto 
the loop. Most people deem it permissible to divert the trolley onto the 
loop, thereby killing one to save five.79 Since his colliding with the trol-
ley is a prerequisite for saving the others, it may seem unreasonable to 
call his being hit by the trolley an undesired side effect; it is, rather, 
part of the very plan to save the five. Nor can the reasoning behind 
people’s different judgments be traced to the notion of using someone 
as a means, since in both the footbridge and the loop case someone is 
used as a means. Yet, most people are willing to accept diverting the 
trolley onto the loop, and most do not accept pushing the large person 
off of the footbridge. 
What, then, does account for people’s different judgments? After 
all, all three cases – the “standard” trolley switch problem, footbridge 
push dilemma, and the loop case – seem to raise the very same prob-
lem of whether or not it is permissible to sacrifice one in order to save 
five.80 This is a problem for philosophers of a deontologist bent, and 
they go to great lengths in order to reach harmony amongst our differ-
ent judgments on the ever more diabolic scenarios.81 
2 The trolley problem from a psychological point of view 
The suspicion that people respond in an incoherent way is not only a 
problem for philosophers interested in justifying our differing judg-
ments, but in itself opens an attention-grabbing psychological issue: 
“How is it that nearly everyone manages to conclude that it is accepta-
ble to sacrifice one life for five in the switch but not in the footbridge 
dilemma, in spite of the fact that a satisfying justification for distin-
guishing between these two cases is remarkably difficult to find?”82 
Perhaps the best explanation of people’s differing opinions when con-
fronted with the two cases is not that the scenarios differ in morally 
relevant ways, but rather in what psychological effects the descriptions 
of the situations have on us. This suspicion of Greene’s led him to at-
tack the topic from a different angle than philosophers so far had done. 
 
79 Greene 2013, Awad et al. 2020. 
80 For brevity, I will often refer to the different cases as Switch, Push, and Loop.  
81 For further discussion see Kamm 2007. A short version of her view can be found 
in Kamm 2000. Unger 1996 painstakingly dissects the dilemmas and our usual re-
sponses to them. A more recent very readable book-length treatment is Edmunds 2014. 
82 Greene et. al. 2001, p. 2106.  
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3 An fMRI investigation of emotions and moral dilemmas 
Greene and his fellow researchers speculated that, from a psychologi-
cal point of view, the difference between Switch and Push might lie “in 
the latter’s tendency to engage people’s emotions in a way that the for-
mer does not”.83 What is it, then, about certain moral dilemmas that 
elicit our emotions in a way others do not? They had an idea: situations 
where we are personally required to use force or otherwise harm a 
particular individual evoke our emotions to a significantly higher de-
gree than situations where we bring about the same result in a less up 
close and personal way. Intent on testing this hypothesis, the team pre-
dicted that “brain areas associated with emotion would be more active 
during contemplation of dilemmas such as the footbridge dilemma as 
compared to during contemplation of dilemmas such as the trolley di-
lemma.”84 A further empirical consequence of their hypothesis was ar-
ticulated: because normal people will have an emotional reaction that 
disposes them to discard as inappropriate personal violations in order 
to bring about overall better consequences, the minority of subjects 
who reach the opposite conclusion will take longer time to do so.85  
In order to measure the presence of emotional processing, the team 
used a technique called Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, or 
fMRI.86 By tracking changes in blood flow, the technique tells us which 
parts of the brain are activated. In a typical experiment, the subject will 
lie in an fMRI scanner and a particular form of stimulation will be set 
up, for instance text or images on screens in front of the person. As 
 
83 Ibid. They write, further, ”The thought of pushing someone to his death is, we 
propose, more emotionally salient than the thought of hitting a switch that will cause 
a trolley to produce similar consequences, and it is this emotional response that ac-
counts for people’s tendency to treat these cases differently.” 
84 Ibid. 
85 “In light of our proposal that people tend to have a salient, automatic emotional 
response to the footbridge dilemma that leads them to judge the action it proposes to 
be inappropriate, we would expect those (relatively rare) individuals who neverthe-
less judge this action to be appropriate to do so against a countervailing emotional 
response and to exhibit longer reaction times as a result of this emotional interference. 
More generally, we predicted longer reaction times for trials in which the participant’s 
response is incongruent with the emotional response (e.g., saying “appropriate” to a 
dilemma such as the footbridge dilemma). We predicted the absence of such effects 
for dilemmas such as the trolley dilemma which, according to our theory, are less 
likely to elicit a strong emotional response.” (Ibid.) 
86 The initial kind of empirical evidence Greene invoked was retrieved using fMRI, 
but the larger findings are not constrained to neuroscience specifically, nor to the mer-
its of the fMRI technique. See Rachul & Zarzeczny for further discussion of fMRI.  
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stimuli and tasks are presented, MRI images of the subject's brain are 
taken. After the experiment has finished, the set of images is analyzed. 
Firstly, the raw input images from the MRI scanner require mathemat-
ical transformation (a kind of spatial “inversion”) to reconstruct the 
images into “real space”, so that the images look like brains. The final 
statistical image shows up bright in those parts of the brain that were 
activated by the experiment’s stimulus. These activated areas are then 
shown as colored blobs on top of the original high-resolution brain im-
age. 
In a set of two consecutive experiments, subjects were undergoing 
fMRI brain scannings as they were asked to respond to a battery of 60 
practical dilemmas. These dilemmas had been previously categorized 
as either moral or non-moral on the basis of the assessments of pilot 
participants. Typical non-moral dilemmas posed questions such as the 
best way to arrange a travel schedule given certain constraints, which 
of two coupons to use at a store, or what kind of nuts to use for your 
brownie given your tastes. Here is an example: 87 
You are looking to buy a new computer. At the moment the computer 
that you want costs $ 1.000. A friend who knows the computer indus-
try has told you that this computer’s price will drop to $ 500 next 
month.  
If you wait until next month to buy your new computer you will have 
to use your old computer for a few weeks longer than you would like 
to. Nevertheless you will be able to do everything you need to do 
using your old computer during that time.  
Is it appropriate for you to use your old computer for a few more 
weeks in order to save $500 on the purchase of a new computer?88 
The moral dilemmas, in turn, had been categorized as either “per-
sonal” or “impersonal”. Typical impersonal moral dilemmas con-
cerned what policy to vote for given certain differences in outcome, 
whether or not to return the lost wallet of an immensely rich person, 
the switch trolley dilemma etcetera. Personal dilemmas, on the other 
 
87 Subjects were positioned in front of a display where the dilemmas were presented 
as text through a series of three screens, the first two describing a scenario and the last 
posing a question about the appropriateness of an action one might perform in that 
scenario. Subjects responded by pressing one of two buttons (Appropriate” or “Inap-
propriate”.)  
88 www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/293/5537/2105/DC1. Ensuing dilemmas are 
all available there. 
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hand, involved materials such as a doctor deliberately killing one pa-
tient in order to transplant that individual’s organs to five dying pa-
tients, the footbridge dilemma, pushing your despicable boss off a tall 
building etcetera. Over the years, Greene has tinkered a bit with what 
makes a dilemma “personal” or “impersonal”, but in these early stud-
ies what he had in mind was the idea that personal violations are (1) 
likely to cause serious bodily harm (2) to a particular person (3) where 
the harm is not a result of deflecting an existing threat onto a different 
party. A moral dilemma is “impersonal” if it fails to meet these criteria 
(each necessary; jointly sufficient).89 Here is how the standard trolley 
switch problem (categorized as “Moral-Impersonal”) was presented: 
You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching a fork 
in the tracks. On the tracks extending to the left is a group of five 
railway workmen. On the tracks extending to the right is a single rail-
way workman.  
If you do nothing the trolley will proceed to the left, causing the 
deaths of the five workmen. The only way to avoid the deaths of these 
workmen is to hit a switch on your dashboard that will cause the trol-
ley to proceed to the right, causing the death of the single workman.  
Is it appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to avoid the deaths 
of the five workmen?90 
And the footbridge push dilemma (categorized as “Moral-Personal”):  
A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen 
who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. You 
are on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trol-
ley and the five workmen. Next to you on this footbridge is a stranger 
who happens to be very large.  
The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to push this 
stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below where his large 
body will stop the trolley. The stranger will die if you do this, but the 
five workmen will be saved.  
Is it appropriate for you to push the stranger on to the tracks in order 
to save the five workmen?  
Many other moral dilemmas were presented, such as this (categorized 
as “Moral-Personal”): 
 
89 Greene 2004, p. 345. 
90 The term “appropriate” is a bit peculiar, since it may be interpreted as “in accord-
ance with societal standards” rather than, simply, “morally permissible”. It was cho-
sen as it was deemed the best term covering both moral and non-moral dilemmas in 
the battery of questions (Greene, personal communication).  
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Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill 
all remaining civilians. You and some of your townspeople have 
sought refuge in the cellar of a large house. Outside you hear the 
voices of soldiers who have come to search the house for valuables.  
Your baby begins to cry loudly. You cover his mouth to block the 
sound. If you remove your hand from his mouth his crying will sum-
mon the attention of the soldiers who will kill you, your child, and 
the others hiding out in the cellar. To save yourself and the others 
you must smother your child to death.  
Is it appropriate for you to smother your child in order to save your-
self and the other townspeople?  
The term “dilemma” was used in a wide sense indicating simply that 
there was a choice to be made, though it did not have to be a tough one 
in the eyes of most people: 
You have been dissatisfied with your marriage for several years. It is 
your distinct impression that your wife no longer appreciates you. 
You remember how she appreciated you years ago when you took 
care of her after she was mugged. You devise the following plan to 
regain your wife's affection.  
You will hire a man to break into your house while you are away. 
This man will tie up your wife and rape her. You, upon hearing the 
horrible news, will return swiftly to her side, to take care of her and 
comfort her, and she will once again appreciate you.  
Is it appropriate for you to hire a man to rape your wife so that she 
will appreciate you as you comfort her?  
The scanning consistently showed a higher level of activation in emo-
tion-related brain areas during contemplation of the personal moral 
dilemmas compared to the impersonal ones. Correspondingly, parts 
of the brain known to be involved in working memory and infor-
mation processing were more activated by the impersonal than by the 
personal dilemmas.91 In effect, from the point of view of what goes on 
in the brain, our processing of impersonal moral dilemmas have more 
 
91 More specifically in personal moral dilemmas, the medial frontal cortex, posterior 
cingulate cortex, and angular gyrus/superior temporal sulcus are active. In impersonal 
moral dilemmas there is increased activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and 
parietal lobe. See table on page 2106 of Greene et. al. 2001. It is beyond the scope here 
to assess the robustness of claims about one part of the brain being “associated with” 
or “responsible for” emotion rather than information processing or vice versa. 
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in common with other kinds of cognitive skills and information pro-
cessing than with our way of dealing with (or, rather, responding to) 
personal moral dilemmas.  
The prediction that emotionally incongruent answers would need 
longer reaction times was confirmed too. As expected, most subjects 
did judge throwing the large person off the footbridge, or killing one 
patient in order to save five, as “inappropriate”. Subjects who never-
theless found it appropriate did so against their own emotional reac-
tion. Hence, due to “emotional interference”, subjects who judged that 
actively harming one for the sake of minimizing overall harm was ap-
propriate in the personal settings needed more time to reach their con-
clusions.92 Greene and his collaborators compare this interference or 
ambivalence to the so-called Stroop effect, a familiar case of subjects’ 
needing a prolonged time to name the color green in response to the 
word “red” written in green ink.93 
4 Accounting for the results 
Greene sees the results as fitting in to, and supporting, a theory he calls 
The dual process theory of moral cognition. The dual process theory pro-
poses that there are two distinct but interacting kinds of processes in-
volved in assessing and producing moral judgment. One part of the 
system is automatic, quick, and introspectively opaque. The other part 
of the system is effortful, slow, and introspectively accessible. Readers 
familiar with Daniel Kahneman’s work will call them System 1 and 
System 2 respectively.94 Because we are not really aware of the work-
ings of the automatic and quick processes, our introspective experi-
ence of moral thinking tends to mostly mirror the consciously engaged 
part. Hence, the dual process theory may be absent from or in tension 
with common sense. 
Greene likens our moral psychology to a camera with automatic 
and manual modes. For most occasions, the user will get the best result 
by putting the camera in automatic mode, letting it quickly sense and 
adapt to typical situations such as portrait, landscape, sport etcetera. If 
 
92 Greene et. al. 2001, page 2107. 
93 Ibid., page 2106. In a later study, Greene et al. 2004, this link was more thoroughly 
investigated. 
94 Kahneman 2011. Dividing the workings of the brain and the mind into two distinct 
kinds of processes is obviously an oversimplification, but nonetheless a useful one. 
The more relevant distinction is that between automatic and deliberate processes. For 
some complications, see Melnikoff and Bargh 2018.   
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you want to be creative, or if you find yourself in a situation that the 
automatic settings seem inept at making the best of, you will need to 
switch to the camera’s manual mode instead. This allows you to be as 
flexible as you like, but it will take more time.95 The dual processes op-
eration of the moral mind is thus, according to Greene, the solution to 
a type of problem or tradeoff for any organism facing choices: that be-
tween fast efficiency and time-consuming flexibility. 
That moral decision-making, like many other mental tasks, has 
these features seems empirically not very outlandish and is philosoph-
ically fairly innocuous. It is when we combine the empirical theory 
with some philosophical content that we get to the more controversial 
features. According to Greene, there is as Central tension, such that 
Characteristically deontological judgments are preferentially sup-
ported by automatic emotional responses, while characteristically 
consequentialist judgments are preferentially supported by con-
scious reasoning and allied processes of cognitive control.96 
This tenet of his position – the idea, roughly, that the division of our 
moral psyches into passion and reason is mirrored by a divided output 
in the form of deontological versus consequentialist moral judg-
ments – is both empirically more controversial and, more importantly 
for present purposes, the core of the debate on the possible philosoph-
ical relevance of this kind of empirical work on moral psychology. 
Describing the human mind in general, and moral psychology in 
particular, as a semi-stable amalgamation of passion and reason is 
hardly new. What is new is the possibility now, as opposed to during 
the times of Plato or Hume, to interconnect a variety of disparate evi-
dence into one explanatory whole. Here are some findings, in addition 
to Greene’s initial fMRI study that lend support to the dual process 
theory of moral judgment: 
i. Moral dumbfounding: people find themselves accepting 
moral judgments that they continue to hold even after hav-
ing their stated reasons for holding them cancelled.97  
ii. Emotive priming induced under hypnosis affects moral 
judgment. People that were primed to experience disgust 
upon hearing the word “often” bizarrely condemned a stu-
 
95 Greene 2014. 
96 Ibid., p. 699. 
97 Haidt 2010; 2012. 
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dent council representative in charge of scheduling aca-
demic discussions for often choosing topics that will be of 
interest to both students and professors.98 
iii. Inducing disgust makes people judge moral transgressions 
more severely. For instance, a jury deliberating in a filthy 
room will arrive at more draconic verdicts than a jury delib-
erating in a tidy room.99 
iv. Cognitive load decreases utilitarian judgments but does not 
affect deontological judgments.100 
v. Empathy increases deontological judgment.101 
vi. Mirth increases utilitarian judgment.102 
vii. Psychopaths are more prone to making utilitarian judg-
ments.103 
viii. VMPFC patients are more utilitarian.104 
ix. Activity in the Amygdala decreases utilitarian judgments.105 
x. Alcohol dependence blunts emotions and increase utilitar-
ian judgments.106  
xi. Removing time-frames and encouraging deliberation in-
creases utilitarian judgments.107 
xii. Solving math problems with unintuitive solutions lead to 
people making more utilitarian judgments.108  
xiii. Individuals favoring effortful thinking over intuitive more 
likely to make utilitarian judgments.109 
 
98 Wheatley and Haidt 2005. 
99 Ibid. See also Schnall et al. 2008. The evidence for a causal link between disgust 
and severity of moral judgment is in a state of flux. This study supports a link: J. L., 
Steckler, C. M., & Heltzel, G. 2019. Whereas others have found it hard to replicate, see 
for instance Ghelfi, et al. 2020.  
100 Bonnefon, De Neys, and Trémolière 2012. Greene et al. 2008. Also see Greene 
et al. 2009.  
101 Conway and Gawronski 2013. 
102 Valdesolo and DeSteno 2006 and Strohminger, Lewis, and Meyer 2011. 
103 Koenigs et al 2012. 
104 Koenigs et al. 2007. Also Thomas, Croft, and Tranel 2011.  
105 Shenhav & Greene 2014. 
106 Khemiri et al. 2012. 
107 Suter & Hertwig 2011. 
108 Paxton, Ungar, and Greene 2012. 
109 Bartels 2008. 
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xiv. People have a conscious awareness of what speaks in favor 
of a utilitarian judgment but often are unaware of why they 
accept a deontological judgment.110 
xv. The more need for cognition a person has, the more utilitar-
ian and less punitive will be their justification of criminal 
punishment.111 
xvi. Negative emotions produce condemnation of harmless 
“wrongs”112 
5 Philosophical relevance of the study: a problem for deontology? 
The dual process theory, and its auxiliary central tension thesis, is an 
empirical theory about the causal mechanisms involved in processing 
and judging moral matters. In order to establish or refute the theory a 
smattering of moral philosophy might help, but ultimately the decisive 
evidence comes from neuroscience and psychology. How, then, might 
this empirical theory influence debates in philosophy? Here I will take 
on Greene’s and Peter Singer’s proposals that if the dual process the-
ory is true or roughly so, we have reason to lower our credence in de-
ontological normative theories, and a corresponding reason to 
strengthen our relative credence in utilitarianism.  
But how, more precisely, can we understand this challenge to de-
ontological ethics? Here I will follow Selim Berker’s statement of it, 
and in turn I will offer some criticism of his rebuttals.113 Berker goes 
through three possible candidate formulations of the challenge that he 
thinks are weak, but that Greene and Singer in some instances could 
be interpreted as relying on. After discussing these weak arguments, 
he moves on to what he takes to be the most promising way of stating 
the challenge to deontology. Before taking on his rejection of the more 
promising case, let us look first at the weaker ones. The three weak 
arguments are: 1) The “Emotions bad, reasoning good” argument; 2) 
The argument from heuristics; 3) The argument from evolutionary his-
tory. I will briefly comment on each of these weaker arguments, and 
focus my discussion on what Berker takes to be the best formulation of 
the challenge. 
 
110 Cushman, Young, and Hauser 2006; Hauser et al. 2007. 
111 Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson 2002. Also see Sargent 2004. The link between 
“need for cognition” and utilitarian thinking is questioned in Kahane, et al. 2018. 
112 Haidt, Koller, and Dias 1993. Also see Wheatley and Haidt 2005. 
113 Berker 2009. 
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6 “Emotions bad, reasoning good” 
Because deontological judgments are driven by emotion and conse-
quentialist judgments involve abstract reasoning, the former carries no 
“genuine normative force”.114  This argument is weak, according to 
Berker, because it assumes rather than argues for the view that emo-
tions are not a reliable way of discerning moral truths. Although 
Berker is right that there is a tradition that would happily embrace the 
view that emotions are guides to moral truths, I am not sure deontol-
ogists typically see themselves as belonging to that tradition. So, for 
deontologists, the finding that some characteristically deontological 
judgments correlate with brain activity having to do with disgust, fear 
etcetera may seem to them of some relevance.  
As far as I am aware all existing deontological theories are con-
structed alongside some form of rationalist, non-sentimentalist 
metaethical view. Mark Timmons has suggested that this need not be 
so, and thus that these findings do not threaten deontological theory. 
He does not really develop such an account but writes,  
Although all of the versions of deontology that I know of have been 
embedded in a rationalist metaethic, I don't see why one cannot em-
brace sentimentalism (or expressivism) and go on to defend a deon-
tological moral theory. Sentimentalism is a metaethical account about 
the nature of moral judgment; deontology is a normative theory 
about the right, the good, and their relation to one another. Although 
sentimentalism may seem to fit most comfortably with consequen-
tialism, accepting the former metaethical view does not commit one 
to the latter normative moral theory. So again, I don't see how (with-
out further elaboration) the empirical facts about emotion-laden, in-
tuitive moral reactions pose a threat to deontology. Indeed, I would 
suggest that the way to develop a deontological moral theory is to do 
so within the framework of a broadly sentimentalist metaethic 115  
This is an interesting proposal, and one that would need to be spelled 
out in some more detail before it can be assessed. But are metaethical 
views on the nature of moral judgment really theories of the causal 
mechanisms producing evaluative talk? Though semantic views like 
expressivism and cognitivism purport to make the best sense of avail-
able data, our subjective experiences of accepting a moral view etcet-
era, they are something different than psycholinguistic theories. It may 
be a bit unclear just what they are more precisely, and what kind of 
evidence can be brought to bear in order to test them. But, at bottom, 
 
114 Berker’s expression (page 316). 
115 Timmons 2008, p. 102 
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they are philosophical, not psychological.116 The issue here is whether 
or not what triggers an emotional reaction in creatures such as our-
selves is a reliable guide to what is morally pertinent. Saying that they 
are, and specifying all of the characteristics of actions and agents that 
should lead a moral person to experience such emotions, will mean 
working out a normative theory. Maybe this theory will say that the 
fact that a harm was brought about in an up-front and violent manner 
matters morally; presumably it must. This will not really be a change 
at the level of metaethics, but at the level of first-order moral theory. 
7 “Deontological judgments are based in heuristics” 
An elaboration on the Emotions bad argument, Berker claims, would 
be the notion that deontological judgments are unreliable because they 
take the form of heuristics, i.e. a form of standardized shortcuts that 
facilitate or make redundant costly deliberation.117 The problem with 
this would be some well-known errors associated with employing 
heuristics in domains such as probability.118 The major problem with 
using the heuristics charge to undermine deontology is that, in con-
trast to probability, in morals we cannot (as easily) compare the heu-
ristics to truths and note which heuristics are right and which are 
wrong. Berker is right about that: we can assess if heuristics about a 
certain domain are largely trustworthy or not only if we have an inde-
pendent way to assess the truth about claims made in that domain. 
And in the case of ethics, arguably we have no such thing. Still, con-
sidering what we know from the use of heuristics in areas like ration-
ality and probability may make us somewhat hesitant to take them at 
face value in ethics.  
8 “The argument from evolutionary history” 
The third way of characterizing the challenge Berker calls “The argu-
ment from evolutionary history”.119 It says that our emotion-driven de-
ontological judgments have their evolutionary roots in an ancient en-
vironment we no longer find ourselves in, and that, because of this, in 
contrast to consequentialist intuitions, they have no “genuine norma-
tive force”. But, Berker says, this is no more than a just-so story, and 
“presumably consequentialist intuitions are just as much a product of 
 
116 See Joyce 2008.  
117 Berker 2009, p. 317. 
118 See Kahneman 2011, esp. chapters 10 thru 18. 
119 Berker, p. 319. 
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evolution –whether directly or indirectly – as deontological intuitions 
are, so an appeal to evolutionary history gives us no reason to privilege 
consequentialist intuitions over deontological ones.” The possible con-
trast between tendencies in us that favor deontological ethics and util-
itarian ethics and their link to evolution will be explored in the next 
chapter, so I will postpone commenting on that point here.  
To sum up, I do somewhat disagree with Berker that these three 
versions of the argument leave deontology altogether unaffected. If we 
come to believe, based on studying neuroscience and other empirical 
data, that deontological judgments are often triggered by emotions, 
take the form of heuristics and are part of our evolved psychology 
from a time when moral issues could not arise beyond the horizon of 
the surrounding tribe, this may subtract some plausibility points from 
this way of thinking about ethics. Separating these three interpreta-
tions from the coming fourth most interesting one, to an extent under-
states the combined weight of the challenge made. The charge that de-
ontological judgments (are prone to) respond to morally irrelevant fac-
tors is actually best explained by the hypothesis that they are based in 
emotions, take the form of heuristics, and are by-products of an ancient 
evolutionary past social world where harming someone could not take 
an impersonal form. So the best challenge is actually not unrelated to 
these, in Berker’s assessment, lesser challenges. But let us now move 
on to discuss what he takes to be the best version of the challenge. 
9 Deontological judgments as responding to irrelevant factors 
Berker says the best version of Greene’s challenge to deontology claims 
that deontological judgments respond to morally irrelevant factors. 
This is how he states the argument:  
P1 The emotional processing that gives rise to deontological 
intuitions responds to factors that make a dilemma per-
sonal rather than impersonal.  
P2 The factors that make a dilemma personal rather than im-
personal are morally irrelevant. 
C1 So, the emotional processing that gives rise to deontolog-
ical intuitions responds to factors that are morally irrele-
vant. 
C2 So, deontological intuitions, unlike consequentialist intu-
itions, do not have any genuine normative force.120 
 
120 Ibid., p. 321. 
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Berker is skeptical of this argument and expresses his misgivings in 
terms of four worries.121 His first worry is that P1 might not be true. 
His second worry is that if P1 is true, P2 will be seen as less plausible. 
The third worry is that C2 does not follow from C1, and finally, his 
forth and most pressing worry: neuroscience seems to be doing no job 
in the argument. Let us go over these worries in turn. 
The first worry is that P1 might not be true, based on the ambiguity 
of a dilemma’s being “personal”: 
Since Greene et al.'s initial characterization of the personal versus im-
personal dilemma distinction does not track the gives-rise-to-a-deon-
tological-judgment versus gives-rise-to-a-consequentialist-judgment 
distinction, it is far from clear that premise P1 is true… [A]ny attempt 
to precisely characterize the features that give rise to distinctively de-
ontological judgments reintroduces many of the intricacies of the 
original trolley problem: formulating a principle that distinguishes 
what separates cases-eliciting-a-deontological-judgment from cases-
eliciting-a-consequentialist-judgment is likely to be as difficult as the 
old problem of formulating a principle that distinguishes the permis-
sible options in trolleylike cases from the impermissible ones… So 
settling on a fully adequate account of the sorts of features to which 
deontological judgments are responding is likely to be an extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, task, and until that task has been com-
pleted, we cannot be sure whether P1 is true.122 
It is true that the characterization of what makes a moral dilemma 
“personal” or “impersonal” in Greene’s terminology has evolved over 
time. In the 2001 study, coders categorized dilemmas as personal if, 
and only if, they exhibited the following three features: a) the act fore-
seeably causes bodily harm to b) a specific, identifiable individual (or 
group thereof) and c) the harm is not the result of the agent deflecting 
an existing threat (sloganized as ME HURT YOU). In later studies 
Greene and his collaborators have tried to isolate the influence of the 
agent’s intention, her spatial proximity to the individual harmed, the 
role of bodily force etcetera which led them to categorize dilemmas as 
personal only if the action considered involves the use of physical force 
(as distinct from mechanically operated switches and the like) in a way 
that causes harm as a means (as distinct from as a side-effect).  
 
121 Ibid., p. 322. 
122 Ibid., p. 322-4. 
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An illustration of how this updated version of the personalness fac-
tor plays out might be seen if we consider some variations of the foot-
bridge case. In one experiment, different versions were given to differ-
ent groups. One group was asked about the standard footbridge sce-
nario where the subject can either approve or disapprove of the per-
son’s pushing the stranger. A second group was given a description 
were the action under consideration was not pushing the stranger, but 
flipping a switch next to him that would release a trap door underneath 
him. A third group was asked to consider a scenario were the stranger 
was pushed with a pole, and, finally, a fourth group considered a version 
were the agent was switching a trap door from afar.123 Answers to the 
four scenarios cluster into a distinct pattern. Around 30 percent of re-
spondents think it is permissible to push the stranger using either your 
hands or a pole. Around 70 percent, then, do not support such actions. 
Around 60 percent of respondents, however, approve of releasing a 
trap door, either from afar or when standing right next to the stranger. 
Releasing a trap door is creating a new threat but it does not involve 
the use of physical force. Using a pole, depending on its length, creates 
a distance between the agent and the stranger and so is less up close 
than the case where one stands next to the stranger and turns a switch, 
but it does involve the use of physical force. Though spatial proximity 
and personal force often hang together, it seems, then, it is the force 
factor distinctively that gives rise to a strong emotional reaction.  
How does this matter for P1? If P1 is interpreted as saying that all 
deontological judgments derive from intuitions that are caused by 
emotional processes responding to the personalness factor, then P1 is 
false. But that is too strong a claim, one that is very unlikely to be true. 
A more plausible suggestion says that for the subset of moral dilemmas 
that are, in the stipulated sense, personal, deontological intuitions and 
corresponding judgments derive from emotional processes. These pro-
cesses respond to features that make a dilemma personal, and not the 
features that, according deontological ethics, make a given act right or 
wrong. So, P1, thus understood, stands. Greene does not have to claim, 
absurdly, that it would not be a deontological judgment to deem as 
impermissible the release from afar of the footbridge trapdoor. What 
he does claim is that people will be more willing to make that admit-
tedly deontological judgment than the deontological judgment that it 
is impermissible to push the stranger in the original footbridge case, 
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and that the difference is accounted for not in terms of morally relevant 
features as outlined by deontological ethics but in terms of emotional 
processes triggered by the use of personal force.  
Let us now turn to, P2, which says “The factors that make a di-
lemma personal rather than impersonal are morally irrelevant”. It is a 
normative principle, not an empirical prediction or explanation. My 
first reaction was that it is uncontroversial. As we have seen, philo-
sophical agreement on this principle is what allows us to observe to 
what extent people in real life seem to place importance on it. But 
Berker is skeptical of P2 too. This is because that while it may be un-
controversial that the use of personal force itself is not of moral im-
portance, it is ”quite another thing to say that whether one has initiated 
a new threat that brings about serious bodily harm to another individ-
ual is a morally irrelevant factor.”124  
This overestimates the importance of the changes to the definition 
of personalness. In all of the tests people have had a stronger emotional 
reaction to some of the scenarios than to others. This tendency is a hu-
man constant and has nothing to do with how researchers define “per-
sonal dilemma”. It is still totally kosher deontology to insist that it is 
impermissible to initiate new threats harming another individual. But, 
as we have seen, creating a threat is distinct from using force, so this 
does not really challenge P2.  
So what is the disagreement really over? There is a certain nebu-
lousness about the nature of the dispute here, which I think derives 
from Greene. In some of his writings he comes close to expressing the 
thought that deontological judgments are a sort of psychological nat-
ural kind, or in any event a phenomenon that science discovers for 
us.125 But we need to make a division of labor here: what makes a judg-
ment a deontological judgment or a consequentialist judgment is de-
termined by the relation between the content of that judgment and the 
moral theories we call deontological and consequentialist respectively. 
Typically, people working in moral philosophy will be the most com-
petent jurors here. What goes on in the brain, what stimuli trigger these 
judgments etcetera, these questions are, of course, outside the compe-
tence of philosophers to answer. Greene seems at places to propose 
that deontologist philosophers do not really understand what deontol-
ogy is, just the way members of an isolated tropical community may 
fail to realize ice is a form of water. But we do not have to get into 
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complicated matters of reference and natural kinds here. The follow-
ing is sufficient: the best explanation of the failure to separate at a prin-
cipled level the permissibility of acting in cases like Push and Loop is 
that human beings have an innate emotional reaction to personal force, 
and deontological philosophy has rationalized these reactions into ar-
ticulate principles. The principles have nothing to do with personal 
force, but it is with the presence or absence of that factor that the per-
ceived plausibility of the principles will vary. This is controversial 
enough, but seems to me as something we have grounds for accepting. 
According to Berker, there is a tension between P1 and P2 such that 
if the triggers of deontological judgments are characterized in simplis-
tic terms (e.g. responding to degree of personalness), they are easily 
dismissible as morally irrelevant, but the more complex and nuanced 
the characterization of what triggers deontological judgments become, 
the less plausible it will be to dismiss that account as responding to 
morally irrelevant factors. But, as I said when discussing P1, there is 
no need to claim that all deontological moral judgments respond to 
morally irrelevant features, such as personalness. It is enough that a 
sufficiently large and important sub-group of deontological judgments 
do. And remember, it would be question-begging to assume at this 
point what features are morally relevant (number of survivors versus 
intentionally causing harm to an innocent person etcetera). All that is 
needed is that under none of the theories discussed is personalness per 
se considered morally relevant.  
Berker’s third worry is that, even if we grant P2 (that personalness 
is morally irrelevant), the argument is invalid since C2 does not follow 
from C1. We may come to conclude that deontology has been given a 
blow, but this alone does not justify us in assuming that a similar blow 
might not be in the cards for consequentialism too. For instance, Berker 
claims, it might be said that consequentialist judgments fail “to re-
spond to morally relevant factors by ignoring the separateness of per-
sons, or by treating people as vats of well-being, or by assuming all 
value is to-be-promoted, or by making morality incompatible with in-
tegrity” leaving us with the same old battle over what moral intuitions 
are the right ones.126  
If separateness of persons (in some sense incompatible with conse-
quentialism) is a moral desideratum and if utilitarians do not pay at-
tention to that, then they are indeed mistaken. But the dialectic here is 
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different. For the suggestion is that we have found a feature, unlike 
separateness or whatever, that deontologists and consequentialist 
alike agree is morally insignificant. It is because of this shared commit-
ment that Greene and Singer got a foothold in the debate: it is a non-
question-begging challenge to the datum that, in certain scenarios, de-
ontological judgments seem more plausible than consequentialist ones 
even in the absence of a principled way of making sense of the discrep-
ancy. Berker may be right, of course, that an analogous undermining 
of consequentialism in fact is possible, although the specific routes he 
mentions would not seem to be plausible candidates, since they are not 
agreed by consequentialists and deontologists alike to be morally rel-
evant. 
In any event, it has to be admitted C2 does not follow from C1. We 
should also note that Greene does not claim it does either (this is after 
all Berker’s reconstruction of what he takes Greene’s challenge to be). 
The only way C2 would follow from C1 is under the implausible as-
sumption that every factor speaking against deontology automatically 
entails a corresponding strengthening of consequentialism. Because 
Greene does not claim C2 follows from C1, and since it clearly does 
not, a more interesting interpretation, I claim, is to think of C1 as 
providing an undercutting defeater against certain ways of question-
ing consequentialism, i.e. ways which, upon empirical inspection, are 
revealed to rely on the defunct personalness factor. This is more in line 
with the shape of the debate, and with Greene’s intentions. Still, there 
may be specific direct ways of undermining beliefs favoring utilitari-
anism too, as well as a more general skepticism towards all moral be-
liefs. These worries will be the topic of the next chapter.  
10 What is added by the empirical work? 
Let us now look at Berker’s most pressing worry, viz. that the neuro-
science does no work in the case against deontology.  
We have, Berker notes, three distinctions under consideration: 
1) dilemmas that engage emotion processing versus dilemmas 
that engage “cognitive” processing; 
2) dilemmas that elicit deontological judgments versus dilem-
mas that elicit consequentialist judgments; 
3) personal moral dilemmas versus impersonal moral dilem-
mas.127 
 
127 Ibid., p. 325. 
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And continues: 
Greene et al.’s dual-process hypothesis posits that the first of these 
distinctions matches up with the second. In order to experimentally 
assess this hypothesis, Greene and his colleagues identified the sec-
ond distinction with the third one, and then directly tested whether 
the first distinction matches up with the third. But the argument from 
morally irrelevant factors only depends on Greene et al.’s identifica-
tion of the second distinction with the third one. Thus the neurosci-
entific results are beside the point.128 
Here is how I think this may be answered. We should not identify the 
second distinction with the third. Rather, dilemmas of type 3), i.e. per-
sonal dilemmas, tend to cause an emotional reaction in respondents, i.e. 
type 1) dilemmas. That is a scientific finding from, among other 
sources, fMRI experimentation, and so is not something which makes 
the neuroscience or other empirical findings “beside the point”.129 This 
emotional reaction in turn, especially when not countered by a re-
sponse produced in brain structures known to be involved in “cogni-
tive” or “information processing” tasks, will typically cause the re-
spondent to make a deontological moral judgment about what would 
be the right thing to do. So the work done by neuroscience is that it 
provides us with a causal account of moral judgment, one that was not 
known to philosophers from the armchair and for which there is much 
empirical evidence in addition to neuroscience. The account in ques-
tion, the dual process theory, says deontological judgments are often 
the result of features of the case at hand not themselves judged to be 
morally relevant on the deontological moral theory, such as the pres-
ence or absence of personal force. No such similar systematic mis-
match between professed features of moral relevance and moral judg-
ment seems to exist in the case of utilitarian judgments, which consist-
ently track the feature judged to be of moral importance on that view: 
the maximization of value. So, neuroscience and other kinds of psy-
chological (broadly defined) evidence indeed do some work in 
Greene’s work.  
11 Restating the challenge 
Berker’s central expression in the discussion has been if Greene has 
established if there is or is not any “genuine normative force” to deon-
tological intuitions. This way of phrasing things, I believe, is a little 
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unclear. As I mentioned, I am critical of his reconstruction of Greene’s 
view, and I suggest at this point to rephrase Greene’s argument, so that 
it a) is more explicitly one with an epistemic conclusion b) allows for 
assessment in terms of degree or “plausibility points” and c) does not 
rely on an overly ambitious view about the psychology of all deonto-
logical judgments. Here is how I suggest we understand Greene’s chal-
lenge: 
P1’ A significant subset of deontological judgments are 
caused by emotional processes which respond to fac-
tors that make a dilemma personal rather than imper-
sonal. 
P2’ The factors that make a dilemma personal rather than im-
personal are morally irrelevant on both deontological 
and consequentialist accounts. 
C1’  A significant subset of deontological judgments respond 
to factors that are morally irrelevant on both deontologi-
cal and consequentialist accounts. 
C2’ When criticisms of consequentialist ethics rely on judg-
ments that respond to morally irrelevant factors we may 
justifiably take that particular criticism as possessing no 
or minimal evidentiary value. 
This, I suggest, is the challenge of the dual process view to deontolog-
ical ethics. It clearly makes neuroscience (and other kinds of empirical 
data) do some work. C1 follows from P1 and P2, and these premises 
stand a good chance of being true. By “significant subset” here I do not 
necessarily have in mind a number or relative proportion, but rather a 
set of judgments we take an interest in because they constitute an im-
portant conflict line in ethical theory, viz. the debate between conse-
quentialist and deontological ethics. Admittedly, even on this recon-
struction, C1’ does not logically imply C2’ but rather puts epistemic 
pressure on some of the most stubborn traditional criticisms of conse-
quentialism. 
12 What are deontological and what are consequentialist 
judgments? 
A lot has been said about the neural correlates of deontological and 
utilitarian judgments. We know what these are, right? Deontological 
judgments, in these contexts, are often judgments to the effect that a 
proposed line of action, while leading to a positive overall outcome in 
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some sense (more survivors, more wellbeing etcetera), is immoral be-
cause it violates some fundamental restriction. Like pushing someone 
in front of a trolley to save five lives. And utilitarian judgments are 
judgments that a proposed line of action, while violating some pur-
ported restriction, is never the less morally okay because it leads to 
overall better effects. Like pushing someone in front of a trolley to save 
five lives. 
Frances Kamm and others have voiced the concern that the way the 
options are labeled in the tests and surveys used is often inaccurate in 
a way that may make utilitarian judgments seem more appealing than 
they would be if more accurately expressed.130 In Greene’s first study 
the question asked after describing a dilemma was if a given course of 
action (say pushing the stranger on the footbridge was “Appropriate” 
or “Inappropriate”. This is not typically the vocabulary of moral phi-
losophy, but was used to create a seamless transition between moral 
and nonmoral contexts. But more importantly, the term “appropriate” 
does not distinguish “permissible” from “obligatory”, and the most 
plausible interpretation is probably that the suggested action is per-
missible but not obligatory. And, it may be argued, on utilitarianism, 
refraining from pushing the stranger is not permissible, and hence 
pushing him is obligatory: one does the wrong thing if one refrains. 
Take The crying baby dilemma mentioned above for instance. A group 
of people are hiding in a basement while enemy soldiers search the 
neighborhood. If you are found, you will be killed just as all the others 
already rounded up and instantly killed. Your baby cries, and the 
sound will soon be noticeable to the enemy soldiers. If nothing else 
helps, would it be “appropriate” of you to suffocate your baby so that 
the group will not be detected and killed? Greene suggests saying yes 
to this is a characteristically utilitarian judgment. And saying no is a 
characteristically deontological judgment, since although the outcome 
will be less bad, killing your baby is just wrong.  
Here is what Kamm says about this case. The baby will die no mat-
ter what you do, and hence is not made worse off by being killed. Also, 
since it is the baby’s cries which would reveal the group’s wherea-
bouts, the baby is a so-called innocent threat. Given these strange and 
appalling circumstances, it is unclear what deontological principle for-
bids killing this doomed baby.131 If the child’s life depended on your 
actions or if it was a bystander and not an innocent threat, things 
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would be different according to deontological ethics, but not according 
to utilitarianism. On utilitarianism, killing a bystander child who is not 
a threat and who would live if it were not for your action may be mor-
ally obligatory. If “appropriate” means “merely permissible”, that is an 
incorrect way of describing the utilitarian verdict on the crying baby 
dilemma. While, according to the deontological ethics proposed by 
Kamm, killing the child is permissible. So how can an answer, that kill-
ing the baby is permissible but not obligatory, which is actually false 
according to utilitarianism but true according to deontological ethics, 
be classified as “characteristically” utilitarian?  
These are good questions. If the only response options are “appro-
priate” and “inappropriate”, a reasonable interpretation is that the for-
mer includes both the prerogative and the obligation to act. But Greene 
had probably assumed that the crying baby case was one where the 
deontological judgment was definitely to call the proposed action in-
appropriate. And if Kamm says he is wrong about that, who can disa-
gree? This kind of inexactness in gauging what it is people are doing 
when they provide their assessments of what may be done should 
make us feel less secure in the conclusions drawn by Greene and oth-
ers. It may be that the net they threw at these matters was, here and 
there, a bit too coarse. On the other hand it may be argued that the 
resolution is high enough, for what we are trying to get at are not the 
precise statements of philosophers but psychological tendencies and 
how these tendencies give rise to approval or disapproval of major al-
ternatives in the ethical debate. Some parts of our psychology, Greene 
would say, make us favor a utilitarian way of thinking where action-
types are not seen as right or wrong in themselves but right or wrong 
given the alternatives and consequences, and a corresponding deonto-
logical flipside where some action-types are seen as right or wrong in 
themselves quite distinct from their overall consequences. I think it is 
fair to say we have seen a measure of that, some lack of finesse not-
withstanding. But it is also fair to say that there are many ways of de-
veloping a deontological ethics, and not all of them will conserve peo-
ple’s intuitions about drastic cases such as the crying baby. As Kamm 
phrased it, “nonconsequentialists are not squeamish”, and are indeed 
willing to up close personally use violent force, only under different 
conditions than the utilitarian.132 It seems not even Kamm is a preser-
vationist. 
 
132 Ibid., p. 335.  
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Foot’s, and later on Thomson’s, formulation of the trolley problems, 
and other related dilemmas of causing death and saving lives, caught 
our attention because of the inconsistency or tension occurring when 
we say yes in Switch and no in Push, and then yes again in Loop. The 
attempts to come up with a principled way of accounting for this led 
us down a route of philosophical contortionism. They could have just 
said no at the very first junction. Greene suggests people fail to see 
what needs to be done in Push because emotions cloud our minds. But 
a possible reply to this is that we fail to see the impermissibility of 
turning the trolley in the firsts case because we are not emotionally 
triggered. The absence of an emotional response leads people to falsely 
adopt a utilitarian mindset, or some version of deontology where this 
choice is permissible. Thomson herself now accepts this view. Her rea-
soning is as follows. In the Switch case, let us introduce a third option: 
in addition to the track containing the group of five and the side track 
with the one single person, we now also have a third track – where you 
are at. You said it was permissible to kill one to save five. Would you 
turn the trolley on yourself – must you, morally, do it? Thomson thinks 
you have no obligation to be that altruistic. And you are not permitted 
to impose that same cost on someone else instead. The man who thinks 
he does not have to pay with his own life to save five cannot “decently 
regard himself as entitled to make someone else pay it.”133  
13 Conclusion 
The upshot is that, for decades, even deontologist philosophers man-
aged to forget that “negative duties really are weightier than positive 
duties”.134 But how could that be? Thomson does not even want to 
mention Greene, she has instead herself concluded that,  
what seems to vary is at heart this: how drastic an assault on the one 
the agent has to make in order to bring about thereby that the five 
live. The more drastic the means the more strikingly abhorrent the 
agent's proceeding. That I suspect may be due to the fact that the 
more drastic the means the more striking it is that the agent who pro-
ceeds infringes a negative duty to the one.135  
 
133 Thomson 2008, p. 366. She acknowledges the work by MIT grad student Alexan-
der Friedman as instrumental in triggering this change.  
134 Ibid. 353. 
135 Ibid. 374. 
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I will not more fully detail and assess Thomson’s trolley turnaround 
here.136 The reason I bring up her new, highly interesting, take on these 
matters – and the same is true for my brief discussion of Frances 
Kamm – is, rather, to point to the many options available for us in con-
tinuing a discussion from the point of view of moral philosophy even 
after all of the psychological, anthropological, and neuroscientific facts 
are acknowledged. Greene’s criticism of deontological ethics is based 
on the idea that many of its verdicts are rationalizations of emotional 
responses triggered by features of actions and situations which are, 
even on the deontological view itself, morally irrelevant. This charge 
is inapplicable in cases where the position defended rejects the more 
intuitive response (switching the trolley) or goes against judgments 
congruent with a strong emotional response (killing the baby). This 
suggest that there are many ways of working out a deontological eth-
ics, and that this project seems feasible enough even if we come to sus-
pect that many judgments often thought of as characteristically deon-
tological originate in emotional responses to morally irrelevant factors. 
The struggle continues.
 
136 For some assessments, see FitzPatrick 2009 and Graham 2017. 
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3 Coping with Debunking: Ethical 
Truths of Reason 
People have been wary about the possible moral implications of evo-
lutionary theory ever since Darwin published On the Origin of Species 
in 1859.137 Many of us know the (regrettably apocryphal) story of how 
the wife of the Bishop of Worcester is supposed to have said, upon 
learning of the book’s claims, “Descended from the apes! My dear, let 
us hope that it is not true, but if it is, let us pray that it will not become 
generally known”. The initial worry was that the non-divine origin of 
humans did not sit well with the teachings of Christian ethics. In the 
last decades, however, the biological challenge to morality has often 
been thought to consist in the fear that evolution has produced our 
capacity for moral judgment in a way that is adaptive rather than ac-
curate. 138 The fashionable term for this is that evolutionary considera-
tions might debunk our moral claims.  
Peter Singer was the first philosopher to write about Joshua 
Greene’s neuroscientific research, and he took it to support consequen-
tialist modes of thinking in ethics over deontological ones.139 At that 
time, it seemed to him that neuroscientific and evolutionary consider-
ations were particularly compromising for deontological moral judg-
ments, leaving consequentialist judgments intact or at least relatively 
less affected (see chapter 3). Since then a more general onslaught on 
ethics based in evolutionary psychological considerations wider than 
Greene’s dual process theory has gained prominence in the field, no-
tably through the works of Sharon Street and Richard Joyce. Singer 
never intended to throw out the baby with the bathwater, so he had to 
return, with co-author Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek, for some damage-
control, seeking again to examine the notion that bringing evolution-
ary psychology into the picture will undermine some but not all ethical 
 
137 For an overview, see Ruse & Richards (eds.) 2017. 
138 An early but still contemporary example is Ruse 1985. More recently Joyce 2006 
and Street 2006 are probably the most prominent exponents of this line of challenge 
(more on Street shortly). There are, of course, also suggestions that evolutionary the-
ory in some way or other vindicates morality, providing it with some external ground 
or even first order moral principles. See eg. Sterelny & Fraser 2017. 
139 Singer 2005. 
 
70 
views.140 The aim of this chapter is to examine whether or not that res-
cue mission succeeded. It was a very ambitious project, and so a degree 
of skepticism towards it is to be expected.  
1 Evolutionary debunking 
The starting assumption is the idea that the causal origin of a belief 
may affect how justified a person is in holding the belief. If I open my 
fridge and carefully inspect the interior and observe that it is com-
pletely empty save for an old ketchup bottle, I am justified in claiming 
“We have no milk”, whereas if I come to believe the same thing based, 
not on looking in the fridge, but on the testimony of my old demented 
uncle, clearly my justification is weaker. When I look outside and no-
tice the sun is shining, this gives me grounds for accepting that the sun 
is in fact shining. Barring extravagant circumstances, we take such ob-
servations to be reliable indicators of what the facts are. But suppose I 
now learn that someone is actually blocking the visibility right outside 
my window and is instead projecting a perfect image of a shining sun. 
Absent other information on the matter, this new evidence under-
mines, i.e. debunks, any belief I have about what the weather is like 
outside. Since I realize that the projection would make me form the 
belief that the sun is shining even if it was not, I should suspend belief 
about the current weather. It might be, of course, that behind the pro-
jection of a shining sun, the sun is actually shining. But it should also 
be clear that I would have no grounds for that belief, since I would 
hold it regardless of the actual weather. The (causal) link we typically 
require between the external world and my observation has been sev-
ered. So a debunking account is not intended to establish the falsity of 
some claim, but instead removes the positive grounds for accepting 
said claim. 
Debunking explanations such as these are pretty unremarkable. 
How do they relate to matters of ethics? Let us turn to our brains. The 
human brain is a physical organ and its structure and function are the 
result of millions of years of natural selection. Our capacity to ”moral-
ize”, that is our propensity to evaluate behavior, characters, situations 
and states of affairs from a moral point of view, is made possible by 
the brain. Why this capacity?141 Presumably because it helped our an-
cestors survive and procreate. In order for the capacity to have this 
 
140 Lazari-Radek & Singer 2012, and the 2014 book by the same authors. 
141 See chapter 1. 
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function, do we also need to suppose it gives us an accurate represen-
tation of a mind-independent moral reality? The answer is not obvi-
ous, since we have no grounds for assuming that a capacity to make 
moral judgment is adaptive only insofar as it is truthful. Consider, by 
analogy, our vision. This capacity has evolved because, again, it has 
helped our ancestors to survive and procreate. In order for the capacity 
to have this function, do we also need to suppose it gives us an accu-
rate representation of a mind-independent world? This time, the an-
swer is obvious. The visual stimuli we receive are useful for survival 
and procreation because by-and-large they accurately transfer infor-
mation about surrounding dangers, food-sources, partners etcetera. 
For many of our visual experiences the best explanation of their occur-
rence postulates the object of the experience as a mind-independent 
fact. The challenge is: can something similar be said for moral judg-
ments? If no positive answer is available, the reliability of moral judg-
ments is threatened. 
2 Sharon Street’s challenge 
In her 2006 paper “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of 
Value” Sharon Street stated the challenge in the following way: 
Evolutionary forces have played a tremendous role in shaping the 
content of human evaluative attitudes. The challenge for realist theo-
ries of value is to explain the relation between these evolutionary in-
fluences on our evaluative attitudes, on the one hand, and the inde-
pendent evaluative truths that realism posits, on the other. Realism, 
I argue, can give no satisfactory account of this relation. On the one 
hand, the realist may claim that there is no relation between evolu-
tionary influences on our evaluative attitudes and independent eval-
uative truths. But this claim leads to the implausible skeptical result 
that most of our evaluative judgments are off track due to the dis-
torting pressure of Darwinian forces. The realist’s other option is to 
claim that there is a relation between evolutionary influences and in-
dependent evaluative truths, namely that natural selection favored 
ancestors who were able to grasp those truths. But this account, I ar-
gue, is unacceptable on scientific grounds.142 
So what are evolved social apes like us likely to think ethics demand, 
according to Street? Here are two examples: that a) We have greater 
obligations to help our own children than we do to help complete 
strangers, and b) The fact that someone has treated one well is a reason 
 
142 Street 2006, p. 109. 
 
72 
to treat that person well in return.143 It is obvious why, on evolutionary 
grounds, we would come to believe we have special duties toward our 
children. Not being prone to think that, or being prone to think the 
opposite, would produce fewer surviving offspring. Or rather, the 
mechanism is this: because we and other mammals are naturally dis-
posed to care for our offspring and place a primacy on their interests, 
once morality evolves we will be disposed to accept moral judgments 
conducive to these tendencies. So the crux here is that it is the very 
natural appeal of these positions that spell the dismantling of our con-
fidence in them. For, as with that sunny projection right outside my 
window, we would hold those beliefs even if they were not true. Russ 
Shafer-Landau has usefully labeled the notion that, due to evolution-
ary forces, our moral faculties are more disposed to accept beliefs with 
certain propositional contents rather than others ”doxastically discrimi-
nating”.144 This bias undermines, or so one might fear, our grounds for 
thinking our beliefs are responsive to how the purported moral facts 
are, which in turn should lower our confidence in them.145 
3 Accounting for miracles 
If our moral beliefs have been shaped independently of any moral facts 
it would be something of a miracle if any one of them were true. Like, 
in Street’s words, arriving at the shores of Bermuda after setting out 
for the islands while ”letting the course of your boat be determined by 
the wind and tides”.146 Is there a better way to navigate this? In re-
sponse to Street’s challenge, a variety of coping strategies have been 
formulated. In the remainder of this chapter, I would like to pay spe-
cial attention to a suggestion made by Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and 
Peter Singer.  
In the course of writing a book on Henry Sidgwick’s philosophy 
and how his thinking relates to themes in contemporary debates in 
 
143 Ibid. In the terms presented in chapter 1, Street (like myself) is a strong nativist, 
i.e. she holds our natural tendency to make moral judgments is skewed towards judg-
ments of a certain sort, namely those that would favor behavior that by and large are 
conducive to inclusive fitness.  
144 Shafer-Landau 2012, p. 4. 
145 The debunking thesis is variously expressed as the charge that our moral judg-
ments are insensitive to the moral facts, or that we can explain our judgments without 
references to them being true, or that any successful correspondence between moral 
judgment and moral facts is just a coincidence or that our moral judgments are unrelia-
ble. For discussions, see e.g. Enoch 2010 and Srinivasan 2015. 
146 Street, op.cit., page 121. 
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moral philosophy, Lazari-Radek and Singer came up with a nifty re-
sponse to Street which they claim salvages the objectivity of ethics in a 
way that is not vulnerable to evolutionary debunking.147 Lazari-Radek 
and Singer first take us through another debate, which much troubled 
Sidgwick: the relation between the demands of ethics (on his view, uni-
versal benevolence) and the demands of rational egoism (individual 
prudence). Sidgwick famously ended his The Methods of Ethics in a tone 
of despair, noting there is an “ultimate and fundamental contradiction 
in our apparent intuitions of what is Reasonable in conduct,” concern-
ing the individual’s reasons to promote the good of oneself and the 
good of others.148 Having spent hundreds of pages establishing univer-
sal benevolence as the correct ethical position, Sidgwick still thought 
there exists no decisive reason to hold ethical demands as more ration-
ally compelling than self-interested demands. But, Lazari-Radek and 
Singer argue, Sidgwick was overly pessimistic about the irreconcilabil-
ity of the conflict between universal benevolence and prudence. Com-
ing to see this then gives us, so they claim, ammunition that can be 
used to fight back on Street’s evolutionarily inspired challenge to 
moral realism.  
Lazari-Radek and Singer grant, and claim Sidgwick would too, that 
Street is right in claiming that many (perhaps most) of our moral judg-
ments are unjustified.149 They also grant that it is hard to defend the 
notion that evolution might have equipped us with some psychologi-
cal capacity that would make us identify true moral judgments as such. 
But, they argue, evolution has equipped us with a more general rea-
soning ability, which was not itself selected for because it helped us 
identify moral truths, but is possible to put into such use once in place:  
A plausible explanation of the existence of these capacities is that the 
ability to reason comes as a package that could not be economically 
divided by evolutionary pressures. Either we have a capacity to rea-
son that includes the capacity to do advanced physics and mathemat-
ics and to grasp objective moral truths, or we have a much more lim-
ited capacity to reason that lacks not only these abilities but others 
that confer an overriding evolutionary advantage. If reason is a unity 
 
147 Lazari-Radek & Singer 2014. I concentrate in this chapter mostly on their 2012 
paper. 
148 Sidgwick 1907, p. 508. 
149 Lazari-Radek & Singer 2012, p. 13. 
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of this kind, having the package would have been more conducive to 
survival and reproduction than not having it.150 
It is easy to see why there would be selective pressures causing our 
ancestors to develop mental skills that helped them plan and to form 
complex cooperative hunting schemes, anticipate the behavior of part-
ners, prey and predators, perform basic arithmetic tasks, build shel-
ters, gossip, assess threats, build weapons and so forth. Although we 
may have some modular machinery for specific tasks like that, it seems 
parsimonious to postulate some degree of general, domain-neutral 
emergent capacity for rationality as well. This domain-general rational 
capacity, Lazari-Radek and Singer believe, may help us identify moral 
truths that are not vulnerable to debunking, statements which are true 
and evidently so.  
4 Self-evidence in ethics 
There is a long tradition, of which Sidgwick is a part, in moral philos-
ophy of thinking that some ethical statements are self-evident. How are 
we to understand this attribute? John Locke, though not himself a pro-
ponent of the view that there are self-evident ethical statements, beau-
tifully characterized a self-evident proposition as one that “carries its 
own light and evidence with it, and needs no other proof: he that un-
derstands the terms, assents to it for its own sake”151 Eighteenth cen-
tury philosopher Richard Price said in a more psychological vein that 
“There are undoubtedly a variety of moral principles and maxims, 
which, to gain assent, need only to be understood.”152 W.D. Ross gave 
a more epistemological emphasis and defined a self-evident statement 
as being “evident without any need of proof, or of evidence beyond 
itself”.153 C.D. Broad said that there are some statements “such that a 
rational being of sufficient insight and intelligence could see it to be 
true by merely inspecting it and reflecting on its terms and their mode 
of combination”.154  
 
150 Ibid., p. 17. 
151 Locke 1690, p. 32. As I understand Locke he rejected the notion that ethical prin-
ciples are self-evident, claiming “there cannot any one moral rule be proposed whereof 
a man may not justly demand a reason” (ibid). For a concise presentation of Locke’s 
views, see Schneewind 1994.  
152 Price 1787, p. 284.  
153 Ross 1930, p. 29. 
154 Broad 1936, p. 102-3. 
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A more recent statement comes from Robert Audi, who says that 
self-evident propositions are “truths such that (a) adequately under-
standing them is sufficient justification for believing them … and (b) 
believing them on the basis of adequately understanding them entails 
knowing them”155 Some intuitionists state the view in terms of a per-
missible prima facie credence to what seems plausible, as when Michael 
Huemer writes, “If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, 
S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing p”, and 
that beliefs thus formed are justified “unless countervailing evidence 
should arise that is strong enough to defeat the initial presumption in 
their favor”. 156 
All of these varying statements belong in a tradition called ethical 
intuitionism. This position comprises both a metaphysical thesis and 
an epistemological. The metaphysical thesis is a non-naturalist form of 
moral realism according to which there exists moral properties and 
these properties are not identical, nor reducible, to any natural prop-
erty or properties. The epistemological thesis is the above stated notion 
that some basic moral propositions are self-evident and need no fur-
ther support. Many, of course, are skeptical of the metaphysical thesis 
and so defend either moral nihilism or various forms of naturalist re-
alism.157 In this context my primary concern is with the epistemological 
thesis, i.e. the view that belief in a proposition based on properly un-
derstanding and reflecting on it entails, with some reservations to be 
spelled out shortly, knowledge. There are, then, on this view, some 
justified, true ethical claims which are able to withstand attacks of the 
sort offered by Sharon Street.  
5 Debunkproofing moral principles 
Sidgwick formulated a four-step test by which we could separate the 
only seemingly self-evident statements from the genuinely self-evi-
dent. Propositions with a claim to self-evidence, Sidgwick suggested, 
must meet the following conditions with “complete fulfillment”: 
a. The proposition is clear and precise. 
b. The self-evidence is ascertained by careful reflection 
c. The propositions accepted as self-evident must be mutually consistent 
d. There is general acceptance of the propositions.158 
 
155 Audi 2008, p. 478. 
156 Huemer 2007, p. 30, and Huemer 2005, p. 105, respectively. 
157 Mackie 1977, Olson 2014; Brink 1989, Foot 2001.  
158 Sidgwick 1907, pp. 338-42. My italics. 
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Lazari-Radek and Singer adopt parts of Sidgwick’s litmus test, and 
adds a non-debunking clause to it. On their suggestion, a moral intui-
tion enjoys ”the highest possible degree of reliability” when 
1. careful reflection leads to a conviction of self-evidence;  
2. there is independent agreement of other careful thinkers; and 
3. there is no plausible explanation of the intuition as the outcome of an 
evolutionary or other non-truth-tracking process.159 
We have a lot of seemingly plausible moral intuitions, and the job of 
moral philosophy is to put them through this updated Sidgwick test. 
As utilitarians, Lazari-Radek and Singer are of course quite happy to 
have statements defending family partiality and justice as reciprocity 
debunked on account of them being plausibly explained as the out-
come of an evolutionary or other non-truth-tracking process. But could 
there be other moral principles, with no link to an evolutionary benefit, 
that survive Street’s challenge? Lazari-Radek and Singer argue that 
there is still room for some moral statements to remain standing after 
the philosophical worms of evolutionary debunking have done their 
job.  
In addition to Sidgwick, Lazari-Radek and Singer are inspired by 
Derek Parfit and his turn in later works to a form of non-naturalist 
moral realism conjoined with the epistemological thesis that some 
statements are self-evident. According to Parfit an example of a self-
evident proposition on a non-moral matter would be:  
 W: No statement can be both wholly true and wholly false.160  
And, as an example of self-evident moral statement he provides: 
 T: Torturing children merely for fun is morally wrong.161  
For Lazari-Radek and Singer, the statement at the center of their atten-
tion is Sidgwick’s point-of-view-of-the-universe idea, which says:  
 U: The good of any one individual is of no more importance, 
from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, 
than the good of any other.162 
 
159 Lazari-Radek & Singer 2012, p. 26. 
160 Parfit 2011b, p. 544. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Sidgwick 1907, p. 382. 
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6 Agreement of other careful thinkers  
Lazari-Radek and Singer actually say very little on what self-evidence 
is or how to tell when we face a case of it. This may not be a particular 
weakness of their position, since they stand on the shoulders of Sidg-
wick and others after him who have developed views on that particu-
lar part. Instead, they focus on how the idea that some ethical claims 
are self-evident interacts with anthropological, biological and other 
empirical data. According to Lazari-Radek and Singer there is a ten-
dency for the most widely adopted religions to espouse an ethical com-
mitment nearly identical to U. We can see this thought expressed, they 
claim, in the Jewish and Christian versions of the Golden Rule, and 
similar ideas are present in the Confucian, Hindu, and Buddhist tradi-
tions.163 That the originators of these various traditions, in most cases 
isolated from one another, would converge over accepting something 
like U is best explained, Lazari-Radek and Singer suggest, by its being 
a truth of reason: “Like our ability to do higher mathematics, it can 
most plausibly be explained as the outcome of our capacity to rea-
son.”164  
I think it is safe to say, my limited scholarly reach notwithstanding, 
that all these traditions are actually not in agreement, and that much 
of the purported agreement is at least partly sustained simply because 
the target claims are very imprecise. One could find elements of more 
or less any moral position in those ancient schools. We could grant that 
all ethical traditions broadly speaking are about the proper restraint of 
self-interest and the promotion of a wider good. But that is just not 
distinct enough. We need more precisely formulated positions before 
we can say we have an agreement or not.  
Though we probably overestimate the occurrence and depth of gen-
uine and fundamental moral disagreement in the world, if we turn our 
focus to present-day moral philosophers (”other careful thinkers”) it 
seems clear the disagreements in normative ethics cannot entirely be 
explained by differences in empirical assumptions, cultural back-
ground or cognitive shortcomings on the part of one side of a divide 
in opinion. In fact, the agreement criterion is more suitably directed 
against the notion that there are some moral intuitions that are truths 
of reason. For if there were, we would expect to see reasonable people 
 
163 Lazari-Radek & Singer 2012, p. 26. 
164 Ibid. In addition to these tendencies toward impartiality and inclusion, anthropo-
logical data would also tell a story of tribalism and differential moral status, a ten-
dency in ethics not even the most careful thinkers have been immune to. 
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converge, but they do not. Parfit worried a lot over peer disagreement 
and more or less wrote three thick volumes to finally make everyone 
agree, because 
If we had strong reasons to believe that, even in ideal conditions, we 
and others would have deeply conflicting normative beliefs, it would 
be hard to defend the view that we have the intuitive ability to rec-
ognize some normative truths. We would have to believe that, when 
we disagree with others, it is only we who can recognize such truths. 
But if many other people, even in ideal conditions, could not recog-
nize such truths, we could not rationally believe that we have this 
ability. How could we be so special? And if none of us could recog-
nize such normative truths, we could not rationally believe that there 
are any such truths.165 
In some matters, disagreement is a tolerable thing and does not 
threaten the notion that we are dealing with a robust domain of dis-
course. Some participants may simply be in error due to biases or in-
sufficient familiarity with the evidence. Even disagreement among ex-
perts is to be expected in areas where data are either very sparse or 
complex. But disagreement among experts over statements purporting 
to be self-evident is really a warning flag that the statements in question 
are not self-evident. One may respond that if lack of widespread disa-
greement is crucial, it would appear this will (over)generalize to other 
philosophical areas, outside of moral matters. And there may even be 
a sort of self-undermining quality to this requirement: is it not the case 
that qualified philosophers disagree what the implications of disagree-
ment are for a given domain of discourse? I do not think these are ab-
surd implications. One may concede that, yes, maybe widespread dis-
agreement among philosophers constitutes to an extent evidence that 
the domain of discourse in question is not one where self-evidence is 
to be found. Additionally, all statements, including the notion that the 
presence of peer disagreement is prima facie evidence that we are not 
dealing with self-evident claims, are to be assessed on a coherentist 
fashion. Lazari-Radek and Singer, to my mind, pay too little attention 
to these matters, especially as it is listed as one among three necessary 
conditions on a maximally reliable ethical intuition. It is probably be-
cause their main focus is the specific counter to debunking strategies 
that they neglect this part. And given that this thesis is on the impact 
on moral philosophy of research on human behavior I too will turn to 
that part now, setting aside criticisms of the criteria for self-evidence, 
 
165 Parfit 2011b, p. 546. 
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focusing instead on whether their candidate claims plausibly satisfy 
those criteria, in particular that about evolutionary debunking.  
7 No evolutionary explanation 
Here is where Lazari-Radek and Singer put down most of their work. 
They strive to show that the norm of universal benevolence is not vul-
nerable to evolutionary debunking. We have already seen that moral 
statements expressing special concern for our offspring or for the value 
of survival are easy to explain from an evolutionary point of view. That 
is, given the kind of creatures we are, it is a given we would find moral 
propositions like that appealing (perhaps even self-evident). But be-
cause of this, we can see that our grounds for thinking that they, in 
addition to being appealing, correspond to any purported moral facts, 
are weakened. They might be, of course, but the fact that we hold them 
gives no support to that further assumption, since we would hold 
them anyway. We may therefore come to suspect that we are not epis-
temically justified in believing them, or at least that an account of a 
reliable link between our acceptance of these moral judgments and the 
alleged moral facts they imply the existence of should be provided. 
Lazari-Radek and Singer think there are, though, some ethical 
claims which can meet this challenge; in particular Sidgwick’s princi-
ple which states that the good of one individual is of no more im-
portance, from the point of view of the universe, than the good of an-
other individual. This principle, Lazari-Radek and Singer think, is not 
fobbed off upon us by evolutionary forces, but is insulated from such 
undermining processes by being instead the product of reason. Lazari-
Radek and Singer continue:  
Street correctly points out that a specific capacity for recognizing 
moral truths would not increase our reproductive success. But a ca-
pacity to reason would tend to increase our reproductive success. It 
may be that having a capacity to reason involves more than an ability 
to make valid inferences from premises to conclusions. It may include 
the ability to recognize and reject capricious or arbitrary grounds for 
drawing distinctions and to understand self-evident moral truths—
what Sidgwick referred to as “rational intuition.” In other words, we 
might have become reasoning beings because that enabled us to solve 
a variety of problems that would otherwise have hampered our sur-
vival, but once we are capable of reasoning, we may be unable to 
avoid recognizing and discovering some truths that do not aid our 
survival. That can be said about some complicated truths of mathe-
matics or physics. [...] Either we have a capacity to reason that in-
cludes the capacity to do advanced physics and mathematics and to 
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grasp objective moral truths, or we have a much more limited capac-
ity to reason that lacks not only these abilities but others that confer 
an overriding evolutionary advantage. If reason is a unity of this 
kind, having the package would have been more conducive to sur-
vival and reproduction than not having it.166 
It seems very plausible that evolution has provided us with a capacity 
to reason which can be employed in various domains and for many 
different kinds of task, and also that this general capacity can by adap-
tive even if it also may allow the holders of it to reach conclusions 
which at the individual level are not conducive to their fitness. This 
alone, of course, does not show that there are ethical truths of reason, 
only that we are the kind of thinkers who may come to discover them.  
I think there are several problems with Lazari-Radek and Singer’s 
acceptance of Sidgwick’s principle as a non-debunkable truth of rea-
son. Look again at the statement Lazari-Radek and Singer want to 
claim is self-evident and non-debunkable: 
U: The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from 
the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good 
of any other. 
How is this principle to be understood? The most straightforward in-
terpretation is that, seen from an impartial perspective, the significance 
of something’s being the good of this rather than that individual van-
ishes. Alternatively, if the world is made better by me being happier 
(other things being equal), then it would also be made better by you 
being happier (other things being equal). So, from an impartial point 
of view, this principle tells us, my well-being is equally important as 
your well-being. Could we need any evidence for that? Could anyone 
seriously believe, not just that his happiness is more important for him 
than the happiness of others is for him, but that his happiness is more 
important simpliciter; that others, in not realizing this and confusedly 
pursue their own good, are guilty of an error of judgment? Perhaps, 
then, this idea is about as self-evident as they come in ethics. 
I grant that the view is not trivial, and it is evaluative, but, I submit, 
it is unclear if the principle holds any action-guidance. In short it is 
unclear if it is an ethical view at all since the deontic implications of 
the view that the good of one compared to another is equally im-
 
166 Lazari-Radek and Singer 2012, p. 16-17. 
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portant, when viewed impartially, are indeterminate. Most philoso-
phers who defend agent-relative reasons would probably agree that 
from the point of view of the universe the good of one is of equal im-
portance as the good of another. Problem is, these philosophers think 
it makes all the difference that human beings typically do not occupy 
the point of view of the universe. And when one looks a little closer at 
Lazari-Radek and Singer’s discussion it is actually clear that they are 
laboring with three interconnected theses, not just the point-of-view-
of-the universe idea. In addition to U, we also have  
R:  “As a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally – so 
far as it is attainable by my efforts – not merely at a particular 
part of it”.167  
As well as  
E: “Each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other 
individual as much as his own, except in so far as he judges it 
to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable 
or attainable by him”168 
The relationship between U, R, and E is not altogether clear. A plausi-
ble suggestion is that R, properly understood, implies E. It is also note-
worthy that R and E, in contrast to U, are deontic views, not (merely) 
evaluative. A link between these principles is provided by Sidgwick’s 
treatment of rational self-interest. In that discussion R serves to justify 
why we should not discount the value of our future selves merely be-
cause they are distant in time, something that peculiarly would suggest 
some moments of our own existence have greater significance than 
others.  
 Aiming at the good generally is a helpful way of seeing that differ-
ent moments of our lives have, and should be given, the same value. 
And just as it is a sign of irrationality to give intrinsic weight to when a 
good state occurs, it might be thought that there is something irrational 
with assigning weight to to whom the good accrues. But there is an ob-
vious answer to this latter challenge, which is different from what can 
be said to the discounter of his future self. When someone acts or rea-
 
167 Quoted from Sidgwick, Lazari-Radek and Singer 2012, p. 24. 
168 Lazari-Radek and Singer 2012, p. 17. 
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sons in a way implying different moments of their life are given differ-
ent weight it is a plausible move to say “remember, it will still be hap-
pening to you”. Obviously, that prod is unavailable when the good in 
question has to be allocated to one individual rather than another, not 
to one and the same individual but at different moments of their life. 
Whether this special concern for ourselves is rationally defensible or 
not, and how this requirement relates to other normative concerns is 
well-trodden terrain in moral philosophy. And while utilitarians are 
attracted to the ideal that both the when and the who are irrelevant, it 
might not be self-evident that “Each one is morally bound to regard 
the good of any other individual as much as his own” just because pru-
dential time-partiality is irrational. 
When Lazari-Radek and Singer assess “universal benevolence”, 
they have the point-of-the-universe-thought in mind and, as careful 
thinkers, arrive at a conviction of self-evidence. Then, when moving to 
the criterion of not being debunkable by evolutionary considerations, 
they seem rather to have E or R in mind. But the interesting question 
is if this package of views – evaluative and deontic – is both self-evident 
and not a plausible candidate for evolutionary debunking on the 
grounds that acceptance of it was adaptive. My contention is that the 
more other-regarding we make it, the less vulnerable to evolutionary 
debunking it becomes (a good thing), while at the same time seeming 
to careful thinkers less and less self-evident (the not so good flipside). 
We can see the dialectic more clearly by transforming the package 
of Sidgwick’s three rather lofty statements into the following two:  
CG: Constancy of goodness: if two individuals have the same well-
being goods, then their goods have the same impartial value.  
PG: Promotion of goodness: each agent has a moral obligation to 
promote good universally, adopting the outsider’s perspec-
tive on his or her own good relative to the good of others. 
CG and PG are separate claims, and CG does not imply PG, and so one 
can be self-evident without the other being it too. In fact, PG is judged 
by many as implausible, and even Parfit agreed with Sidgwick and 
disagreed with Lazari-Radek and Singer in claiming that when there 
is a conflict of rational self-interest and impartial demands, while the 
more impartial option is permissible it is not rationally required.169 
 
169 Parfit 2011a, p. 143.  
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8 Is what survives empty? 
Lazari-Radek and Singer argue we cannot explain the seeming attrac-
tiveness of universal benevolence as the product of evolution. How-
ever, in order for benevolence to be a substantive moral view, a view 
of moral goodness as benevolence need to be spelled out. Singer now-
adays adheres to the classic hedonist account of wellbeing. Hedonism 
and the desire-fulfillment view remain the major candidates in the de-
bate over what makes someone’s life go best, what wellbeing ulti-
mately is, among philosophers combining consequentialism with an 
axiology to form utilitarianism.  
Guy Kahane has pointed out that our attraction to these views can 
be given an evolutionary explanation too.170 Presumably humans and 
other sentient animals experience pain in response to certain stimuli, 
because beings in the past who were so equipped stood a better chance 
at avoiding certain harmful stimuli, and thus stood a better chance at 
surviving and reproducing. It is no wonder we would come to think 
of pain as bad and pleasure as good, and the avoidance of pain as good 
etcetera. So axiological beliefs about what has value seem to be open 
to evolutionary debunking just the way more general theories in eth-
ics: “is this a judgment we make because we have a biological disposi-
tion to make it, or is there an independent advantage to this view such 
that any rational being would make that judgment?” For all we know, 
the truth about prudential value may be very far from what evolution 
brought us to think is prudentially valuable. Perhaps, Kahane suggests, 
what is ultimately valuable is “ascetic contemplation of deep philo-
sophical truths” or why not a “Nietzschean perfectionist aestheticism 
(which might even revel in pain)”. 171  How can Lazari-Radek and 
Singer prefer hedonism to such views, while maintaining any norma-
tive belief we can explain as the result of an evolutionary process is to 
be distrusted?  
So, what idea of “good” might be non-debunkable and still recog-
nizably utilitarian? If no candidate is found, the victory for universal 
benevolence seems pyrrhic and impotent. Lazari-Radek and Singer re-
spond that “if no theory of well-being or intrinsic value were immune 
to a debunking explanation, this would show only that no theory could 
be preferred over others on the ground that it alone cannot be de-
bunked. It could not show that no theory of well-being is true.”172 
 
170 Kahane 2011 and Kahane 2014. 
171 Kahane 2014, p. 334. 
172 Lazari-Radek and Singer 2012, p. 28. 
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While I am more sympathetic than Kahane to this notion of mutual 
destruction as simply levelling the playing field, this of course is not a 
positive basis for accepting hedonism or any other view of prudential 
value. Still, establishing that wellbeing – whatever it amounts to more 
precisely – is something morality demands we promote universally is 
no small thing.173 But what about the consequentialist – the to-be-pro-
moted – part, is it insulated from debunking? 
9 Can universal benevolence be debunked too? 
When Lazari-Radek and Singer attempt to identify ethical claims 
which can be given an evolutionary explanation, they have in mind 
positions that promote or accept egoism or partiality, reciprocity, or 
loyalty to a limited group. I agree it is plausible to assume we are 
equipped with emotional and other mental dispositions that would 
make us attracted to such views. Our acceptance of them, then, is vul-
nerable to debunking since we have no way of telling if their appeal 
comes from, as it were, within us, or from the accuracy of the view as 
such. But Lazari-Radek and Singer are pretty confident their impartial 
principle cannot plausibly be explained in a similar fashion, since ac-
ceptance of it would appear to make individuals behave in ways that 
are detrimental to their evolutionary success. 
But this assumes, though, a rather tight match between overt be-
havior and acceptance of norms. What does seem impossible to expect 
is a mechanism which causes humans to behave in a universally benev-
olent manner, paying neither more nor less attention to the wellbeing 
of themselves or their offspring compared to any other sentient being. 
But a mechanism which causes humans to believe in universal benevo-
lence, or a mechanism which causes humans to signal a belief in univer-
sal benevolence, do not seem to be unlikely evolutionary products of 
a highly social, intelligent animal who in a lifetime encounters a couple 
of hundreds of individuals and is often asked to justify its behavior 
towards others.  
There is a complex story to be told here. On the one hand utilitarian 
or impartialist ways to think about ethics may be seen as a form of 
virtue signaling: being a moral, generous, good person. And we may 
believe that that in turn conferred an advantage to the individual in 
 
173 Jaquet 2018 defends Lazari-Radek and Singer against Kahane’s point, arguing 
that adopting a subjectivist account of wellbeing, such as the desire view, would pro-
vide immunity to evolutionary debunking. MacAskill, Mogensen, and Ord argue that, 
in practical deliberation, utilitarianism is again less susceptible to debunking.  
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our ancestral past (as today).174 And if we also take on board the idea 
that this may even involve a degree of self-deception such that the per-
son sees himself as acting on impartialist concerns but in fact is not, 
that person can have the social cake and eat it too.175 These aspects 
would be able to explain, from an evolutionary point of view why 
tendencies to think impartially might have been adaptive even though 
that seemed counterintuitive at first glance. If that is so, aspects that 
make utilitarianism appealing may not be that it rests on self-evident 
ideas but on tendencies in us which are the result of evolutionary pro-
cesses. Such a debunking story will necessarily be speculative, but that 
is hardly a contrast to the already existing stories.  
On the other hand, recent research suggests people judge those who 
employ a utilitarian way of thinking as less trustworthy and less moral 
than people who employ a deontological way of thinking.176 This sug-
gests Lazari-Radek and Singer are correct in claiming utilitarianism is 
relatively more sheltered from evolutionary debunking, since a ten-
dency to employ a utilitarian mode of thinking on moral matters 
would be costly not only in the sense that you would act against your 
own self-interest, but also in the sense that that would not even be con-
sidered laudable. If we believe that an important function of ethics was 
to enhance cooperation and we are informed people trust utilitarians 
less than they trust deontologists, it seems being a utilitarian is not an 
advantage in forming cooperative alliances. Again, the winner in this 
game is whichever position we find it the most difficult to come up with 
a story of how it would be that we came to like it. In any event, this 
shows that any argument attempting to expose or shelter a moral view 
from evolutionary debunking cannot just rely on the view considered 
as a semantic content but on the emotional and behavioral tendencies 
associated with accepting it – or professing acceptance of it. When we 
say that a certain type of moral judgment or moral theory is possible 
to explain or not as the result of an evolutionary process, we need to 
take onboard all of these factors.  
 
174 Miller 2001. A shorter treatment of the view is developed in Miller 2007. For phil-
osophical discussions of a related issue, see Tosi and Warmke 2020. 
175 See Trivers 2011.  
176 Everett et al. 2018. Also see Everett, Pizarro, and Crockett 2016 and Montealegre 
et al. 
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10 Concluding remarks 
One of the difficulties is this debate seems to be that it is hard to tell 
what can and what cannot easily be given an evolutionary explanation. 
It is pretty easy to come up with such an account for almost anything. 
Why do people have tribal views, leading to xenophobia and focus on 
cooperation within one’s group? Well, we evolved from hunter-gath-
erers living in groups of between 50-150 individuals, all dependent on 
each other, often with genetic family ties to one another, often in con-
flict over territory and food with other hunter-gatherers. Why did the 
Christian faith spread throughout the Mediterranean region in the cen-
turies following the death of Jesus? Well it was the first system of belief 
which emphasized the equal value of all human beings, making it very 
attractive to those living under oppression, providing a meaningful 
and coherent worldview which was easy to proselytize. 
There will always be a more or less plausible story of why, psycho-
logically, we are prone to accepts certain views or employ certain ways 
of thinking or feeling. The question is if, in ethics, these explanations 
are always debunking, or if there are, as it were, vindicating accounts 
of the genesis of a moral judgment or capacity for moral judgments.177 
In this chapter I have interrogated one suggestion to the effect that 
there is, and that this account favors a utilitarian position in ethics. I 
concede that there are some facets of utilitarianism which makes it 
hard to debunk by offering an evolutionary explanation of an ac-
ceptance of it, namely its impartial demandingness and the experi-
mental findings that people are less likely to trust and esteem utilitar-
ians. These features suggest that being prone to accept utilitarianism, 
or displaying behavior dictated by it, would not have increased the 
inclusive fitness of individuals so disposed. But there are other fea-
tures of it where we may suspect that there is an evolutionary account 
of why we would find at least certain aspects of it appealing. Thinking 
about ethics in an impersonal way may have started at a point in hu-
man history where “impersonal” in practice did only extend to a lim-
ited set of individuals. Today we think of “universal benevolence” and 
utilitarianism as very demanding moral outlooks, but this demanding-
ness, which is reflective of a certain incompatibility with our psychol-
ogy, is a recent feature of the view, present only because of modern 
technology. The gist of the outlook became attractive to us at a time 
 
177 Cf Tersman 2008 and Tersman 2017. 
 
87 
when the horizon was much closer. Obviously there cannot be selec-
tive pressure to directly accept or reject a moral principle but rather on 
psychological features that lead us to think and feel in certain ways 
and ultimately to act in certain ways. Because of this cut between psy-
chological dispositions and general moral principles, there will always 
be a degree of uncertainty in any inquiry into whether or not the moral 
principle is debunkable. For there will always be a multitude of psy-
chological features that go into making a principle appealing or repel-
lent to us.  
I am skeptical of the notion of self-evidence in ethics. I think it pig-
gybacks on the more familiar and epistemically much secure way it is 
used in logic and mathematics. I also think it is inevitable that we as-
sess ethical statements by considering how well they fit together with 
other statements we believe there is good reason to accept, as well as 
considering the plausibility of what it entails in cases, real and imag-
ined. That means I reject the foundationalism which goes hand in hand 
with Lazari-Radek and Singer’s appeals to self-evident ethical intui-
tions. Ironically, the one statement I find it the hardest to doubt, as 
close to self-evident as they come, is Quine’s dictum that no single 
statement is immune from revision in the light of new evidence.178  
A recurring theme in Singer’s writings is that there is a place for 
reason in ethics, and also that employing reason leads to less tribal, 
moral inclusive, more universal moral views.179 I mentioned above that 
it is only recently that impartialist modes of thinking about ethics be-
came so revolutionarily demanding. The moral community always 
seemed so small. But what made it expand? According to Singer, the 
expansion is the result of stepping on the “escalator of reason”. Sup-
pose you do not care for the neighboring tribe, and experience only 
satisfaction or indifference in response to their plight. At the same 
time, you care a lot about your kids and the other member of your tribe. 
How things fare for them is a deep concern of yours. But what is so 
special about your people, morally separating them from the others? 
You realize of course, for members of the other tribe, matters are felt 
just the inverse way: they care a lot about what happens to them and 
could not care less about what happens to you. But as soon as we pose 
the question, “What are the morally relevant differences between X 
 
178 Quine 1951, p. 40. 
179 Singer was an early participant to the discussion on the relevance for moral phi-
losophy of evolutionary considerations on human psychology. See his 1981 book The 
Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology.  
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and Y, making it proper to assign greater weight to X than to Y?”, we 
start a process of reason-governed reflection on what ultimately gives 
someone moral status, and what grounds for exclusion are arbitrary. 
As is well known, Singer has employed this tool to argue for an expan-
sion of moral concern, to not only other tribes, but to eradicate the 
moral significance of distance, ethnicity, sex, race, and species.  
To some degree this vindicates Lazari-Radek and Singer’s position: 
there is no direct evolutionary debunking explanation of utilitarian-
ism. All that was needed for us to arrive at it was some initial sympa-
thy and a domain-general capacity to reason. As Singer has often re-
turned to in his work, we can employ a domain-general reasoning ca-
pacity to assess the merits of suggested ideas about what gives a being 
or entity moral status or consider the merits of a distinction drawn. 
Even if we would grant that such an assessment itself is not biased by 
features of our psychology whose deployment here would not be con-
ducive to finding moral truths, there are still two important caveats. 
First, the fact that a system of beliefs is coherent and contains no inter-
nal inconsistencies is not sufficient to show that the beliefs therein are 
also true. Second, the kind of equality or impartiality which these steps 
lead to does not separate utilitarianism from other competing moral 
theories.  
Kahane’s challenge about what notion of wellbeing is really in-
voked brings to the fore a familiar conundrum about how to think 
about ethical objectivity. If ethical properties and ethical theories about 
them are truly mind-independent, they can be just about anything, im-
plying there is no pre-theoretical higher probability of happiness hav-
ing positive intrinsic value than pain or ascetic contemplation. On the 
other hand, we come to ethical inquiry with a set of implicit constraints 
on what the field is about and what kinds of positions we take seri-
ously; that it concerns ideas about how humans can live together, what 
we owe one another in terms of respecting or promoting our putative 
rights or interests etcetera. If we take these brackets away, anything is 
possible. You could say these constraints, which are the arbitrary re-
sults of our evolved psychology, debunk the field. But without them, 
there is no field.
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4 Virtue Ethics, Schmirtue Ethics? 
Although it has been with us since ancient Greece, virtue ethics was 
for a long while pretty dormant and made a comeback to “Modern 
Moral Philosophy” in 1958 with Elizabeth Anscombe’s influential es-
say of that name.180 Since then, virtue ethics is seen as a major, theoret-
ically independent, option in ethical theory, alongside the consequen-
tialist and deontological traditions.181 In the last two decades, however, 
this ongoing renaissance has been subjected to attacks from philoso-
phers citing experimental data from social psychology to question the 
virtue ethical approach to moral philosophy. Crudely put, the charge 
is that the evidence for the common-sense notion that people have, and 
differ in, character traits is meager or non-existent. Instead, the most 
powerful explanation of any given individual’s behavior, contrary to 
folk wisdom and our everyday notions of ourselves and people 
around us, is said to be the situational factors within which we act. If 
individual differences in character traits play no role, or only a subor-
dinate role, in explaining human behavior, it may seem misguided to 
place moral assessments’ most basic emphasis on them. To the extent 
that virtue ethics rely on there being character traits, and it seems plau-
sible to think that it does, these result would thus appear to pose a 
threat to virtue ethics.  
In the present chapter I state this so-called situationist challenge to 
virtue ethics, going through some of the psychological evidence in-
voked to cast doubt on the theories’ descriptive contents. I will de-
scribe and assess some of the ways virtue ethics has been defended 
against this line of attack. In the spirit of this thesis’ general biological 
approach to human psychology, I will then counter the situationist 
charge, bringing substantial causal and explanatory force back to the 
person side in this person vs situation debate. For a while there it 
seemed as though virtue ethics was down for the count, but my con-
tention is that the situationist challenge was too hastily conceived and 
that the research program on which it was based has all but collapsed 
in social psychology’s ongoing replication crisis.  
 
180 Anscombe 1958. 
181 On the history, decline, and return of virtue ethics, see Frede 2013 and Chappell 
2013. 
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1 Situating the debate 
That human behavior is greatly influenced by the circumstances has 
been known (or suspected) long before there was a science of psychol-
ogy. Francis Bacon remarked in a letter to the Earl of Essex that “op-
portunity makes a thief”.182 And way before him, Plato had Glaucon 
and Socrates discuss the Ring of Gyges, which makes its bearer invisi-
ble. Glaucon says:  
Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put 
on one of them and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined to 
be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No man 
would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely 
take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with 
any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, 
and in all respects be like a god among men. Then the actions of the 
just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would both come at 
last to the same point.183 
Moving to the modern era (1920s), Hugh Hartshorne and Mark May 
followed schoolchildren over several years, documenting their behav-
ior with a focus on honesty and deception. To the surprise of many, 
their studies suggested belief in some children as honest and others as 
dishonest was largely unwarranted. Finding that a boy does not cheat 
on an exam even when he could, or that another tells a lie, they ob-
served, were of almost no predictive value when trying to figure out 
what these individuals would do in similar situations where honesty 
was a relevant factor. In a phrase that could be the credo of what was 
to become the “situationist” strand in social psychology, Hartshorne 
and May concluded that honesty is not an “inner entity” but “a func-
tion of the situation”.184  
For the general audience, the power of the situation really sank in 
as Stanley Milgram’s obedience experiments became widely known 
and discussed, and, soon thereafter, Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison 
Experiment.185 Oddly, the increasing support for situationism, and the 
 
182 Bacon 1598, p. 99. 
183 Plato, The Republic, Book II, 360b–d. The thought experiment of the ring making 
the bearer invisible could also be interpreted as arguing for a certain other psycholog-
ical thesis, viz. egoism. 
184 Hartshorne & May 1928, p. 385. 
185 Milgram 1963 and Milgram 1974. Philip Zimbardo details his Stanford Prison Ex-
periment in Zimbardo 2007. Recently, The Stanford Prison Experiment has come un-
der massive critique, and my assessment must be that we should disregard it as a 
sham. See Texier 2019. 
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corresponding skepticism of character traits, in psychology, was con-
temporaneous with a growing popularity of virtue ethics in the field 
of philosophy. It was not until the early 1990s that philosopher Owen 
Flanagan noted that the ”entire enterprise of virtue ethics depends on 
there being individual traits of character which are causally effective 
in the production of behavior across situations of a kind”.186 Philosoph-
ical attention to psychological research of a more critical, indeed de-
structive, kind came some years later with John Doris’ “Persons, Situ-
ations, and Virtue Ethics” and Gilbert Harman’s “Moral Philosophy 
Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribu-
tion Error”, published the following year.187  From then on, the so-
called situationist challenge is one of the standard criticisms of virtue 
ethics, and one that every proponent of virtue ethics is expected to 
have something to say about.  
One of virtue ethics’ main relative advantages has always been its 
presumably more true-to-life and complex view of human moral psy-
chology: it captures the way people actually think about moral issues. 
Julia Annas says “a large part of its appeal is the thought that, unlike 
its competitors, Kantianism and consequentialism, it can give a realis-
tic account of our ethical life.”188 Whereas consequentialism and deon-
tology are preoccupied with formulating criteria of what makes acts 
morally right or wrong, it is often said that virtue ethics seeks a return 
to that ancient Athenian question, “What kind of person should I 
be?”189 In answering this question, virtue ethics prescribe that we de-
velop certain virtuous character traits, such as generosity, courage or 
temperance. In so doing it assumes that we may have character traits, 
and that they are evolvable under our control to some degree. Virtue 
ethics also assumes that human behavior is explicable in terms of indi-
viduals’ character traits (as opposed to external factors not under the 
person’s control). If this were not so, the prescription to develop cer-
tain traits of character would be unrelated to our behavior towards one 
another and so would not really be intelligible as a moral ideal. The 
question then is: just what assumptions about human psychology are 
implicit in virtue ethics, and is there reason to believe the truth of these 
assumptions have been threatened by social psychological research? 
 
186 Flanagan 1991, p. 282. 
187 Doris 1998 and Harman 1999. Doris’ book length treatment is Doris 2002. 
188 Annas 2003, p. 21. 
189 A virtue ethics position may also be about formulating theoretical criteria for 
morally right action. The most notable version of such a view is Hursthouse 1999. 
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2 The problem   
Here are the two questions discussed in this chapter: 
1. What empirical claims regarding human psychology is virtue 
ethics committed to? 
2. Has psychological research shown these claims to be false? 
Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, describes ethical or moral virtues 
as the character traits that permit a person to properly adjudicate be-
tween two desires or courses of action at opposite extremes (vices of 
excess or deficiency, respectively).190 Thus the virtue of courage lies be-
tween the vices of cowardliness and rashness, generosity between stin-
giness and extravagance and so forth. Since character traits relate to 
our behavior and psychology, studying them seems prima facie an em-
pirical, rather than philosophical, endeavor. If virtues are character 
traits, then virtue ethics branches into psychology in a way that makes 
it interesting to find out whether or not that part of the theory holds 
up to scrutiny. That virtue ethics does make empirical claims is 
acknowledged within the tradition itself. Here is Alasdair MacIntyre: 
To identify certain actions as manifesting or failing to manifest a vir-
tue or virtues is never only to evaluate; it is also to take the first step 
towards explaining why those actions rather than some others were 
performed191 
Rosalind Hursthouse says something similar: 
Suppose someone were described as having the virtue of honesty. 
What would we expect them to be like? (...) Most obviously we expect 
a reliability in their actions; they do not lie or cheat or plagiarize or 
casually pocket other people’s possessions. You can rely on them to 
tell the truth, to give sincere references, to own up to their mistakes, 
not to pretend to be more knowledgeable than they are; you can buy 
a used car from them or ask for their opinion with confidence.192 
 
190 Nicomachean Ethics 1105b28-110669. There are other notions of virtue, e.g. Maria 
Merritt’s Humean (Merritt 2000) and Michael Slote’s sentimentalist versions (Slote 
2005 and Slote 2007), but a roughly Aristotelian conception is the most common, and 
this standard view is what is the target of the situationist critique. I should also note 
that my primary concern are the moral virtues, not, say epistemic or intellectual ones. 
191 MacIntyre 1984, p. 199. 
192 Hursthouse 1999, p. 11. Emphasis added. She goes on to say virtue is much more 
than just this reliable regularity of behavior, and connects with doing the right thing 
for the right reasons etcetera. We shall return to that later on. 
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In order to make virtues accessible to empirical study we must link 
them to overt behavior. But, as any virtue ethicist will tell you, virtues 
are more than just behavior. The virtues are connected to how a person 
feels, reasons, her perceptions of social situations and the way she de-
liberates. I will return to these complications, and the issue of whether 
or not they affect social psychological criticisms directed at virtue eth-
ics. Meanwhile, let us look at how John Doris, the leading voice of the 
social psychological critique of virtue ethics, portrays the virtue ethical 
notion of character traits. 
In Doris’ formulation, “If a person possesses a trait, that person will 
engage in trait-relevant behaviors in trait-relevant eliciting conditions 
with markedly above chance probability p”. 193  So you cannot tell 
whether or not I’m a brave person by looking at how I make up my 
dishes, but there are situations where you could make assumptions 
like “If he’s a brave guy he’s going to do X”.194 According to Doris, vir-
tue ethics is committed to a certain view of human psychology, and a 
view on character traits to be more specific, which he calls globalism. 
Globalism is the object of his attack, and he states it in the following 
three theses: 
a) Consistency. Character and personality traits are reliably man-
ifested in trait-relevant behavior across a diversity of trait-rel-
evant eliciting conditions that may vary widely in their con-
duciveness to the manifestation of the trait in question. 
b) Stability. Character and personality traits are reliably mani-
fested in trait-relevant behaviors over iterated trials of similar 
trait-relevant eliciting conditions.  
c) Evaluative integration. In a given character or personality the 
occurrence of a trait with a particular evaluative valence is 
probabilistically related to the occurrence of other traits with 
similar evaluative valences.195 
 
193 Doris 2002, p. 19. “Character trait” is often abbreviated to “trait”. Some such traits 
might be considered virtues or vices whereas others are thought to be neutral with 
respect to such categorization. So when I talk of people having or not having a partic-
ular virtue, what I mean is a character trait of the appropriate type. Exactly which 
character traits, or other features of a person’s psychology, are virtues need not con-
cern us here. 
194 We might want to allow for exceptions (no one is perfect), adding a probability 
or ”acting in character” clause.  
195 Doris 2002, p. 22.  
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Globalism, to wit, describes our personality as an “evaluatively inte-
grated association of robust traits”.196 Most of the situationist attacks 
have been targeting the consistency thesis, which says that if an indi-
vidual acts honestly or courageously say in a situation where these 
traits are relevantly at play we should expect that individual to at hon-
estly or courageously at some other kind of situation where again the 
traits are at play. The stability thesis, albeit in a very narrow or local 
sense, seems to be accepted by both Doris and Harman. That is, they 
accept the reality of stable traits within a constrained domain, like be-
ing talkative in class or being helpful to family members. The thesis of 
evaluative integration, which states that the possession in a person of 
one virtue makes it more likely that she also possesses evaluatively 
closely related virtues too, is given even less attention. So the center of 
the situationist challenge is really the consistency thesis. According to 
Doris and Harman, systematic observation has failed to confirm the 
behavioral patterns expected by globalism, and in particular the cross-
situational consistency part. The upshot is that the psychological facts 
simply do not match the virtue ethical theory, centered as it is on de-
veloping and acting from virtuous character traits. Let us now attend 
to some of the evidence invoked for this conclusion. 
3 The case against robust character traits (“globalism”)  
Underpinning Doris’ challenge to virtue ethics is a large body of ex-
perimental work in social psychology. Common to all the studies is the 
conclusion that people’s behavior seems overwhelmingly influenced, 
if not determined, by variables outside of the person. In a nutshell, it is 
the situation the individual acts within, not the alleged character he or 
she possesses, that explains their behavior. This view – the antithesis 
to globalism – has become known as situationism.  
Let us now look at some of the evidence in support of that second 
premise. I will focus on four landmark studies, though there are many 
others with seemingly similar implications. 197  My account will be 
purely descriptive so readers familiar with the research may skip to 
section 4. 
 
196 Ibid., p. 23. 
197 Consult Doris 2002 or Ross & Nisbett 2011 for accounts of further such experi-
ments. Other overviews and discussions include Alfano 2013 as well as three books by 
Christian Miller: Miller 2013, Miller 2014, and Miller 2017. Also volume 5 in the Moral 
Psychology series edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (this one on virtue and character 
was co-edited with Miller). A concise recent overview can be found in Miller 2020. 
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3.1 Help for a dime 
People exiting a phone booth witness a woman who accidentally drops 
a folder of papers in front of them. Who stops to help collect the scat-
tered papers and who rushes on? For one group of callers, a dime was 
placed in the coin return slot of the phone; for the other group, there 
was no bonus dime. Here are the results: 
Helped  Did not help198 
Dime   14   2 
No dime  1   24  
3.2 Obedience to authority 
Stanley Milgram drew together people from different walks of life to 
participate in an experiment studying the effects of punishment on 
learning and memory. Arriving in pairs to the laboratory and Yale Uni-
versity, a rigged lottery assigned one to be “learner” and the other to 
be “teacher”. The learner is in fact, unbeknownst to the “teacher”, a 
confederate of the experimenter. The assigned teacher witnessed as the 
learner, a man in his fifties wearing a white shirt and tie, was seated in 
an “electric chair”, his hands strapped to the armrests and wires at-
taching his fingers. The teacher is then taken to an adjacent room 
where he can hear the learner on an intercom radio. The teacher is in-
structed to read groups of words, and the learner is to repeat them to 
the best of his recollection. If the learner’s answer is incorrect, the 
teacher is to administer an electric shock to the learner. In front of the 
teacher is a “shock generator”. It has an instrument panel with thirty 
horizontally placed switches, each of which is clearly labeled with a 
voltage designation ranging from 14 to 450 volts. In groups of four 
from left to right, the switches are arranged in the following categories: 
“Slight Shock”, “Moderate Shock”, “Strong Shock”, “Very Strong 
Shock”, “Intense Shock”, “Extreme Intensity Shock”, “Danger: Severe 
Shock”. The two switches after this last designation were simply 
marked “XXX”.  
As the learner made mistakes, the experimenter instructed the 
teacher to give ever stronger shocks to the learner. At 75 volts, the 
learner started moaning and objected to the pains inflicted. At 150 
volts, he stated that he could no longer endure the pain, demanded to 
be released and complained that his heart was bothering him. Beyond 
200 volts he screamed in pain and reiterated his request to discontinue 
 
198 Isen & Levin 1972, p. 387. 
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the experiment (“Let me out! Let me out!”) The screams got more and 
more hysterical until reaching 345 volts, after which there was only 
silence. According to the experimenter, the teacher was to continue ad-
ministering shocks since no answer is a wrong answer. The learner in 
fact didn’t receive any shocks at all, and his sounds of pain and pro-
tests were tape recordings prepared in advance.  
A number of alterations to the basic experimental idea were tested 
to control for the relative influence of different variables. For instance, 
obedience was even higher when no verbal feedback of pain was heard 
from the learner. It was lesser when the teacher had to physically force 
the learner to hold his hand to a metal plate in order to receive the ever-
stronger shocks (still, in this condition, 30 percent of subjects were fully 
obedient, i.e. administered the maximum shock of 450 volts). To test 
the alternative hypothesis that the results were not necessarily obedi-
ence to authority but rather an example of the aggression (these) peo-
ple carry inside, in one variation of the experiment the teachers were 
able to choose the voltage themselves. Very few administered shocks 
stronger than 75 volts, the point where the learner for the first time 
indicated that the shocks started to bother him.199 
Here are some further statistics from Milgram’s studies. In the very 
first version the learner is not visible for the teacher, and there is no 
voice-feedback. However, at 300 volts the walls vibrate as the learner 
pounds in protest. In this version of the experiment, all participants ad-
ministered what they thought to be 345 volts of electric shock to an innocent 
person strapped down in a neighboring room, and 65 percent of them kept 
giving the shock until the maximum of 450 volts was reached. When the 
learner’s vocal protests were vividly heard the percentage of subjects 
fully obedient to the experimenter dropped to 62.5 percent. When the 
subject was sitting next to the learner, who protests, screams and 
pleads from 150 volts and upwards, full obedience dropped to 40 per-
cent, with 25 percent of the subject dropping out at 150 volts. When 
subjects had to physically press the protesting subject’s hand to a shock 
plate, 60 percent of subjects administered 180 volts or more, and 30 
percent were fully obedient, forcing the desperately screaming sub-
ject’s hand to the shock plate 22 times from the first protests at 150 
volts. In subsequent versions, women turned out to be no less obedient 
than men, though they often showed more distress during the experi-
ment. 
 
199 Milgram 1974 pp. 71-3. 
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3.3 Clerics in a hurry 
40 Divinity students at Princeton Theological Seminary were asked to 
participate in an study concerned with their capacity to quickly impro-
vise a public speech. Experimenters told them to walk to another 
building to give a lecture. Half of the subjects were instructed to talk 
about job opportunities for divinity students after graduation, and the 
other half were instructed to discuss the parable of the Good Samari-
tan, which as you recall highlights the moral responsibility to help peo-
ple in urgent need even if one has other commitments. In addition to 
this variable, subjects were told that they were either already late and 
had to hurry, that they had just enough time or that they had some 
extra minutes.  
On their way to the other building, the subjects (walking alone) 
passed a man who slumped over against a wall while coughing and 
groaning in distress. The question was: how many would stop to ask 
if he needed help, and what were the influence of the variables content 
of speech and degree of hurry relative to that behavior? Here are the 
results: 
Degree of hurry   Low Medium High 
Percentage offering help 63 45  10 
Degree of hurry turned out to be the only factor correlated to helping 
behavior; subjects preparing to talk about the Good Samaritan acted 
no differently from subjects preparing to talk about career opportuni-
ties.200 
3.4 Bystander effect on helping behavior (“Lady in distress”) 
People sitting in a room suddenly hear a loud bang from bookshelves 
collapsing followed by the sounds of a woman screaming in pain in an 
adjoining room. If the subject was sitting alone, they stopped what 
they were doing and tried to help in 70 percent of cases. If the subject 
was sitting with a confederate of the experimenter who did nothing, 
subjects initiated helping behavior in just 7 percent of cases.201 
 
200 Darley & Batson 1973, results on p. 104-5. Subjects were also interviewed on the 
nature of their religious beliefs and on their motives for becoming a minister. None of 
the differences between subjects in those regards mattered. 
201 Latané & Rodin 1969. Also see Latané & Darley 1970.  
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4 Implications of the psychological data 
After administering 150 volts, the point at which the learner first states 
that he wishes the experiment to end, the subject turns to the experi-
menter and tells him he will not go any further. The experimenter re-
torts that the learner’s protests are to be disregarded, and the following 
dialogue ensues:  
 
EXPERIMENTER:  It’s absolutely essential to the experiment that we 
continue. 
SUBJECT:  I understand that statement, but I don’t understand 
why the experiment is placed above this person’s 
life. 
EXPERIMENTER:  There is no permanent tissue damage. 
SUBJECT:  Well, that’s your opinion. If he doesn’t want to con-
tinue, I’m taking orders from him. 
EXPERIMENTER:  You have no other choice, sir, you must go on. 
SUBJECT:  If this were Russia maybe, but not in America.202 
This is the kind of reaction we would expect from any decent person 
in light of what the participants were asked to do. In reality, though, 
this subject was almost unique. The studies we have reviewed all seem 
to involve, at least, and to varying degrees, virtues such as compassion, 
benevolence and fortitude. We would surely predict a compassionate 
person of some fortitude not to obey the instructions to punish a per-
fectly innocent individual who desperately pleads to be released. Like-
wise, a benevolent person would offer help in the other three studies, 
particularly, I think, in the lady in distress study where excuses such 
as risks or time constraints do not apply. However, what is most strik-
ing about the results is not that that acts of compassion, benevolence 
or fortitude are rare but that they do not seem to have much to do with 
what kind of person is studied, but very much to do with the particulars 
of the situation any given person is acting in. If the character variable 
did most of the work there would seem to be no difference in the de-
gree of obedience depending on the proximity of the victim, for in-
stance, since a compassionate person would terminate the experiment 
at the point where the subject wishes it to be terminated; and the pres-
ence of a passive, non-helpful person would not have much of an in-
fluence on a consistently helpful person’s decision to offer help. Let us 
 
202 Milgram 1974, p. 48-9. 
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now state the situationist challenge as a modus tollens argument along 
the following lines: 
i. If human behavior were largely organized by robust traits, rig-
orous observation of human behavior would find general be-
havioral consistency. 
ii. Rigorous observation has not found general behavioral con-
sistency. 
iii. Human behavior is not largely organized by robust traits. 
5 Virtue ethical responses 
There are some ways of defending virtue ethics in a tweaked form, a 
form not in collision with the situationist challenge. For instance, in-
stead of speaking about virtuous people, one may speak about virtuous 
acts. Judith Thomson and Thomas Hurka have developed such ac-
counts.203 Or one may settle for the stable but very narrow traits ac-
cepted even by Doris, such as helpful to fellow church-goers or courageous 
in the face of weather-based threats. My focus here will be on attempts to 
defend virtue ethics in a more headstrong and ambitious way. The old-
fashioned way if you will.  
5.1 Virtues do not allow for that kind of testing 
Julia Annas and Rosalind Hursthouse are probably the two most 
prominent virtue ethical philosophers alive. They have both been un-
impressed with the situationist challenge, which they take to miss the 
notion of virtue relevant for virtue ethics.  
As you remember, Doris characterizes character traits as robust dis-
positions to act in certain ways given certain conditions (with above 
chance probability p). Annas points out that this notion only sees char-
acter traits “from the point of view of a scientific observer”.204 But, she 
continues, “a virtue, unlike a mere habit, is a disposition to act which 
is exercised in and through the agent’s practical reasoning”.205 This as-
pect of virtue allows for, indeed, demands, a responsiveness to the par-
ticular situation at hand: 
Practical expertise, including the understanding of the virtuous per-
son, is highly situation-sensitive. […] A virtue is not an entity in me 
 
203 Thomson 1997 and Hurka 2006. 
204 Annas 2003, p. 22. 
205 Annas 2003, p. 24. 
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determining my behavior; it is the way I am, my disposition to de-
cide. And a virtue is a disposition to respond to situations in an intel-
ligent and flexible way, not a stubborn habit that is indifferent to cir-
cumstances.206 
For instance, being virtuous involves the competence to recognize if, 
in the given situation, being honest is more appropriate than being 
kind, as well as the inner emotional and deliberative processes in-
volved in coming to a decision about how to act. Because of such nu-
ances, Annas believes, the experiments and observations done in social 
psychology are too blunt to justify skepticism about virtues. 
While it is valuable to point out that virtue involves aspects which 
are not easily attainable by scientific methods, the situationist can still 
contend that the present challenge concerns a necessary but not suffi-
cient part of being virtuous: having a set of behavioral dispositions that 
remain stable over time and consistent across situations. The situation-
ist critique does not assume that virtue is solely “an entity in me deter-
mining my behavior”, but it does seem fair to maintain virtue is partly 
that, i.e. a disposition shaping my behavior. Even if, according to An-
nas, virtues are intelligent dispositions, not some mechanical regularity 
or disposition, this does not really help. For, what in the experiments 
cited is supposed to reasonably influence the intelligent situation-sen-
sitive virtuous agent? The upshot of the situationist challenge is that 
tweaks of the situation make us act differently, for no reason whatsoever. 
Anyone can accept that the particular circumstances may warrant dif-
ferent behavioral responses. But the situationist challenge takes it as 
given that some variations are morally irrelevant. So Annas probably 
dismisses the challenge too quickly by assuming too simplistic a no-
tion of virtue is being investigated.  
Annas’ points about virtue not being mere habit but critical reflec-
tion does not rise to a defense of virtue ethics against situationism if 
she does not also provide the particular situation-sensitive “excuses” 
in the cases under discussion. Alternatively, she may conceive of vir-
tue primarily as an inner activity. But that is an unattractive route for 
other reasons. What good is the kind of sensitivity and practical rea-
soning she emphasizes, after all, if they do not help us do the right 
thing (or, if you will, that which a virtuous agent would actually do)? 
In cases where, because of the complexity of the situation, it is genu-
inely uncertain what the virtuous person would do, we would not be 
warranted in drawing conclusions about an agent’s virtuousness 
 
206 Ibid., p. 27. 
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based on her behavior in those cases. But Annas has not argued that 
the Milgram cases are like that, and especially not that the different 
variations of them give rise to morally significant changes. 
Rosalind Hursthouse too is quite dismissive of the psychological re-
search being brought to bear on virtue ethics. According to her, be-
cause virtues are not just habits of behavior, such as telling the truth or 
helping, but “is concerned with many other actions as well, with emo-
tions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, at-
titudes, interests, expectations and sensibilities”,207 she thinks “the so-
cial psychologists’ studies are irrelevant to the multi-track disposition 
... that a virtue is supposed to be”.208 But this dismissal is also unsatis-
factory. Is she saying that it is (always) impossible to find out whether 
or not a particular action was virtuous or not, or whether a particular 
person possesses a particular virtue or not? Situationist psychology de-
nies that we have broad-based character traits that consistently gener-
ate trait-relevant behavior across different situations. Of course, Hurst-
house denies situationism. On what grounds? Presumably because she 
thinks people do have, and differ in, character traits that are either vir-
tues or vices, and that these traits play an important part in bringing 
about behavior. But if it is an empirical possibility to find out, as Hurst-
house thinks she has, that people have character traits, it seems per-
fectly natural to suppose it equally much of an empirical possibility to 
find out they do not have.  
If, on the other hand, virtues as multi-track dispositions are elusive 
to any test, asserting them is no less epistemically risky than being 
skeptical of their role in helping us understand human behavior. Quite 
the contrary. Hursthouse offers no criticism of the specific design and 
interpretation of individual studies invoked by situationists to under-
mine character attributions. Perhaps they do fail to track the multi-
tracked virtues, and one wants to know in what ways. One way to do 
this would be to question the assumption that it is clear in the respec-
tive experiments what the virtuous thing to do is. 
The type of critique Doris and Harman direct against globalism, 
and indirectly against virtue ethics, does not presuppose that virtues 
are simple character traits, or that they reflect unfailing, rigid habits. 
What it does presuppose, though, is that there is such a thing as a trait-
relevant behavior given certain trait-relevant eliciting conditions. This 
comes down to the claim that there are descriptions of situations such 
 
207 Hursthouse 2013. 
208 Ibid.  
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that we can say what, e.g., a brave or a generous person would do in 
that situation. Perhaps such descriptions would have to be either very 
exhaustive or simplistically typified for them to make us feel confident 
in making a judgment as to what behavior in terms of a certain virtue 
is called for. To take an example, as familiar as mother’s milk to any 
philosophy undergraduate, if I pass a shallow pond on my way to lec-
ture and notice a child about to drown, it would be monstrously igno-
ble of me to keep on walking on the sole ground that I do not want to 
spoil my trousers.209 Beneficence requires that I save the child, since the 
cost to me is trivial. We make this judgment instantly because, given 
the description, it is clear that the child’s drowning and my being able 
to save it at only a trivial cost is a beneficence-eliciting condition. If, on 
the other hand, the pond is not shallow but deep and I do not know 
how to swim, or if my saving this child puts my own child’s life in 
peril, it is no longer evident that this is a situation where beneficence 
is required, or what the beneficent thing to do would be. 
For at least some particular occasions, virtue ethics must be able to 
inform us what the virtuous thing to do is. It will then be possible to 
examine empirically how common it is for people to act virtuously at 
those occasions. This in itself should not be controversial. Is the situa-
tion where, in Milgram’s studies, the absent experimenter instructs the 
subject over the phone to administer 400 volts to a person sitting in an 
adjacent room such an occasion, i.e. one where virtue ethics gives us 
an answer as regards the virtuous thing to do? I can think of no possi-
ble reason why a virtue ethicist would doubt the least what the subject 
ought to do. If you think of virtues such as compassion or beneficence, 
this is a trait-eliciting condition, i.e. one where compassion or benefi-
cence is appropriate or called for. Consider next the situation where 
the same instruction is given by the experimenter now present in the 
same room. Are the conditions rendering these same virtues appropri-
ate or called for still present to the same degree or not? Surely they are, 
but people do not respond to them. The trait-relevant eliciting condi-
tions are the same, but the trait-relevant behavior differs. That is why 
we may come to suspect people lack character and that what deter-
mines behavior is manipulation of the situational variables. It may be 
possible that the two conditions above really differ in morally relevant 
ways. But what, on virtue ethics’ own account, could those differences 
be? Only if Hursthouse got into such details could she substantiate the 
 
209 Singer 1972. 
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claim that social psychology is irrelevant in studying “the multi-track 
disposition ... that a virtue is supposed to be”.210 
5.2 No surprise here, virtues are rare  
Since virtues, on Annas’ view, are like complex skills they take time to 
perfect and we cannot expect the perfection of these skills to be wide-
spread. She did not conclude that virtue must be rare after reading 
Milgram and other social psychologists. Rather, virtue must be rare 
because it is a difficult skill. If virtue is very rare, finding it seldom is 
to be expected.  
I think this is a pretty good response – virtue is rare. And this is not 
some ad hoc maneuver; no, Aristotle too held the same view. Mark 
Alfano, however, thinks this view, “though plausible for Plato, Aristo-
tle, and Nietzsche, rubs our democratic ethos the wrong way” and that 
it goes against an egalitarian notion “that almost anyone can be 
brought reliably to do what the virtuous person would do”.211  But 
these are not incompatible beliefs. One may hold both that virtue is in 
fact very rare and that more or less anyone could be brought to act in 
accordance with virtue (n.b., not the same thing as acting virtuously). 
The rarity thesis is not threatened by the relatively weak egalitarian 
condition Alfano holds to be a core tenet of virtue ethics. 
If virtues are rare, then what is the fuss? The more radical sugges-
tion here must be that, given the situationist findings, not only is virtue 
rare but human behavior in general is not caused by underlying psy-
chological character traits (of which virtues are an instance) at all. How 
may that be? Because having a character trait in the form of a virtue is 
having some specific set of values, norms, beliefs, desires, emotions 
etcetera. These things are intercorrelated in the person such that what 
a generous person desires is related to how she feels and what norms 
she are inclined to accept and how she is inclined to act. There is a 
causal unity which determines how each one of us reasons, feels, acts 
etcetera. The situationist challenge says there is no such unity; you can 
 
210 Kamtekar 2004 p. 460 similarly argues that the situationist challenge is based on 
an impoverished notion of character, the unrobustness of which poses no threat to 
virtue ethics: “Traditional virtue ethics offers a conception of character far superior to 
the one under attack by situationism... Briefly, the so-called character traits that the 
situationist experiments test for are independently functioning dispositions to behave 
in stereotypical ways, dispositions that are isolated from how people reason.”  
211 Alfano 2013, p. 32-3. 
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change the mood and nothing else need to follow. Edouard Machery 
formulates this stance: 
Remember that the notions of character and of kind of person are 
meant to explain why behaviors differ (because characters differ) and 
how to change people’s behavior (change their character). But now 
suppose that the mental states and dispositions that constitute our 
character and the kind of person we are are not unified. Then, one 
would not explain why behaviors differ by referring to people’s char-
acter; rather, one would refer to their emotions, or to their values, or 
to their moods—viz. to specific psychological causes. Similarly, one 
would not propose to change people’s behavior by changing their 
character; rather, one would propose to intervene on their moods, 
emotions, values, second-order desires, and so on. It would then 
seem that people have no character. […] Much of the recent research 
in psychology suggests that behavior is the product of numerous 
causes that are not correlated with one another.212 
This very deep-going fragmentation of human agency sounds trouble-
some for virtue ethics. It seems to imply not only that virtue is rare but 
that it is more or less unattainable. Annas, of course, does not accept 
this view of human psychology in general, but even if she granted the 
lion’s part of it she could say that in the virtuous person there is such 
a unity, and it is upheld even when disrupted by situational cues.  
Another way of answering this lack of character interpretation is to 
dispute that it is the only, or even the best, account of the available 
evidence from studies such as the four recapitulated above. Situation-
ist philosophers take the evidence to show that, because behavior is so 
sensitive to situational manipulation, there are no character traits. But 
another interpretation is that there are many character traits, and that 
situational manipulation may bring them into conflict. Being loyal and 
being compassionate, respecting personal integrity and being helpful 
etcetera. Additionally, many of the studies may not show lack of char-
acter (and hence lack of virtue) but rather the presence of some vices, 
such as vanity, egoism, deference to authority, greed, cowardice, lazi-
ness etcetera.213 This view aligns with the commonsensical observation 
that most of us are, as Christian Miller likes to say, a mixed bag.214 
 
212 Machery 2010, p. 226-6. 
213 The idea that proponents of the situationist challenge have given insufficient at-
tention to so-called non-malicious vices as cowardice and laziness is developed in 
Bates & Kleingeld 2018.  
214 Miller 2017. 
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6 The science of individual differences  
I turn now to present and partially resuscitate the other side of the per-
son-situation debate, namely the person. Our everyday, folk-psycho-
logical, view tells us people have and differ in important character 
traits, some of which we think of as virtues and vices. But the situa-
tionist challenge insists this is something of a chimera. Our intuitions 
in this area, Doris and Harman tell us, are like pre-scientific intuitions 
on many other issues – misguided. Both Harman and Doris emphasize 
the need to replace the appealing and seemingly self-evident views on 
character, and psychology more generally, with the best possible sci-
entifically supported view, be it appealing or not. Social psychology 
has certainly demonstrated the power of the situation, and that there 
is such a thing as the fundamental attribution error, i.e. a systematic 
failure to account for the role of situational pressures in explaining hu-
man behavior.  
But we might not have to resign ourselves to folk-psychology in or-
der to back up the existence of substantial non-situationist influence 
on character and behavior. In the following, I want to sketch some of 
the considerations that justify us in not abandoning the belief that in-
dividuals differ systematically, and that individuals exert an influence 
over both what situations they end up in and how they act once in 
them. Replacing folk-psychology with our best-supported scientific 
ideas about the mechanics of human behavior will not necessarily 
mean we become character-denying situationists.; quite the contrary.  
From the perspective of evolutionary psychology, the situationist 
stance is prima facie implausible. If different individuals behaved simi-
larly when in similar situations, evolution could not occur based on 
differences in how successful their behavior was. But evolution has oc-
curred precisely because of differential reproductive success. Accord-
ingly, we can expect there to be individual differences in how different 
individuals will behave when faced with the same situation. This sim-
ple observation shows just how extreme and a priori unlikely a strong 
form of situationism is, and we should therefore demand extraordi-
nary evidence before accepting it. Humans have successfully bred 
dogs based on their character traits, giving rise to breeds that vary in 
assertiveness, energy, aggression, protectiveness, playfulness, kind-
ness etcetera. Other non-human animals too, including our closest rel-
ative, the Chimpanzees, vary in personality traits, and these differ-
ences affect how they behave in similar situations, allowing observers 
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to make reliable predictions of their future behavior.215 Birds, too, have 
different personalities, with some being more agreeable, aggressive, 
curious or cooperative than others.216 It would be a mystery if a feature 
necessary for evolution and present throughout the whole of the ani-
mal kingdom, including our closest relatives – relatively stable indi-
vidual differences in how an organism responds to the same stim-
uli – were absent in our particular species. Let us look at some of what 
we know of these individual differences. 
6.1 Vicious biology 
For any psychological trait, people vary: some having more of it and 
others less. This is true of traits like intelligence, aggression, empathy, 
impulsivity, and many more. There is overwhelming evidence that in-
dividual differences – whether it would be the ones just mentioned or 
political orientation, depressive episodes, phobias or emotional stabil-
ity – to a large part are due to differences in genes or other biological 
factors such as pre-natal conditions.217 These biologically based traits, 
in turn, themselves are, or partly constitute, traits of character we 
would call virtues or vices. Here are a couple of examples.  
For a variety of reasons, anti-social behavior is more well-studied 
than pro-social behavior. The concordance rate for juvenile delin-
quency for identical twins is about twice that of fraternal twins, sug-
gesting a strong genetic component in whatever traits (e.g. aggression, 
impulse control, and intelligence) account for the difference in behav-
ior.218 Looking at the influence of biological factors on personality as 
inferred from studies of adoption paints a similar picture. Criminal 
convictions on the part of one or both of the biological parents is a 
strong predictor of criminal convictions of adoptees raised in a family 
not involved in criminal behavior. One study of adoptees suffering 
from an aggression disorder found that 30 percent of their biological 
parents had an antisocial personality disorder (but none of the adopted 
parents, who, naturally had been screened for precisely such disor-
ders). If you think adoption and foster parenting may themselves be 
 
215 See Pederson, King, & Landau 2005, and Weiss et al. 2017. A situationist chimp 
psychologist would likely also remind us that “chimpanzees immigrating to a new 
group abandon their superior nut-cracking technology in favor of the inferior local 
one, just in order to blend in” (Rolf Degen’s phrase); Luncz et al. 2018. 
216 Naguib & van Oers 2013. Also, Schuett, Dall, and Royle 2011. 
217 Bouchard 2004. 
218 Christiansen 1970; Raine 2013. 
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the root of the problem, consider the following study of adoptees 
whose biological mothers were felons and adoptees whose biological 
mothers were not. Members of the former cohort were more likely to 
have been arrested (15 percent versus 2 percent), convicted (13 percent 
versus 1 percent) and incarcerated (10 percent versus none), as well as 
to have been diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder. Other ev-
idence of the biological influence on individual differences and differ-
ences in behavior includes studies showing that low concentrations of 
the neurotransmitter serotonin accompanies violent and other forms 
of anti-social behavior in humans. In one study ranging over a period 
of two years, aggressive children were followed. Those with the lowest 
levels of serotonin at the beginning of the study were most likely to 
end up in serious trouble by the end of the study. In another study, 
newly released convicts of manslaughter or arson were followed over 
a period of three years. Individuals with the lowest levels of serotonin 
upon release were most likely to commit another violent crime during 
the period of the study.219 The level of testosterone is known to influ-
ence behavior, mood and character in many ways. Testosterone is in-
volved in the development of the male sexual organs, the deepening 
of the voice and the occurrence of facial and pubic hair at puberty; it 
helps determine muscle size and strength, bone growth and sex drive 
and the production of sperm. Men produce around 25 times more tes-
tosterone than women do and it is often referred to as the major male 
sex hormone. Testosterone may be a key factor in ambition and posi-
tive forms of aggression, but is also implicated in violent behavior. 
Manslaughter, murder and assault are predominately committed by 
male perpetrators, and most commonly so by men in the ages 17 to 24, 
the age span at which testosterone levels peak, whereupon the curves 
for violent behavior and that for testosterone levels parallel one an-
other in decline.220 Among female convicts, those charged with offen-
sive violence on average have higher levels of testosterone than those 
charged with defensive violence.221  
 
219 See Anderson 2006; also Barnes et al. 2014. 
220 Male killers outnumber females by almost 10 to 1 (the proportion is the same 
among our closest relatives the Chimpanzees). 79 percent of homicide victims are male 
(again, roughly the same proportion among Chimps). When a woman does kill, her 
victim is often an abusive male partner. See The United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime’s Global Study on Homicide: Trends, Contexts, Data, and, for the Chimps, Wilson 
et al. 2014. 
221 Ferguson 2010; Raine 2013. 
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6.2 The Five Factor Model 
The individual differences that exists in propensity to anti-social be-
havior are an instance of the more general finding that people have 
personality traits that exert an influence over behavior. These traits, of 
course, cannot be thought of as the sole determinants of behavior – 
situationist psychology tells us as much – but as habitual patterns of 
emotion, thought, and behavior. The traits may have low predictive 
value for how a given individual will behave in a single given situa-
tion, but they do help explain behavior over time, and not simply be-
cause individuals face the same type of situation over and over 
again.222  
Which are these traits? Different accounts have been developed 
over the years, and there is no uncontroversial and undisputed single 
view or theory on this, but the now most widely accepted alternative 
is called the Five factor model. According to this, the characteristics 
that together make up an individual’s personality can be mapped on a 
continuum of five basic personality dimensions:  
a. Openness to experience 
b. Conscientiousness 
c. Extraversion  
d. Agreeableness  
e. Neuroticism 
Or, for short, OCEAN. These terms are only partly self-explanatory, so 
it is useful to dwell on them a little bit. Openness has to do with an 
individual’s preference for novelty versus routine, both concerning 
ideas and habits. Conscientiousness describes how dutiful and orga-
nized a person is. It also captures a somewhat different quality, viz. 
industriousness. Extraversion is about the individual’s need for social 
stimuli, talkativeness, whether the company of others is a boost or 
drain on energy. Agreeableness measures the individual’s tendency to 
be friendly, compassionate, and conflict-avoidant versus more adver-
 
222 Also, what situations an individual seeks out or is prone to find themselves in is 
itself not independent of the individual’s personality traits. Paragliding accidents and 
gun wounds are not distributed randomly across the population.  
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sarial, suspicious, competitive. Neuroticism, finally, measures emo-
tional stability and the presence of negative emotions such as anxiety 
and nervousness versus stability and calm. 223  
I already mentioned that a trait such as conscientiousness captures 
what are really quite distinct sub-traits like orderliness and industri-
ousness. Each of the five factors constitute a cluster of traits forming a 
temperamental family together constituting the personality consid-
ered as a whole. This also means that there is no special magic to the 
number five, though for now most researchers think that set of person-
ality dimensions captures the various sub-traits we find. (Interestingly, 
from the point of view of moral psychology, a sixth personality dimen-
sion is sometimes invoked, referred to as “honesty/humility”, which is 
meant to capture aspects such as sincerity, modesty, fairness, and 
greed-avoidance.224) 
 I mentioned the effects of testosterone on human behavior (includ-
ing its role in violent offending and as part of important sex differ-
ences) as well as personality differences in dogs, apes, and other ani-
mals. All this is strong evidence that there is an important biological 
component to personality traits. And this has been borne out in studies 
taking into account the relative causal contributions of genes and en-
vironment by studying siblings reared together or apart, identical 
twins reared together or reared apart, fraternal twins reared together 
or reared apart, non-related adopted siblings reared together etcetera. 
The result of this body of research, where both the environmental and 
genetic contributions are controlled for, is rather striking. Adopted in-
dividuals growing up together as siblings in the same family, receiving 
the same upbringing and belonging to the same socio-economic strata, 
are no more similar in their personality traits than people selected ran-
domly on the street. Fraternal twins are less similar than monozygotic 
twins, who in turn are concordant for most traits whether reared apart 
or together. These findings is strong evidence genes account for a good 
deal of a person’s personality. But more surprisingly, “the environ-
ment” as usually understood seems to have very little lasting effects 
on an individual’s personality type. Non-shared environmental fac-
tors, that is, factors which are unique to every individual within a 
household, such as their fetal development, having an infection, a con-
cussion, being exposed to some chemical or having a certain group of 
 
223 For a comprehensive presentation and discussion of personality psychology, in-
cluding the genetics of personality, see Larsen & Buss 2017. 
224 Ashton & Lee 2005. 
 
110 
friends, however, do have an effects. So identical twins reared together 
and identical twins growing up separated in different families are nei-
ther more nor less similar. The correlations you see between parenting 
and a given outcome are almost entirely explained by shared genes. 
That is, the propensity of a parent to exhibit a certain behavior will be 
passed on by their genes, not their behavior, to the child as well.225 So 
next time you see headlines like “Helicopter-parenting creates anxious 
adolescents” or “Reading to your children increases their intelligence” 
ask if the studies invoked may be genetically confounded. 
7 Between a rock and a hard place  
Although the biological and trait psychological considerations I have 
mentioned do not refute situationism (which does not speak of life out-
comes and the like) they do bring some relative weight back to the per-
son and his or her character as a decisive factor in how a life is con-
ducted viewed as a whole, or at least in larger chunks than situations. 
Is this good enough for virtue ethics? From one perspective, neither 
story gives a very hopeful picture of what is left to work with. Accord-
ing to situationist psychology, we are fragmented individuals, whose 
behavior is overwhelmingly shaped by the situational whims of the 
surroundings. The trait psychological story moderates this conclusion, 
but the complementing picture it offers seems threatening in another 
way: our personality traits are challenging to influence, they do not 
predict individual behavior very well, and they do not seem to line up 
in any obvious way with what the virtuous character traits are.  
If you have ever listened to a motivational speaker, chances are you 
have come across the notion that the Chinese word for “crisis” also 
means “opportunity”. Or, as Homer Simpson economically dubbed it, 
crisitunity.226 Let us see if we can adopt this perspective for a while, and 
explore our mangled virtue situation as a crisitunity. In the following, 
I will offer some reasons why optimism might be warranted, but also 
suggestions for reformation and revision for those interested in devel-
oping a virtue ethics for our time. 
 
225 Plomin & Daniels 2011. For two recent overviews of the nature and nurture of 
personality, see Mitchell 2018 and Plomin 2018. For an accessible book critical of the 
biological perspective, see Fine 2017. 
226 The Simpsons, 1994. The trope that the Chinese word for crisis could also mean 
opportunity has been around since the 1930s, but reached a wider audience when John 
F. Kennedy used it in some of his speeches. In accepting the Nobel peace prize, Al 
Gore also made use of it in his speech.  
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Stuck between the Scylla of situationism and the Charybdis of ge-
netically and otherwise bestowed stable traits, what is the virtue ethi-
cist to do? First, the approach should assimilate that situations exert a 
much more powerful influence on our behavior than has been granted 
by common sense. In addition to stress, conformity to the group and 
obedience to authority, changes in ambient smells and sounds influ-
ence us, as do seemingly trivial changes in mood. Becoming virtuous 
involves familiarizing oneself with these issues, and developing strat-
egies to counteract them.227 One way to counteract them may be, para-
doxically, to give up. In part because it seems prudent not to trust one’s 
situational self, but also because there are simply too many situations 
to handle. Being helpful all the time is not going to be very, well, help-
ful. In the modern world, there is no end to the number of occasions. 
Instead, being virtuous means organizing life in such a manner that 
one’s helpfulness is funneled in ways that seem to make overall sense 
and be morally defensible. Virtue ethics, as well as any school of think-
ing about ethics in a modern context, has to take into account that our 
fragile hominid moral psychology has been outstripped by the ethical 
demands of a globalized world. Virtue ethics should engage both in 
harm reduction by incorporating how situationally fragile we are, and 
prevention by making our overall ethical behavior less dependent on 
how we handle sudden situations. The rationale for the first strategy, 
trying to make us see when situational factors that should not matter 
nevertheless influence us, is a lesson from psychology, but the ra-
tionale for making sure situations come to be less important is also 
based on the wider realization that much of ethical relevance is not 
about things we encounter or people we interact with.  
Virtue ethics is an ancient account of the ethical life. Even though 
the ancient Greek civilization may have been as international as was 
imaginable at the time, human interaction then was much more lim-
ited in time and space. No one could imagine the moral issues evoked 
by faraway famines, mass migration, or climate change. Because the 
moral landscape is so different for us today, virtue ethics was due for 
a tune-up nonetheless. The call for such a self-assessment is not be-
cause virtue talk is obsolete, false or misguided, but because we need 
to rethink its application in a context of so many new, less concrete and 
more far-reaching ethical issues.  
 
227 Cf. Miller 2017, where he suggests several explorable routes to virtue. 
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The recommendation – or retreat, depending on how you think of 
it – that we allow ourselves to think of virtue not as situational instan-
tiation but as aggregate outcomes or life-strategies, is in a way a nar-
rowing of the ambitions of virtue ethics, but in another a widening of 
its application. Doris thinks it would be a considerable narrowing of 
our ambitions to settle for an aggregationist approach. First of all, he 
says, we really are interested in predicting and understanding behav-
ior on particular instances. Questions such as “how could he do such 
a thing?”228 presuppose the meaningfulness of explaining individual 
instances of behaviors, not just general trends. More importantly, per-
haps, Doris says, virtue ethicist themselves typically do not think of 
virtues as general trends or aggregative outcomes, but as robust traits: 
“Describe a situation, even one where the situational pressures toward 
moral failure are high, and one can confidently predict what the virtu-
ous person will not do”.229 
But because of the confounding effects of situational variables – 
group effects, mood effects, and the like – aggregative outcomes might 
be the best thing virtue ethics could hope for. Consider Josephine, who 
decides to auto-debit a percentage of her income every month to the 
Against Malaria Fund. Presumably her generosity or helping behavior 
towards strangers is just as subjected to subtle situational manipula-
tions as anyone else’s. Still, it is generous and compassionate of her to 
give away money in order to alleviate the harsh plight of others, even 
if her generosity varies according to situational variables in many 
other instances. That our moral lives in this way become less myopic 
also makes situations less important. The most salient moral choices 
may not be daily interactions, but choices about what we consume, 
what we do for a living. These are things we can exercise control over. 
So virtue ethics may have to settle for a type of life-plan perspective 
and give up some confidence in the act-particular perspective. Since, 
as I have said, there are good grounds for focusing less on situations, 
even absent social psychology, this recommendation is partly making 
a virtue of necessity and partly a positive suggestion in itself. 
A possible worry here is that what I am suggesting is that virtue 
ethics is euthanized and resurrected as consequentialism. But the 
worry is unwarranted, for two reasons. First, I am not suggesting that 
any moral theory is correct but only that whoever finds virtue ethics 
attractive but also vulnerable to some psychological research may 
 
228 Doris 2002, p. 73. 
229 Ibid., p. 74. 
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want to reformulate the theory while preserving what in it was attrac-
tive in the first place. Secondly, my suggestion leaves intact the idea 
that aretaic considerations are more basic than considerations of valu-
able outcomes or obligatory action-types rather than the other way 
around.230 So what is aggregated is not utility but virtuous actions, ac-
tions made from a motive of concern, generosity, courage, helpfulness, 
honesty and so on. 
Consider Bruno Batta and Fred Prozi, whose participation in the 
obedience studies is described in the appendix. From the miserable 
point of view of the learner their behavior is identical. But whom 
would you trust (if forced to choose between no others) to care for your 
elderly mother? Most would settle for Prozi, I would guess. Why? Be-
cause he is the more compassionate. This assumption is further strength-
ened by the fact that Batta was in the “touch-proximity” variant and 
Prozi heard the pre-recorded vocal feedbacks from the learner, a set-
ting less conducive to virtuous behavior. He was the more sensitive, it 
even showed in his behavior, but the situational factors made it too 
difficult for him to go all the way towards disobeying the instruction 
to inflict meaningless and undeserved pain on another. The tale of 
their respective behavior, though identical in perhaps the most im-
portant regard, nevertheless reveals a difference in their states of char-
acter. Their behaviors are not indicative of lack of character, but of 
flaws in character as well as of differences in character. We need to take 
these nuances into account.  
Prozi had a greater sensitivity for what the situation required – he 
clearly wanted to stop the experiment and let the poor subject go – but 
he lacked the courage to do so. Now conjoining this description with 
the biological bases for individual differences that I have only briefly 
sketched in section 6, and the aggregative effects of these differences, 
we get what I think virtue ethics could most ambitiously hope for 
given situationist psychology: a higher probability for an overall vir-
tuous life – not relentless reliability in doing the right thing.  
“’His ethical perceptions were unfailingly admirable, although he 
behaved only averagely’”, Doris writes in a mock epitaph meant to 
discredit a notion of virtue which emphasizes sensitivity rather than 
actual behavior.231 Separating the two altogether would indeed per-
verse virtue ethics, but there remains a good possibility that there is a 
 
230 For more on the relationship between virtue ethics and consequentialist consider-
ations, see Driver 2001 and Hartman & Bronson, forthcoming. 
231 Doris 2002, p. 17.  
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connection between Prozi-type sensitivity and actual behavior, viewed 
aggregatively. Granted, just about anyone could falter in the swamping 
noise of the present situation, but some character traits will neverthe-
less result in overall more virtuous behavior in a life. So the sensitivity, 
you can call it intellectual or not, which virtue ethicists speak of – is a 
disposition, but its effect is noticeable only over a series of acts or per-
haps viewed over a life-time. 
So much for coping with Scylla. What about the Charybdis of stable 
personality traits? From the point of view of virtue ethics, there are two 
problems with assimilating this body of research, which I will call nor-
mativity and alignment respectively. Virtue ethics, typically, is com-
mitted to the idea that one’s character traits are malleable, possible to 
shape and perfect. But according to personality research, our traits are 
very stable and not easily changed. The other problem is that there is 
no clear understanding of the relationship between these five basic 
personality traits and the vocabulary of virtues.  
These two problems, I suggest, might dissolve one another. The 
normativity charge starts with the commonplace that virtues are the 
sort of thing where moralization is appropriate, i.e. we blame and 
praise people based on their display of virtuous or vicious behavior, 
we admire and believe we ought to mimic virtuous people. But if we 
have no freedom over what traits we have, and little or no freedom in 
changing or developing them once acquired, how can there be room 
for normativity? The alignment problem is about our understanding 
of the virtues as behavioral dispositions, given a toolbox of just five 
basic personality traits where there seems to be little apparent overlap. 
Whence the virtues? 
But given the fact that our personality is not easily changed, it is a 
good thing, from the point of view of virtue ethics, that these traits are 
not identical to a complete list of the virtues. Instead – and here is the 
crisitunity again – the fact that virtue and personality come apart 
opens up the possibility that a person may develop and perfect her 
virtues without going through the miracle of changing her personality. 
And this possibility, assuming it is one, is also the solution to the nor-
mativity charge. We may think of our five basic traits as the ingredi-
ents each one of us has to work with. There is a degree of freedom to 
recruit from your dealt hand of traits and behave generously, coura-
geously, compassionately, and make these behaviors habitual. Scoring 
high on conscientiousness is equally likely to lead you to be like Eich-
man as Mandela. Expressed another way, looking at a personality test 
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result for a given individual will not allow you conclude with any cer-
tainty that they are just, brave, modest etcetera. Some virtues may be 
easier to compose given certain traits than others, but the mixture of 
traits underdetermines the mixture of virtues. The basic building 
blocks of our character are the result of a natural lottery, something 
Aristotle knew, but there is still room for growth and development 
given these conditions. Of course, given your hand, some virtues 
might be more easily attained than others, and the reverse will be true 
for others. We must probably also accept that through no fault of their 
own, some people will have a harder time attaining virtue than others. 
This element of luck and natural virtue and vice is hardly welcome, 
but we need not think it nullifies the approach.232 
One observation I make having surveyed quite a bit of the social 
psychological literature on person and situation, and importing to this 
debate some of the thinking and experimentation on moral judgment, 
is that we can understand the situationist findings as analogous to the 
use of heuristics concerning judgment. Just like our judgments are 
guided by quickly available but only vaguely conscious heuristics such 
as “don’t kill” “don’t be violent” etcetera, our behavior is guided by 
similar heuristics, such as “do as you’ve agreed to”, “don’t make a 
scene”, “stay out of trouble” and so forth. But just as the existence of 
heuristics shaping moral judgment, while a potent distorting factor, 
does not rule out a capacity to critically reflect on moral theories and 
these heuristics themselves, the existence of situationally triggered be-
havioral heuristics, while potent, does not rule out our having person-
ality traits that are critical in shaping behavior. Sometimes these traits 
get swamped by the power of the situation, but sometimes they shine 
through. Over the course of many situations, indeed a lifetime, indi-
vidual differences in traits will show. According to the situationist cri-
tique, the correlation between an individual’s being helpful in situa-
tion A and situation B is simply too low to warrant any ascriptions of 
helpfulness to her. But a clever and illuminating piece of reasoning by 
psychologist Robert Abelson might provide some grounds for not dis-
missing low correlations as inconsequential. Abelson asks us to con-
sider baseball player Ted Williams, who ended his career with a record 
.344 batting average. As his nickname “The Greatest Hitter Who Ever 
Lived” suggests, he is considered one of the best players of the game. 
Abelson compared this top average to one of the league’s lowest, that 
 
232 See discussions in Athanassoulis 2005, and Hartman 2017. Also, Church & Hart-
man (eds.) 2019. 
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of Bob Uecker (.200). The difference in skill between Williams and 
Uecker explains less than 1 percent of the variance for a given single 
hit being successful or unsuccessful.233 Still, no one would propose a 
team would be better off sending out Uecker rather than Williams to 
make that hit. Comparing character traits to baseball skills might not 
spell the vindication of virtue ethics, but the comparison does show, I 
think, as Sabini and Silver put it, that “believing in globalism is not 
entirely a matter of succumbing to an illusion”.234 Some hit better than 
others. More generally, the upshot is that “Personality psychologists 
have lost hope of predicting ‘all of the people all of the time’ and focus 
on predicting ‘some of the people some of the time’.”235 
8 Situationism – in psychology, and in philosophy  
For many, the appeal of virtue ethics is its distinctive way of formulat-
ing the questions of ethics: How am I to live? What kind of person 
should I be? The other ethical theories are usually taken to offer an-
swers to the question What acts are right, and what makes them so? 
For me, this difference makes virtue ethics less, not more, interesting. 
For it is somewhat elusive in what sense virtue ethics is then a compet-
itor to, indeed incompatible with, say, utilitarianism if its basic tenets 
are answers to a different set of questions than the rest of the bunch.236 
A utilitarian or Kantian, too, may be interested in what kind of person 
to be, and it is not clear answers at that level would be incompatible. 
For virtue ethics to be a theoretically independent alternative to conse-
quentialism and other ethical theories it needs to be incompatible with 
them. It must be more than just psychological advice.  
Here are some of the separate claims hovering around the designa-
tion ‘virtue ethics’: 
a) Human behavior is aptly described as flowing from character 
traits of the individual. 
b) The idea that leading a worthwhile life is inseparable from 
leading a moral life; you cannot be a flourishing psychopath. 
 
233 Abelson 1985. 
234 Sabini & Silver, 2005, p. 541n. 
235 Larsen & Buss 2017, p. 95. 
236 For developments, see Svensson 2010; Svensson 2011, and Svensson & Johansson 
2018. Also, Hursthouse 1999. 
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c) The moral worth of human action is not exhausted by the con-
sequences of overt behavior, nor to be assessed as tokens of ac-
tion-types, but rather by reference to the motives, emotions and 
reasons of the agent; an action is right if, and only if, it would 
be performed by a fully virtuous agent acting in character. 
The debate on virtue ethics and situationism has focused mainly on a) 
and to what extent it is true or false and to what extent its truth or 
falsity affects the plausibility of virtue ethics. But if b) were true, situ-
ationism may be a threat not only to virtue ethics but to prudential 
value. If we have no characters we cannot, on this view, have fully 
flourishing lives; without moral excellence, the quality of our lives are 
diminished.237 On hedonist or preferentialist accounts, lack of virtue is 
unrelated to wellbeing, but for the development of some sort of per-
fectionist or objective list view, there is a relation such that leading a 
good life has to do both with prudence and morality. 
I have tended to believe c) is pretty insulated from experimental re-
sults. How can a criterion of rightness be affected by empirical data? 
The criterion is perfectly intelligible of course. We can imagine such a 
thing as a fully virtuous agent and can understand the idea that her 
motives, emotions, and reasons are what ground our moral obliga-
tions. I do not find the criterion particularly attractive, partly because 
it seems incomplete in an important sense.238 But this is an old discus-
sion in ethical theory and there is nothing about possible moral impli-
cations of psychological research which would settle that debate.  
8.1 The ongoing reappraisal in social psychology 
True, there is a tension in the field of psychology between those who 
emphasize the power of the situation and those who emphasize the 
stability of traits, but it is also important to note that this quarrel is 
about where within the middle ground to settle. Both Doris and Har-
man are motivated by a desire to confront moral philosophy with the 
 
237 Appiah 2008 brings up this implication.  
238 If the virtuous is explanatorily prior to the good and the right, then, as Julia Driver 
said, “it seems natural to ask the further question, ‘Why would the virtuous agent ad-
vise me to do A?’ If the answer is simply that what the virtuous agent advises deter-
mines right action, independent of any other reasons or considerations, then the ac-
count seems quite capricious; if, on the other hand, there are independent reasons, 
then aren’t those the right-making features – and then isn’t what the virtuous agent 
advises superfluous?” (Driver 2006, p. 118.). As you can see, there is an analogue here 
to the Euthyphro challenge to Divine command theory. 
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most up to date and accurate psychological science. They view our no-
tions of personality as a folk-psychological hodgepodge, and they take 
social psychology experimentation to provide a sobering scientific cor-
rective.239 Ironically, once philosophers started to notice the situation-
ist trend in psychology, psychologists themselves had already started 
to moderate the more extreme conclusions, and the pendulum had 
swung back towards the person part of the person-situation research.  
A more general observation is that it has become apparent that 
much of psychological research fails to replicate, i.e. when a different 
research group attempts to follow the same protocol, they fail to 
demonstrate the previously published result.240 So, when you read of 
an effect or proposed phenomenon of our psychology, chances are that 
the claim is false or unsubstantiated. In fact, of all the subdisciplines of 
psychology, social psychology is particularly frail; studies in this field 
successfully replicated in just 25 per cent of cases. That is about half 
the success rate compared to cognitive psychology.241 Of the studies 
cited by situationist critics of virtue ethics, Milgram’s is the most 
tightly controlled, and yet it did not sample a randomized selection of 
the population but people who volunteered to help the experimenter 
in a psychological study. After listening to the audiotapes still kept at 
Yale University, and after interviewing participants and their friends, 
families and relatives, psychologist Gina Perry became convinced that 
participants, as in the Stanford Prison Experiment, realized what was 
expected of them. She was also able to establish that the experimenter’s 
cues were not employed in a consistent manner.242 Both the notoriety 
of the basic study design and the stricter ethical restrictions on what 
unwitting participants may be exposed to have made exact replica-
tions difficult, but what has been done seems to confirm the initial 
basic findings, though there is ongoing discussion on just how to in-
terpret the results. Milgram took himself to study obedience, but only 
one of the four prods where actually an order, namely the fourth, “You 
have no other choice, you must go on”. And, in attempts to replicate 
 
239 “Personality psychology studies the ways ordinary people think about personal-
ity and character traits, which is to be distinguished from studying the truth about 
personality and character traits.” Harman 2009, p. 236. Deleted from the published 
version but still available online is the assessment, totally erroneous in my view, that 
“personality psychology is in pretty bad institutional shape as a scientific discipline”. 
240 Nosek et. al. 2015. 
241 Ibid., p. 5. 
242 Perry 2012. Also see Griggs 2017. 
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the study, no one continued upon hearing it. As mentioned, there was 
a bit of improvisation going on around the putatively fixed prods, but 
it appears the more explicitly order-like the prod was, the less likely 
participants were to keep administering shocks. In other words, the 
orders of an authority figure led to disobedience, not obedience. Prods 
emphasizing that the experiment was harmless or that the shocks were 
required for scientific purposes, however, where less likely to trigger 
disobedience. Instead of obedience, we may think of the subjects’ be-
havior as identification with the scientific goals of the study.243 Mil-
gram was much more rigorous than Zimbardo; still, looking at all of 
the ancillary evidence, as well as his own accounts (see the this chap-
ter’s appendix, pp. 124-7), one becomes troubled by the plain observa-
tion that he seems so eager to tell a story. 
Many of the other studies invoked by situationists are problemati-
cally underpowered. The fact that there are many of them may suggest 
an underlying trend nonetheless, but the 25 per cent replication rate 
remains our best sober assessment of the strength of research in this 
field. Social psychology research of the coins-in-a-phone-booth type 
sometimes look like middle school social science projects compared to 
the emerging science of behavioral genetics, which employs rigorous 
quantitative methodology, carefully controlling for possible confound-
ing factors, and utilizes data from vast numbers of individuals, often 
whole populations.244  
What accounts for the poor replicability rate in social psychology? 
For a long time, there has been strong incentives to build one’s career 
by coming up with new theories and findings, rather than accumu-
lating findings into large bodies of knowledge interconnected by a 
plausible theoretical framework. Psychology therefore runneth over 
with theories and effects, the one more silly and specific than the other. 
We have the “Google effect” (the tendency to forget things that are 
easy to find with an internet search) or the “Rashomon effect” (the ten-
dency that people will describe one and the same series of events dif-
ferently based on their previous experience and biases). These effects 
are obviously specific (and well-known) instances of broader psycho-
logical mechanisms, but you cannot publish a paper claiming just that. 
The field set itself up for this backlash by perpetuating a norm that 
 
243 See Griggs for more discussion and references. Also see Hollander & Turowetz 
2017. 
244 For more on behavior genetics and how it relates to psychological research, see 
Barbaro & Penke 2020. 
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gifted scholars have their own theories and effects and only the bores 
would care about effect sizes and reproducibility. This phenomenon, 
too, of course, has a name: the toothbrush effect. What is true of tooth-
brushes, the saying goes, is true of theories: no self-respecting psy-
chologists would use anyone else’s.245 Another explanation for the low 
replicability is the bias in favor of publishing positive results. We will 
never know how many times a team of social psychologist baked 
lovely croissants and did not get people to help strangers more than 
without the pleasant scent. For this reason, there is now a movement 
which aims to convince scholars to preregister interesting research 
questions, and then commit to publishing the result whatever it is. 
Sounds like a good idea.246  
Another factor is a form of anti-biological bias. In a recent survey, 
the attitudes and beliefs of leading social psychologists on the rele-
vance of evolutionary thinking for psychological research was studied. 
While almost every prominent researcher in social psychology af-
firmed that all life on Earth, including humans, are the product of evo-
lution, only half assented to the proposition that evolution has had an 
effect on our minds and influences social attitudes and preferences.247 
In fact, we know that all psychological traits have a genetic component. 
We also know that no psychological trait is a hundred percent deter-
mined by genetics.248 Studying humans without taking onboard these 
basic facts is futile. 
9 Conclusion and moving forward 
As is often the case when two people quarrel, there is actually more 
agreement than meets the eye. Annas criticizes Doris for thinking of 
virtue as “uncritical and rigid habit” (while simultaneously something 
“developed independently of activity”) which is “radically unintellec-
tual” and boils down to “cloddish habit-following”.249 She emphasizes 
that virtue instead is a “disposition to act on reasons” and that “the 
 
245 The term, if not the observation, was coined by Watkins 1984. Later discussed in 
Mischel 2009. 
246 For more on the turn to preregistered studies, see Nosek et al. 2018. Ritchie 2020 
offers a good discussion, not just relevant for psychology. 
247 Buss and von Hippel 2018, p. 6.  
248 Plomin et al. 2016. 
249 Annas 2005, p. 637, 639.  
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more virtuous you are, the more complex and dynamic your charac-
ter”.250 For these reasons, Annas believes, virtue ethics remains un-
harmed by Doris’s clumsy cross-examinations.  
If Annas found too little talk of dynamic adaptation and intelligent 
reasoning in Doris’ interrogation of virtue ethics, it is because his 
whole project is premised on the idea that we look at differences in 
behavior in response to situations between which there are no morally 
significant differences, i.e. comparisons where there simply are no rea-
sons to respond differently. Intelligence, nuance, and dynamic reason-
ing are all fine – in the end, Annas must agree with Doris these morally 
important qualities would not lead its possessor to conclude that the 
scent of freshly baked croissants spells an increased obligation to help 
bypassers. But her charge is in any event unfair since Doris frequently 
emphasized that being virtuous is not mechanically acting “the same” 
but is about deliberation, emotions, sensitivity to changes in the situa-
tion etcetera. Early on in the book, he writes, in what could equally 
well be from one of Annas’ works on the subject, that “virtues are not 
mere dispositions but intelligent dispositions, characterized by distinc-
tive patterns of emotional response, deliberation, and decision as well 
as by more overt behavior.”251 As for the “rigid” part, Doris states that 
“to attribute a virtue is not to say that a person can be counted on to 
reliably do the same thing but to say that they can be counted on to 
reliably do whatever is appropriate to that virtue.”252 Finally, before 
people brought up social psychology experiments as ways of criticiz-
ing virtue ethics, Annas expressed herself in ways that are similar to 
what she now blasts: virtue implies, she wrote, “a firm tendency to act 
and decide in one way rather than the other.”253 
In addition to creating disagreement where none exists, it seems as 
if Annas makes virtue ethics a moving target so as to prevent any crit-
icism from sticking. This is a general bug of the debate: the difficulty 
of fixating what it is virtue ethics needs to be true of human psychol-
ogy. Critics of virtue ethics, such as Doris, have been very clear on 
what they take to be the empirical presuppositions of virtue ethics, and 
how they think these presuppositions square with available evidence. 
It has been less easy to pinpoint what defenders of virtue ethics believe 
that their theory needs to be true of human psychology. 
 
250 Ibid. p. 637 
251 Doris 2002, p 17. 
252 Ibid., p. 176. Also see Doris’ response to Annas in the PPR exchange. 
253 Annas 1993, p. 51. Cited in Doris 2005. 
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It is time to sum up what lessons can be learnt from exposing virtue 
ethics to the situationist critique. First, there is such a thing as attribu-
tion error, that is we tend to overemphasize the importance of the in-
dividual’s trait and discount the significance of the situation. Folk psy-
chology is on the side of personality psychology, and it is a good thing 
situationists have offered a sobering corrective. Aiming for virtue 
means coming to understand the mechanics of behavior as a person-
situation interaction, and develop cognitive and emotional tools to rec-
ognize and offset those kinds of situational cues that are likely to make 
us act in ways we would not endorse on reflection.  
Even if the situationist critique took virtue ethics by surprise, lead-
ing to a somewhat dazed, defensive response, the theory, as far as I can 
tell, has not been dealt a lethal blow. There is still hope for virtue ethics, 
and improved versions will certainly be developed. We should all ad-
mit virtuous development must include knowledge of, and strategies 
to overcome, situational variables. Also, while not becoming too elitist, 
virtue ethicists should not be ashamed to tell the world that develop-
ing into a virtuous person takes time and skill and is not easy, and 
hence we cannot expect it to be common. More controversially, the 
view will have to live with a degree of moral luck, in the sense that 
some of the ingredients of virtue are personality traits that the individ-
ual has only little control over.  
How disappointing situationist conclusions from social psychology 
are for virtue ethics depends on what your expectations and ambitions 
were to start with. The relative advantage virtue ethics long has been 
thought to possess compared to, say, utilitarianism or Kantianism, has 
been its linkage to an appealing moral psychology, one that inspires 
us to moral development and enlightens moral education. Letting go 
of much of the psychological baggage, what remains is no longer a 
“philosophy of life”, but simply one ethical theory among many oth-
ers. That may not be too bad, either. As I stated above, I believe for 
independent reasons that a criterion of rightness along the lines, “An 
action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would charac-
teristically do in the circumstances” is unsatisfactory, but that is an ar-
gument we may not be able ground in experimental work.  
Another lesson, perhaps not as salient for the ancients, is that moral 
concerns today are so much more far-reaching, both in time, space and 
in the number of individuals affected. There is no end to the number 
of occasions I can be helpful, and we therefore need to design our lives 
in ways that make us, on the whole, helpful. That may not be identical 
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to offering help to every one asking us for it in our daily lives. Even if 
I described this as a conversion from a “classic” view to an aggrega-
tionist view, the change should not be overstated. When we think of 
moral exemplars we think of people who committed their lives to 
fighting injustice, helping others, standing up to illegitimate power et-
cetera. They had a life-plan approach to being a good person, and that 
is still possible. 
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Appendix: Same but different 
Reports from the Milgram experiments 
Example 1 
Bruno Batta is a thirty-seven-year-old welder who took part in the varia-
tion requiring the use of force. He was born in New Haven, his parents in 
Italy. He has a rough-hewn face that conveys a conspicuous lack of alert-
ness. He has some difficulty in mastering the experimental procedure and 
needs to be corrected by the experimenter several times. He shows appre-
ciation for the help and willingness to do what is required. After the 150 
volt level, Batta has to force the learner’s hand down on the shock plate, 
since the learner himself refuses to touch it. 
When the learner first complains, Mr. Batta pays no attention to him. 
His face remains impassive, as if to dissociate himself from the learner’s 
disruptive behavior. When the experimenter instructs him to force the 
learner’s hand down, he adopts a rigid, mechanical procedure. He tests 
the generator switch. When it fails to function, he immediately forces the 
learner’s hand onto the shock plate. All the while he maintains the same 
rigid mask. The learner, seated alongside him, begs him to stop, but with 
robotic impassivity he continues the procedure. 
What is extraordinary is his apparent total indifference to the learner; 
he hardly takes cognizance of him as a human being. Meanwhile, he re-
lates to the experimenter in a submissive and courteous fashion. 
At the 330 volt level, the learner refuses not only to touch the shock 
plate but also to provide any answers. Annoyed, Batta turns to him, and 
chastises him: “You better answer and get it over with. We can’t stay here 
all night.” These are the only words he directs to the learner in the course 
of an hour. Never again does he speak to him. The scene is brutal and de-
pressing, his hard, impassive face showing total indifference as he sub-
dues the screaming learner and gives him shocks. He seems to derive no 
pleasure from the act itself, only quiet satisfaction at doing his job 
properly. 
When he administers 450 volts, he turns to the experimenter and asks, 
“Where do we go from here, Professor?” His tone is deferential and ex-
presses his willingness to be a cooperative subject, in contrast to the learn-
er's obstinacy. 
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Example 2 
Fred Prozi’s reactions, if more dramatic than most, illuminate the conflicts 
experienced by others in less visible form. About fifty years old and un-
employed at the time of the experiment, he has a good-natured. if slightly 
dissolute, appearance, and he strikes people as a rather ordinary fellow. 
He begins the session calmly but becomes tense as it proceeds. After de-
livering the 180-volt shock, he pivots around in the chair and, shaking his 
head, addresses the experimenter in agitated tones: 
Prozi: I can’t stand it. I’m not going to kill that man in there. You hear him 
hollering? 
Experimenter: As I told you before, the shocks may be painful, but . . . 
Prozi: But he’s hollering. He can’t stand it. What’s going to happen to him? 
Experimenter (his voice is patient, matter-of-fact): The experiment re-
quires that you continue, Teacher. 
Prozi: Aah, but, unh, I'm not going to get that man sick in there -- know 
what I mean? 
Experimenter: Whether the learner likes it or not, we must go on, through 
all the word pairs. 
Prozi: I refuse to take the responsibility. He’s in there hollering 
Experimenter: It’s absolutely essential that you continue, Prozi. 
Prozi (indicating the unused questions): There’s too many left here, I 
mean, Jeez, if he gets them wrong, there’s too many of them left. I mean, 
who’s going to take the responsibility if anything happens to that gen-
tleman? 
Experimenter: I’m responsible for anything that happens to him. Con-
tinue, please. 
Prozi: All right. (Consults list of words.) The next one’s “Slow -- walk, 
truck, dance, music” Answer please. (A buzzing sound indicates the 
learner has signaled his answer.) Wrong. A hundred and ninety-five 
volts. “Dance.” (Zzumph!) 
Learner (yelling): Let me out of here! My heart’s bothering me (Teacher 
looks at experimenter.) 
Experimenter: Continue, please. 
Learner (screaming): Let me out of here! You have no right to keep me 
here! Let me out of here, my hearts bothering me, let me out! 
Prozi (shakes head, pats the table nervously): You see he’s hollering. Hear 
that? Gee, I don’t know. 
Experimenter: The experiment requires . . . 
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Prozi (interrupting): I know it does sir, but I mean -- hunh! He don’t know 
what he’s getting in for. He’s up to 195 volts! (Experiment continues, 
through 210 volts, 225 volts, 240 volts, 255 volts, 270 volts, at which point 
Prozi, with evident relief, runs out of word-pair questions.) 
Experimenter: You’ll have to go back to the beginning of that page and go 
through them again until he’s learned them all correctly. 
Prozi: Aw, no. I’m not going to kill that man. You mean I’ve got to keep 
going up with the scale? No sir. He’s hollering in there. I’m not going to 
give him 450 volts. 
Experimenter: The experiment requires that you go on. 
Learner: Ohhh. I absolutely refuse to answer anymore. (Shouting urgently 
now.) Let me out of here! You can’t hold me here Get me out. Get-me-
out-of-here! 
Experimenter: Continue. The next word is “green,” please.  
Prozi: “Greengrass, hat, ink, apple.” (Nothing happens. No answering 
buzz. Just gloomy silence.) 
Prozi: I don’t think he is going to answer. 
Experimenter: If the learner doesn’t answer in a reasonable time, about 
four or five seconds, consider the answer wrong. And follow the same 
procedures you have been doing for wrong answers. Say, “Wrong,” tell 
him the number of volts, give him the punishment, read him the correct 
answer. Continue, please. 
Prozi: “Green -- grass, hat, ink, apple.” Answer, please. (More silence. 
Subject just sits there.) 
Experimenter: Go on with the procedure, please. 
Prozi: Three hundred and fifteen volts The answer is “ink.” (Zzumph!) 
Learner: Ohh. Ooohh 
Prozi: (relieved to hear response). Next one . . . 
Learner: I absolutely refuse to answer. 
Prozi: You got to. You get a shock if you don’t answer. (Experiment con-
tinues with learner refusing to answer, and, finally failing even to grunt 
or groan. At 375 volts, the subject stands up.)  
Prozi: I think something’s happened to that fellow in there. I don’t get no 
answer. He was hollering at less voltage. Can’t you check in and see if 
he’s all right, please? 
Experimenter (with same detached calm): Not once we’ve started. Please 
continue, Teacher. 
Prozi (sits down, sighs deeply): “Cool day, shade, water, paint.” Answer 
please. Are you all right in there? Are you all right? 
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Experimenter: Please continue, Teacher. Continue, please. (Subject 
pushes lever. Zzumph!) 
Prozi (swiveling around in his chair): Something’s happened to that man 
in there. (Swiveling back.) Next one. “Low -- dollar, necklace, moon, 
paint.” (Turning around again.) Something’s happened to that man in 
there. You better check in on him, sir. He won’t answer or nothing. 
Experimenter: Continue. Go on, please. 
Prozi: You accept all responsibility? 
Experimenter: The responsibility is mine. Correct. Please go on. (Subject 
returns to his list, starts running through words as rapidly as he can read 
them, works through to 450 volts.) 
Prozi: That’s that. 
Experimenter: Continue using the 450 switch for each wrong answer. 
Continue, please. 
Prozi: But I don’t get anything! 
Experimenter: Please continue. The next word is "white." 
Prozi: Don’t you think you should look in on him, please? 
Experimenter: Not once we’ve started the experiment. 
Prozi: What if he’s dead in there? (Gestures toward the room with the 
electric chair.) l mean, he told me he can’t stand the shock, sir. I don’t 
mean to be rude, but I think you should look In on him. All you have to 
do is look in on him. All you have to do is look in the door. I don’t get 
no answer, no noise. Something might have happened to the gentleman 
in there, sir. 
Experimenter: We must continue. Go on, please. 
Prozi: You mean keep giving that? Four-hundred-fifty volts, what he’s got 
now? 
Experimenter: That’s correct. Continue. The next word is “white.” 
Prozi (now at a furious pace): “White -- cloud, horse, rock, house.” An-
swer, please. The answer is “horse.” Four hundred and fifty volts. 
(Zzumph!) Next words, “Bag -- paint, music. clown, girl.” The next an-
swer is “paint.” Four hundred and fifty volts. (Zzumph!) Next word is 
“Short -- sentence, movie . . .” 
Experimenter: Excuse me, Teacher. We’ll have to discontinue the experi-
ment.
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5  Concluding Remarks 
Of all the beautiful and memorable quotes photographer Steve Pyke 
asked his portrayed philosophers to provide, I always liked Kit Fine’s 
the most:  
Philosophy is the strangest of subjects: it aims at rigor and yet is un-
able to establish any results; it attempts to deal with the most pro-
found questions and yet constantly finds itself preoccupied with the 
trivialities of language; and it claims to be of great relevance to ra-
tional enquiry and the conduct of our life and yet is almost com-
pletely ignored. But perhaps what is strangest of all is the passion 
and intensity with which it is pursued by those who have fallen in its 
grip. 
This thesis project was spurred by what one may call a naturalist urge, 
i.e. a will to have science and philosophy interact and hopefully see 
those stubborn yet elusive philosophical problems either solved or dis-
solved. A lesson from my attempts to confront moral philosophy with 
science is an appreciation of just how resilient the field is. And not just 
philosophy as such, but individual philosophical theories and posi-
tions. Originally I had a hope that moral philosophy’s confrontation 
with psychology would lead to an undermining of deontological and 
virtue ethical views, leaving consequentialist ones intact and relatively 
strengthened. And to an extent this hope or prediction materialized. 
But I also concede that all of the major options in ethical theory are still 
alive and kicking. As Folke Tersman put it, “so many moves are open 
to a clever philosopher, that people will soon figure out ways to ac-
commodate the new data within just about any philosophical the-
ory.”254  
And it is not just about being clever. Positions are actually revised 
and refined in light of these kinds of confrontations. There is an enor-
mous discussion in philosophy about the evidentiary role of intuitions, 
inspired by work in psychology, neuroscience, cross-cultural anthro-
pology and evolutionary theory. Psychologists and physical anthro-
pologists are formulating grand views on the “nature of morality” and 
how these foundational models in some sense are innate or not. The 
competence of moral philosophers is badly needed in such endeavors, 
but it is equally true that philosophers should get up to speed on the 
developments in these neighboring fields. 
 
254 Tersman 2008, p 390. 
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The renewed interest in the role of intuitions has not just led to a 
more mature sense of self awareness in the field of philosophical meth-
odology and to some great works being written, but also meant the 
beginning of a discussion on how the possibility that intuitions vary 
by sex, class, and ethnicity has an impact on who feels at home in the 
world of academic philosophy and who feels like the odd one out.255 
Since its first inception there has been a more or less continuous in-
terest from philosophers in evolutionary theory. This view of the 
world has made a mark on epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of 
mind, and, of course, moral philosophy. The relationship between 
moral philosophy and evolutionary thinking is especially interesting, 
with responses ranging from dismissal to “the time has come for ethics 
to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and bi-
ologicized”.256 There was a wave of writings on evolution and ethics in 
the aftermath of Edward O. Wilson’s controversial 1975 book Sociobi-
ology (from which the quote above is taken), with philosophers like 
Michael Ruse arguing for skeptical and or anti-realist conclusions, and 
some, like Peter Singer and James Rachels employing evolutionary 
thinking to undermine appeals to partiality, thus having it make a pos-
itive contribution to normative ethics rather than a skeptical one.257  
A second wave of interest in the implications for moral philosophy 
of evolutionary theory was incited by Sharon Street’s and Richard 
Joyce’s skeptical work. Theirs is a much more sophisticated and well-
worked out challenge to moral realism than the one prompted by the 
earlier ones formulated by Ruse and Wilson. In response, moral real-
ists have refined their view and offered ingenious replies and devel-
opments. 258  The relevance of evolution is also a cornerstone in 
metaethical work defending anti-realist or so-called quasi realist ex-
pressivist views on ethics by thinkers like Alan Gibbard, Simon Black-
burn, and Mark Schroeder.259  
What are the next steps in the field of empirically informed ethics? 
It is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future. On the 
one hand we may see a degree of saturation stemming from the reali-
 
255 Fricker 2007; “Buckwalter & Stich 2014; Drożdżowicz 2018, Machery, et al. 2017. 
Demarest et al 2016; Figdor & Drabek 2016. 
256 Wilson 1975, p. 562. 
257 Ruse 1985; Singer 1981; Rachels 1990. 
258 Enoch 2013. Justin Clarke-Doane 2016. 
259 Gibbard 1990, Blackburn 1998, Schroeder 2010. 
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zation that empirical findings rarely amount to a knock-down refuta-
tion of any philosophical view of some complexity. On the other, we 
are bound to encounter ever more refined empirical measures to study 
moral judgments at the neural level, giving philosophers new stuff to 
think about. And the more philosophers themselves participate in de-
signing such studies, the more likely it is that they will be of high qual-
ity and philosophical relevance.  
The study of the purported innateness of morality involves a broad 
spectrum of research disciplines and is continuing to evolve. Research-
ers from comparative and biological anthropology will systematize the 
uniformity and variation of human morality, and will merge that kind 
of research with fMRI data on moral thinking at the neural level, 
providing us with both a wider and a more fine-grained analysis. My 
impression is that the researchers involved in these kinds of explora-
tions often think of them as vindicating certain normative outlooks, 
while the perspective of philosophers is often to think of the findings 
as something potentially serving as biases in our moral thinking. The 
earlier in the process philosophers are involved, the less likely that the 
work produced contains philosophical mistakes, and the more likely, 
too, that the best available psychological, biological, and anthropolog-
ical data trickle down to philosophical discussions.  
What has been the relevance of the data and theories surveyed in 
this thesis has varied with the issue at hand. In the case of virtue ethics 
and situationist psychology, the way forward has mostly been in terms 
of setting the scientific record straight, realizing how much of social 
psychology has failed to replicate and is more and more comple-
mented with (if not replaced by) findings anchored in behavioral ge-
netics and personality psychology. As for the dual process theory in 
general, and fMRI studies of moral judgment in particular, here I have 
mostly taken the available data as given. But we should not trust the 
empirical parts here to be settled, and the picture may change with 
new developments and techniques. The finding that an important sub-
set of deontological moral judgment responds to morally irrelevant 
factors is troubling for the view and does have an undermining effect 
on their normative force. But as the end of the chapter showed, just 
what deontologists should say about various cases remains unsettled, 
and so there is obvious room for development, including ones which 
bring onboard these findings to make sure the ensuing theory is not a 
rationalization of responses to morally irrelevant factors. 
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So moral philosophy has proved a very adaptive sounding board to 
advancements in evolutionary thinking, and far from being dissolved 
it has flourished. That the discussion on the innateness of morality is 
premised on an evolutionary understanding of human psychology is 
so obvious it hardly needs to be mentioned. The debate over the neu-
roscience and psychology of moral intuitions is also solidly anchored 
in evolutionary considerations. Even my rejoinder to the situationist 
critique of virtue ethics is premised on the impact of evolutionary con-
siderations on individual differences in personality traits, and though 
not all virtue ethicists will welcome help of that sort it is their best bet. 
Daniel Dennett famously said that Darwin’s idea of evolution by nat-
ural selection was “the single best idea anyone has ever had”.260 It is 
evident to see how its sway permeates everything human.  
Many years ago, in an intro psychology class, I read about how pi-
lots need to learn about and take into account several biologically 
grounded visual cues that in some cases would lead them to miscalcu-
late the aircraft’s altitude. Coming in to a landing field that starts after 
an ascending slope will give the pilot the impression that the angle is 
too steep when in fact it is good. Changing the plane’s angle based on 
the pilot’s visual impressions may cause the plane to crash. The land-
scapes surrounding the runway, and how lights from nearby cities or 
constructions present themselves, will affect what the human mind 
will take to be reliable information on the trajectory of the plane. Some-
times these input are accurate, sometimes not. A skilled pilot will have 
to learn to sometimes recruit our spontaneous visual cues, but to some-
times disregard them and instead trust what seems a counterintuitive 
but test-proven corrective. I like to think of moral philosophy as these 
pilots navigating hazardous landscapes. By learning more about our-
selves, philosophers too may come to be able to every now and then 
successfully land a plane. 
 
 
 
260 Dennett 1995, p. 21. 
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6 Svensk sammanfattning 
Avhandlingen undersöker olika sätt på vilka forskningsfynd i psyko-
logi kan tänkas vara av betydelse för vårt ställningstagande i filoso-
fiska debatter kring etisk teori. ”Psykologi” förstås här i vid mening 
och inkluderar bland annat socialpsykologi, kognitiv psykologi, ut-
vecklingspsykologi och delar av hjärnforskning liksom evolutionsteo-
retiska resonemang och landvinningar relevanta för mänskligt bete-
ende. Etiska teorier, å sin sida, är generella uppfattningar om vad det 
är som gör vissa handlingar och beslut moraliskt riktiga och andra 
oriktiga (jag använder här termerna ”etik” och ”moral” som synony-
mer). Det är i grova drag tre olika sådana etiska teorier som i avhand-
lingen på olika sätt konfronteras med psykologiska rön: utilitarism, 
deontologisk etik samt dygdetik.  
Utilitarismen säger att en handling är moraliskt riktig om, och end-
ast om, den leder till minst lika bra konsekvenser som varje alternativ 
handling som agenten kunde utföra i situationen med avseende på det 
totala välbefinnandet. Lite mer informellt säger utilitarismen att vi 
handlar moraliskt rätt när vi på ett opartiskt sätt i så stor utsträckning 
som det är möjligt handlar så att kännande varelsers välbefinnande 
främjas. 
Vad kunde vara fel med det? Jo ett mindre tilltalande sätt att besk-
riva saken är att ändamålet enligt utilitarismen helgar medlen. Vilken 
sorts handling som maximerar välbefinnandet ges enligt utilitarismen 
ingen självständig vikt, vilket kan tyckas orimligt. En viktig etisk trad-
ition – deontologisk etik – uppfattar istället riktighet som knuten till 
handlingstyper. Vilka handlingstyper som är i och för sig själva rätta 
eller felaktiga kan det finnas olika uppfattningar om, men några för-
slag kunde vara ”att avsiktligen döda en oskyldig människa”, ”att an-
vända en individ enbart som ett medel för att gynna andra” eller ”att 
kränka någons grundläggande mänskliga rättigheter för att uppnå ett 
önskvärt utfall för flertalet”. Deontologisk etik förnekar också utilitar-
ismens moraliska likställande av handlingar och underlåtelser. Vi har, 
säger deontologiska etiska teorier, ett strängare moraliskt ansvar för 
de handlingar som vi aktivt utför än för utfall som kan sägas vara re-
sultatet av att vi har förblivit passiva. Enligt utilitarismen handlar vi ju 
fel närhelst vi misslyckas med att maximera välbefinnandet, även om 
vår ”handling” inte är annat än att sitta med armarna i kors.  
En tredje etisk teoribildning, som faktiskt är den äldsta rent idéhi-
storiskt, fokuserar istället på våra karaktärsdrag, dvs individens stabila 
 
134 
emotionellt och kognitivt grundade beteendedispositioner. Vissa så-
dana karaktärsdrag är särskilt intressanta från moralisk synpunkt, till 
exempel ärlighet, hjälpsamhet, välvilja, generositet, mod och så vidare. 
Dygder som dessa – och motsvarande laster – är centrala för hur vi be-
dömer både oss själva och andra. Ett fokus på dygder i moralfilosofisk 
kontext kan anta olika former, men en central utgångspunkt som är 
särskilt relevant i just detta sammanhang är antagandet att människor 
har karaktärsdrag, att vi kan utveckla dygder, och att vårt handlande 
till stor del är förutsägbart och förklarbart med utgångspunkt i våra 
respektive individuella karaktärsdrag. Han delade med sig av pajen efter-
som han är generös; Hon sprang in i den brinnande byggnaden eftersom hon 
är modig; Eftersom han är en ärlig person kommer han att avvisa erbjudan-
det om att fuska på provet och så vidare. 
Vetenskap och normativ etik 
Vetenskapen söker beskriva och förklara världen sådan den är; moral 
handlar om att ta ställning till vad som är bra och dåligt med världen, 
hur den borde förändras och så vidare. Det är tydligt att detta är två 
helt olika infallsvinklar på saker och ting – att studera dem och att be-
döma dem. Efter den skotske 1700-talsfilosofen David Hume talar man 
om den så kallade Humes lag enligt vilken en värderande slutsats inte 
kan följa logiskt från en uppsättning premisser försåvitt inte någon av 
premisserna är en värdering. Denna insikt tycks innebära att inga fynd 
i psykologi eller andra empiriska vetenskaper kan ha några direkta im-
plikationer för vad som är moraliskt rätt eller fel. I avhandlingen be-
strider jag heller inte denna princip. Den relevans som psykologiska 
forskningsrön kan ha för moralfilosofiska frågor är därför mer indirekt. 
Ett vanligt sätt att åberopa psykologisk forskning har att göra med 
tillförlitligheten i vår bedömning av olika etiska utsagor, vare sig dessa 
är generella teorier eller enskilda omdömen. Detta kan ses som en spe-
cialinstans av en mer allmän observation, nämligen den att kunskap 
om en trosföreställnings tillkomsthistoria kan komma att påverka hur 
vi ser på trosföreställningens grad av rättfärdigande. Betrakta följande 
två olika upprinnelser till en trosföreställning: 
A: Ingrid kom fram till att det är 43 studenter närvarande genom 
att dra en lott från en urna med siffror från noll till 100. 
B: Britt-Marie kom fram till att det är 24 studenter närvarande ge-
nom att noggrant räkna alla i seminarierummet.261 
 
261 Exemplet kommer från Sober 2018, sidan 211. 
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Det är tydligt att Ingrid kommit fram till sin övertygelse på ett sätt som 
är otillförlitligt. Det finns inga skäl att tro att sanningen om hur många 
som befinner sig i seminarierummet har någon relation till vilken siffra 
som dras från urnan. Det skulle kunna vara så att man råkar dra rätt 
siffra, men denna metod för att avgöra antalet närvarande leder inte 
till rättfärdigade övertygelser, inte ens när de råkar vara sanna.  
Någonting liknande detta har kommit att riktas mot olika etiska 
övertygelser, med verktyg från psykologisk vetenskap. Till förslagen 
hör att vissa eller alla etiska övertygelser är otillförlitliga för att de här-
rör från regioner av hjärnan som producerar emotionella responser, eller 
för att det har haft ett överlevnadsvärde att vara benägen att hysa sådana 
etiska övertygelser, eller för att de liknar det slags förenklade och ibland 
felaktiga tumregler som vi omedvetet applicerar för att förstå oss på 
sannolikheter och rationalitet och så vidare. I den moralfilosofiska dis-
kussionen har dessa så kallade undermineringsstrategier (debunking 
strategies) blivit ett populärt och hett omdiskuterat delområde. I av-
handlingen undersöker jag flera sådana strategier relaterade till oenig-
heten mellan utilitarister och försvarare av deontologisk etik. 
Den konfrontation med psykologisk forskning som dygdetiken ut-
satts för är delvis av annat slag. Utmaningen här är inte främst att stö-
det för dygdetik skulle härröra ur psykologiska processer som leder 
till otillförlitliga övertygelser, även om detta är en tillkommande 
aspekt hos debatten. Den centrala utmaningen mot dygdetiken är sna-
rare att den bygger på vissa antaganden om mänskligt beteende som 
har kommit att ifrågasättas av socialpsykologisk forskning. Denna ut-
maning formuleras och diskuteras i avhandlingens kapitel 4.  
Kapitel 1 
Har människan en medfödd moral? Som alltid börjar svaret med kon-
staterandet ”det beror på vad man menar”. Ibland tolkas frågan som 
om vi av naturen är snälla och samarbetsinriktade snarare än våld-
samma och egoistiska. Men i kapitlet argumenterar jag för att frågan 
bör preciseras till: är vår benägenhet att tänka i moraliska termer och 
fälla moraliska omdömen en evolutionärt skapad anpassning eller är 
det en sidoeffekt av att vi kan tänka, känna, tala osv? Det ligger i sa-
kens natur att frågan inte kan ges ett definitivt svar, men jag argumen-
terar för att vår moraliserande tendens sannolikt är en specifik anpass-
ning och inte bara vilken sidoeffekt som helst, likt sparkcykelåkning 
eller zappande framför teven. Att vi kan göra sådana saker beror för-
stås också på hur evolutionen har format oss, men den har inte format 
oss så för att det var gynnsamt att kunna göra dem. 
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Flera slags evidens kan åberopas för moraliskt tänkande som en 
evolutionär anpassning. Förmågan att tänka i moraliska termer är till 
exempel en viktig signal till andra att man är en pålitlig samarbets-
partner. Moraliska övertygelser hjälper individen att skjuta upp belö-
ningar eller avstå avhopp från samarbeten som ger utdelning på 
längre sikt genom att upplevas som en auktoritativ och extern källa till 
motivation. 
Det är påfallande hur snabbt moraliskt tänkande går. Det är nästan 
som observationer: man tycker sig direkt se vad som är rätt eller fel. 
Samtidigt visar forskning att människor kan ha väldigt svårt att un-
derbygga sina moraliska bedömningar med skäl – trots att de själva 
upplever sig göra bedömningen i kraft av vissa skäl. Detta liknar lite 
grann hur kompetenta talare av ett språk vet vad som är rätt form eller 
uttryck men inte kan formulera de grammatiska regler som förklarar 
varför. Denna analogi mellan språk och moral har visat sig vara en 
fruktbar ansats och är i debatten känd som ”universal moral gram-
mar”. Tanken är att vårt moraliska tänkande följer en viss grundläg-
gande struktur som är biologiskt grundad och därför gemensam för 
alla kulturer även om den kan fyllas på med vissa variationer beroende 
på de mer specifika omständigheterna. Men i denna ”grammatik” 
kommer vi överallt finna vissa regler kring och emotionella responser 
inför till exempel bruk av våld.  
Tanken att moralen är medfödd i den mening som här preciseras 
får ses som ett pågående forskningsprogram, där filosofi, antropologi, 
psykologi, evolutionsforskning, arkeologi och så vidare ger viktiga bi-
drag till en ännu oavslutad diskussion. Även om mycket förblir osä-
kert tror jag vi med ganska stor säkerhet kan slå fast några saker som 
kommer visa sig av intresse i kommande kapitel:  
1) vi har en uppsättning medfödda emotionella reaktioner som 
får oss att tycka att vissa moraliska omdömen är rimligare än 
andra, och 
2) vi saknar ofta medveten tillgång till de principer och skäl som 
kan tänkas rättfärdiga dessa omdömen, vilken gör oss sårbara 
för självbedrägeri och rationaliseringar. 
Kapitel 2 
Här får vi börja med att förklara tre versioner av ett tankeexperiment 
som har kommit att inta en central plats i diskussionen. På engelska 
går de under namnet ”the trolley dilemmas”, så vi kan väl kalla dem 
för spårvagnsdilemmana. De tre versionerna kan formuleras så här: 
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Växeln 
En förlupen spårvagn skenar fram i hög hastighet. Om den får fort-
sätta sin färd kommer den att köra över och döda fem människor 
som befinner sig längre fram på spåret. Det enda sättet att rädda dem 
är att växla om vagnen till ett annat spår. Längre fram på det spåret 
står dock en ensam människa som då dödas av vagnen. Är det mora-
liskt acceptabelt att växla om vagnen? 
Knuffen 
En förlupen spårvagn skenar fram i hög hastighet. Om den får fort-
sätta sin färd kommer den att köra över och döda fem människor 
som befinner sig längre fram på spåret. En betraktare på en gångbro 
mellan den framrusande vagnen och de fem människorna överväger 
att hoppa framför spårvagnen för att rädda de andra. Men han inser 
att han väger för lite, och att hans offer skulle vara meningslöst. Bred-
vid honom står däremot en mycket storväxt individ. Det enda sättet 
att rädda människorna på spåret är att knuffa ned den storväxta in-
dividen från bron och framför tåget. Den individen kommer då att 
dö, men hans kropp är tillräckligt tung för att tåget ska stoppas. Är 
det moraliskt acceptabelt att knuffa ned den storväxta främ-
lingen framför tåget?  
Öglespåret 
En förlupen spårvagn skenar fram i hög hastighet. Om den får fort-
sätta sin färd kommer den att köra över och döda fem människor 
som befinner sig längre fram på spåret. Det enda sättet att rädda dem 
är att växla om vagnen till ett annat spår. Detta spår går i en cirkel 
och ansluter sedan återigen till huvudspåret strax framför gruppen 
av människor. På öglan står en storväxt främling som är tung nog att 
stoppa spårvagnen men inte tillräckligt tung för att själv överleva 
kollisionen. Är det moraliskt acceptabelt att växla om vagnen? 
De flesta människor bedömer att det är moraliskt försvarligt att växla 
om spårvagnen i det första fallet, men att det däremot inte är moraliskt 
försvarligt att knuffa främlingen i det andra. Varför denna skillnad, 
fallen liknar ju varandra däri att man för att rädda fem behöver orsaka 
ens död? Ett tänkbart svar är att den enskildes död i det första fallet är 
en oavsedd sidoeffekt av att man räddar de fem från att krossas av spår-
vagnen. Naturligtvis skulle man helst vilja att stickspåret var tomt. 
Den som däremot knuffar någon framför en spårvagn för att rädda li-
vet på andra använder denna människa som ett slags instrument, en 
tyngd, vars död gynnar andra människor. Även om utilitarismen na-
turligtvis säger att vi ska handla så att så många som möjligt överlever 
i fall som dessa, kan det tyckas att vi har en godtagbar skillnad mellan 
fallen som deontologen kan peka på: det är inte bara det totala utfallet 
som har moralisk betydelse, vilken sorts handling agenten utför har 
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också betydelse. Och det är, säger deontologen, en moraliskt relevant 
skillnad mellan att rädda fem även om man förutser att en dör som en 
olycklig bieffekt, å ena sidan, och att, å den andra, avsiktligen döda en 
person som ett medel för att rädda andra. Denna sorts konflikt mellan 
utilitarismens rekommendationer och deontologisk etik är typisk och 
välbekant. 
Med introduktionen av öglespårsdilemmat blir läget lite mer kom-
plicerat. En vanlig bedömning är att det är försvarligt att växla om 
spårvagnen till öglan där den storväxta främlingen står, åtminstone 
mer försvarligt än att knuffa personen från gångbron. Samtidigt verkar 
de principer som talade för att knuffen var oförsvarlig också tala för 
att det är fel att ingripa här. Främlingen på spåret dödas också avsikt-
ligen, eftersom kollisionen med honom är en förutsättning för att 
rädda gruppen längre fram på spåret. 
Kanske kan man försöka revidera försvaret av den moraliskt rele-
vanta skillnaden mellan Växeln och Knuffen på ett sådant sätt att Ögle-
spåret ges samma lösning som Växeln, trots att den har vissa grundläg-
gande likheter med Knuffen. Men att det har visat sig så svårt att på ett 
redigt sätt ge ett moralfilosofiskt överblickbar berättigande av männi-
skors spontana bedömningar är också intressant från psykologisk syn-
punkt: hur lever människor med dessa spretiga bedömningar, och hur 
uppkommer de? 
Denna fråga blev startskottet för en serie studier av de psykologiska 
processer som ligger till grund för människors moraliska omdömen. 
Filosofidoktoranden, sedermera psykologiprofessorn, Joshua Greene 
formulerade misstanken att orsaken till att de tre spårvagnsfallen be-
döms olika inte har så mycket att göra med subtila moralfilosofiska 
distinktioner utan snarare förklaras av att de olika beskrivningarna ger 
upphov till starkare eller svagare emotionella reaktioner hos oss. Mer 
specifikt ville han skilja så kallade personliga från opersonliga dilemman 
åt. Opersonliga dilemman kan handla om att välja mellan olika män-
niskors död och överlevnad, men agenten behöver inte bruka våld för 
att åstadkomma något av utfallen. Personliga dilemman, å andra si-
dan, rymmer ett alternativ som i någon mening leder till ett bättre slut-
tillstånd (fler överlevande till exempel) men där agenten behöver 
bruka våld för att uppnå detta utfall.  
Greene och hans forskargrupp använde en så kallad fMRI-kamera 
för att studera hjärnaktiviteten hon människor som tog ställning till 
olika slags beslut, inklusive moraliska dilemman av både opersonligt 
och personligt snitt. Fyra förutsägelser formulerades inför studien: 
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1) De områden i hjärnan som är dokumenterat förknippade med pro-
ducerande av känslor kommer att vara mer aktiverade när vi konfron-
teras med ”personliga moraliska dilemman” och i mindre grad aktive-
rade när vi konfronteras med ”opersonliga moraliska dilemman”; 
2) En majoritet kommer att bedöma att personliga överträdelser inte är 
acceptabla även om de skulle ge totalt sett bättre konsekvenser. 3) En 
majoritet kommer att bedöma att opersonliga överträdelser är accep-
tabla om de totalt sett ger bättre konsekvenser. 4) Den minoritet som 
anser att personliga överträdelser är moraliskt acceptabla om de är 
nödvändiga för att konsekvenserna totalt sett ska bli de bästa kommer 
att behöva längre tid på sig jämfört med majoriteten.  
Förutsägelserna slog alla in. I kombination med många andra slags 
forskningsfynd har Greene argumenterat för att mänsklig psykologi i 
allmänhet, och moraliskt beslutsfattande i synnerhet, rymmer två slags 
mentala processer. En av dessa processer är explicit, reflekterande, 
språklig och någonting som sker medvetet. En annan del är mer auto-
matisk, ofta omedveten, och inte sällan förankrad i emotionella pro-
cesser och responser. Den förra processen är ofta tidskrävande men 
medger flexibilitet och nyansrikedom, medan den senare är snabb och 
tillfredsställande för de flesta kontexter.  
Greene liknar denna tudelning med inställningsalternativen på en 
modern systemkamera, där användaren kan välja på manuellt läge 
(som kräver kompetens och tar tid men medger specifika lösningar för 
specifika ändamål) och ett automatiskt läge där användaren snabbt 
kan ta bra bilder som bygger på att kamerans programmering själv 
avgör vilka inställningar som passar bäst. Greenes position är att det 
manuella läget – ”förnuftets röst” – är benägen att rekommendera uti-
litaristiska lösningar på moraliska dilemman, så länge de är operson-
liga. När dilemman i stället är personliga blir responsen mer emotion-
ell, och vi har en stark känsla att det inte kan vara rätt att utföra en viss 
våldsam handling även om ändamålet är att rädda så många som möj-
ligt. Detta trots att även opersonliga dilemman kan innebära att någon 
dör, eller mer allmänt att de totala utfallen är likvärdiga. Greene menar 
att denna uppkomsthistoria borde underminera vår tilltro till deonto-
logiska omdömen, eller åtminstone att sådana omdömen inte med fog 
kan användas för att kritisera utilitarismen. 
Det finns mycket att säga om fMRI och mer allmänt om denna dub-
belprocessteori om det mänskliga psyket. För våra filosofiska syften 
kan man formulera kärnan i Greenes kritik av deontologisk etik enligt 
följande: 
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I. En viktig grupp deontologiska omdömen orsakas av emotion-
ella processer som svarar på omständigheter som gör ett di-
lemma personligt snarare än opersonligt. 
II. De omständigheter som gör ett dilemma personligt snarare än 
opersonligt är moraliskt irrelevanta. 
III. En viktig grupp deontologiska omdömen orsakas av emotion-
ella processer som svarar på omständigheter som är moraliskt 
irrelevanta. 
IV. Deontologisk kritik av konsekventialistiska etiska teorier som 
åberopar omdömen som svarar på moraliskt irrelevanta om-
ständigheter kan ges låg eller ingen vikt i diskussioner om ut-
ilitarismens rimlighet. 
Tanken är alltså att utilitarismen får ett slags indirekt stöd av denna 
forskning, däri att en typ av vanliga argument mot utilitarismen inte 
bör ges den tyngd som de ibland ges. Jag försvarar i stora drag denna 
syn, men pekar också på sätt som deontologiska positioner kan försöka 
bemöta kritiken, bland annat genom att tydligare ange vilka omdömen 
som en deontologisk teori närmare bestämt kan tänkas ge inför fall 
som dessa. 
Kapitel 3 
En del av den utmaning som presenteras mot deontologisk etik i kapi-
tel 3 vilar på antagandet att evolutionen har fått oss att reagera star-
kare, mer emotionellt, på vissa slags moraliska situationer, nämligen 
sådana som inbegriper personligt våld. Mer allmänt kan man kanske 
förvänta sig att evolutionen format vår moralpsykologi med fokus på 
”den lilla världen”. Mellanmänskliga relationer, snarare än folkhälsa 
eller brottsprevention alltså. Denna insikt kan få oss att se mer kritiskt 
på vissa till synes självklara etiska uppfattningar: vi tror på dem därför 
att det har varit gynnsamt att vara så funtad, inte för att de är sanna. 
Här kan man tacksamt kontrastera med vår perceptionsapparat. 
Denna är ju inte perfekt, men överlag är det svårt att förstå hur till ex-
empel syn och hörsel skulle ha varit evolutionärt gynnsamma för-
mågor om de inte hjälpte oss att upptäcka världen ungefär så som den 
är. När jag ser en tekopp framför mig är den bästa förklaringen till 
denna observation att det verkligen står en kopp där som orsakar 
dessa förnimmelser i mig. När det gäller moraliska övertygelser verkar 
vi inte på samma sätt behöva anta existensen av moraliska fakta som 
upprinnelse till övertygelserna.  
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Såna här tankegångar leder i skeptisk riktning, och filosofer som 
Sharon Street och Richard Joyce har utvecklat olika resonemang om 
hur evolutionspsykologiska rön underminerar anspråk på moraliska 
fakta eller andra antaganden förknippade med moralisk realism. Men 
kanske träffar denna evolutionära underminering vissa etiska uppfatt-
ningar mer än andra? I detta kapitel undersöker jag förslaget att utilit-
arismen är bättre rustad än andra etiska teorier att motstå försök till så 
kallad evolutionär underminering. Grundtanken kan sägas vara att ef-
tersom utilitarismen bygger på en så krävande och oegennyttig ut-
gångspunkt är det svårt att se hur evolutionen kunde ha gynnat att 
människor anammar den. Tvärtom borde det ha haft lågt överlevnads-
värde att gå omkring och tänka att främlingars väl och ve betyder lika 
mycket som mitt eget och bör maximeras opartiskt. Just för att det är 
en så altruistisk tanke finns det hopp om att vi accepterar den för att 
den verkligen är sann snarare än för att vi gynnas av att tro att den är 
sann.  
Att en etisk teori inte kan undermineras evolutionärt är ju så klart 
inte ensamt ett tecken på att den är en rimlig eller sann teori. I kapitlet 
diskuteras förslaget från Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek och Peter Singer 
att utilitarismen bygger på antaganden som är självevidenta, vilket 
bland annat innebär att deras sanning är någonting som vi kan inse 
med förnuftet. Dessa axiomatiska utgångspunkter kommer från 
Henry Sidgwick och lyder:  
U: En enskild individs goda är, från universums synpunkt, inte av 
större betydelse än någon annan individs goda.  
R: Som rationell individ är jag ålagd att sikta mot det goda gene-
rellt, i den mån jag kan påverka saken, inte enbart mot en en-
skild del av det. 
Tanken är alltså att från ett opartiskt perspektiv är vars och ens väl lika 
värdefullt, varken mer eller mindre. För mig kanske mitt väl är mer 
värdefullt, men så är det alltså inte ”från universums synpunkt”. Nästa 
steg är att rationaliteten fordrar att vi har det allmänna goda som än-
damål, inte just vårt individuella goda. Att välja ut en del av det goda 
– mitt väl – är irrationellt på samma sätt som det är irrationellt att bry 
sig om vissa ögonblick mer än andra inom det egna livet. Att diskontera 
betydelsen av framtida lidande för att kunna njuta idag är ju själva 
sinnebilden för oförnuftigt handlande. 
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I kapitlet uttrycker jag skepsis mot flera delar av detta förslag. Dels 
kritiserar jag själva utgångspunkten att en etisk uppfattning kan vara 
självevident. Jag förespråkar en mer holistisk syn på rättfärdigande, 
enligt vilken ingen enskild uppfattning har status av axiom utan varje 
del i systemet motiveras med utgångspunkt i hur väl den passar in i 
och bidrar till helheten. Men även om vi för argumentationens skull 
accepterar denna utgångspunkt, kan man kritisera det specifika försla-
get att Sidgwicks principer och den utilitarism som de motiverar mot-
står evolutionär underminering. Ett problem i dessa debatter är att 
man kan tänka sig en evolutionär tillkomsthistoria för i stort sett vilka 
dispositioner som helst. Även utilitaristiska.  
Kapitel 4 
Skulle du ha varit en av dem som lytt order om du levt i Nazityskland, 
eller skulle du kanske har gjort motstånd och tagit stora risker för att 
hjälpa andra? Varför agerar människor så olika? Är vissa mer empa-
tiska och hjälpsamma och mer andra självupptagna och fega? Att det 
är på det viset förefaller självklart, men en betydelsefull forsknings-
inriktning inom socialpsykologin kan tyckas ge stöd för tanken att 
människors handlande inte alls förklaras av individuella karaktärs-
egenskaper som dem ovan utan långt mer av egenskaperna hos den 
situation som de agerar inom. Även om jag gärna vill tro om mig själv 
att jag är empatisk och modig så är nog sanningen den att jag hade 
varit en av dem som lydde order i Nazityskland om jag hade levt då. 
Det gjorde de flesta, och jag har ingen särskild grund för att tro att jag 
är annorlunda. Jag har haft tur som inte prövats så drastiskt.  
Nazityskland var en extrem tid, men kanske kan denna blinda lyd-
nad frambringas även i modern tid, i ett demokratiskt samhälle med 
individuell frihet att säga nej? Psykologen Stanley Milgram ville testa 
sin misstanke att de flesta av oss skulle lyda en auktoritetsfigur, trots 
att inget straff väntar för olydnad, att på given order bestraffa en an-
nan människa, och i en serie sinnrika och omskakande experiment fick 
han vanliga, genomsnittliga människor att utdela vad de trodde var 
extremt smärtsamma eller rent av dödliga elektriska stötar till en för-
söksperson som misslyckades med att lära sig några glosor. 
Milgrams och en hel rad andra studier gav stöd åt en situationistisk 
syn på mänskligt beteende. En sådan syn verkar vara ett hot mot etiska 
teorier som fokuserar på att utvärdera handlingar och människor i ter-
mer av hur dygdiga de är. Den situationistiska utmaningen mot dygd-
etik kunde formuleras så här: 
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1) Om mänskligt beteende till största delen förklaras av indivi-
ders robusta personlighetsdrag så skulle noggranna studier 
finna stor samstämmighet i individens handlande över tid och 
mellan olika men relevant likartade situationer.  
2) Noggranna studier finner ingen sådan samstämmighet. 
3) Alltså: mänskligt beteende förklaras inte till största delen av in-
dividers robusta personlighetsdrag 
Ett tag såg denna kritik av karaktärsdrag och dygder ut att utgöra ett 
allvarligt hot mot dygdetiken. Men i kapitlet försöker jag erbjuda flera 
olika svarsstrategier. En del av svaret handlar om att moderera ambi-
tionsnivån, och en del är mer inomvetenskaplig och fokuserar på den 
stora mängd forskning som trots allt visar att det finns stora individu-
ella skillnader mellan människor. Situationen är mindre avgörande än 
vad de allra mest hotande formuleringarna av situationism gjorde gäl-
lande. En del av den ”hjälp” jag erbjuder kanske ses av dygdetiker som 
björntjänster. Mitt försvar för biologiskt grundade skillnader i person-
lighetsegenskaper föder nämligen nya problem: hur kan man blir mer 
dygdig, och hur kan en människa vara ansvarig för sin karaktär om 
mycket av förutsättningarna är biologiskt givna? Jag erbjuder några 
svarsstrategier, bland annat den att dygder inte har någon direkt mot-
svarighet i modern personlighetsforskning utan måste ses som kom-
positer av flera olika personlighetsdrag, vilket kan öppna för möjlig-
heten att dygder är förändringsbara och inom individens kontroll. 
Avslutning 
När psykologiska eller andra empiriska rön når filosofin finns ofta en 
förhoppning att vi nu äntligen kan bilägga dessa gamla debatter med 
hjälp av ”riktig vetenskap”. Men debattlandskapet framträder strax i 
ny skepnad, upplyst och förändrat men inte utplånat. Hur frustre-
rande det än är så får vi nog inse att det finns ett knippe filosofiska 
frågor som aldrig helt kan lösas av vetenskaperna. Likväl har de olika 
konfrontationer med tillgänglig empiri som jag har presenterat och ut-
värderat bidragit till att utveckla och bättre formulera, omvärdera och 
revidera filosofiska positioner. Min initiala målsättning med avhand-
lingen var att visa att utilitarismen skulle komma ut på andra sidan 
dessa konfrontationer mindre skadskjuten är konkurrenterna. Under 
arbetets gång har jag släppt den ambitionen något och intar istället en 
mer agnostisk hållning, både till utilitarismen och till styrkan i de olika 
undermineringsstrategier som formulerats mot deontologisk etik och 
dygdetik.
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